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 Since 1999, Jordan has experimented with various forms of privatization and 
corporatization reforms in Amman’s municipal water services and the national water 
sector. The goal of these reforms, it is argued, is to improve water management 
conditions in light of its stark lack of domestic water and energy resources and ongoing 
political and economic impacts of regional wars and conflicts. The reforms, however, 
experienced numerous setbacks. This dissertation seeks to understand why the 
privatization process has struggled and the effects it has generated. Privatization reforms 
come after nearly fifty years of World Bank and USAID sponsored water sector 
development projects in Amman specifically, and Jordan more generally. These projects 
were part and parcel of Jordan’s state building processes and modernization of municipal 
and national water services.  
The overall claim in this dissertation is that these state building and modernization 
processes created institutional and political constraints, which have become endemic to, 
and evolved with, water sector operations and reforms. Four sub-claims are offered. First, 
advocates of privatization and corporatization depict water sector crises through 
economic and engineering frameworks, which neglect considerations of political and 
institutional dynamics. Second, contemporary water crises are strongly influenced by the 
history of water sector development and state building processes, on the one hand, and 
the imbricated evolution of municipal and national water policies and institutions on the 
other. These processes resulted in political and institutional constraints that have become 
part and parcel of the water sector’s operational dynamics and continued transformation. 
Third, corporatization reforms have been shaped by these institutional and political 
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contexts, while also introducing new constraints that further change the dynamics of the 
water sector. Last, reform programs and the design of municipal water services shape 
household experiences, while their opinion of reform processes remains critical for 
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Chapter 1 Institutional and Political Constraints in Water Management 
Introduction 
 Privatization initiatives in municipal water services have been a key topic of 
debate within international development and academic circles (see Harris, Goldin, and 
Sneddon 2013). Privatization programs have been diversely implemented in various 
economic, social, political, and economic contexts, especially in the global South, and 
produced mixed results (Bakker 2010; Budds and McGranahan 2003). Mainstream 
proponents of privatization programs argue that public sector management has failed due 
to poor budget management, ineffective oversight and expansion of municipal water 
services, and mismanagement within the institutions and of water resources (World Bank 
2004; World Bank 1993). Critical scholars, on the other hand, argue that privatization 
initiatives introduce profit and cost-recovery frameworks that fail to improve water 
services and often negatively affect access to water in low-income communities (Bakker 
2010; Swyngedouw 2005). More recently, academics have noted that privatization has 
increasingly fallen out of favor among mainstream development networks (de Gouvello 
and Scott 2012) and that the failures in public and private management regimes have 
much in common (Bakker 2013; Bakker 2010).  
Though the literature on privatization in municipal water services is extensive, 
there has been limited research on how constraints to municipal water services shape 
outcomes of reform initiatives. Understanding the dynamics, or failures, of reforms 
requires attention to how constraints are represented, produced, and evolve over time. 
Critical academic scholarship on scientific representation and modernization (Linton 
2010; Mitchell 2002; Scott 1998), state building processes in the water sector (Haines 
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2010; Baker 2005; Lansing 1991) and urban water governance scholarship addressing the 
social and economic power over urbanization processes (Dill and Crow 2014; Gandy 
2006; Kaika 2005; Swyngedouw 2004) can help close this gap. This dissertation draws 
on these three general bodies of literature, alongside key research on dynamics of 
privatization and their impacts on households (Harris, Goldin, and Sneddon 2013; Bakker 
2010) in order to better understand how the failures of privatization reforms are related 
to, or shaped by, past water sector development initiatives. In particular, the dissertation 
frames municipal water management failures in the public and privatization eras through 
the ongoing evolution of municipal and national water services. The case of Amman, 
Jordan is a useful example for addressing this gap in academic literature.  
Mainstream academics and policymakers advocating for privatization claim that 
the Amman’s municipal and Jordan’s water sector challenges stem from extensive water 
scarcity, rapidly growing population, and mismanagement and institutional overlap, 
which has led to rapidly depleting supplies and excessive fiscal deficits. Mainstream 
perspectives frame these constraints through engineering failures and poor economic 
governance. This research attempts to reframe the debates around Jordan’s water crises 
by focusing on the ways that political and institutional constraints have been produced, 
transformed, and reinforced through the implementation of water sector development 
projects throughout the history of Amman’s municipal water services and Jordan’s water 
sector. This dissertation thus examines the following overall question: how have fifty 
years of municipal and national water sector development affected municipal and 
national water management and reform processes?  
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Amman’s municipal water services have been strongly shaped by state building 
initiatives and international donors financing the development and expansion of water 
sector infrastructure in ways that created and cemented both institutional and political 
constraints to water management. Many of these constraints carried into, and evolved 
with, the privatization initiatives, and ultimately influenced project outcomes in negative 
ways. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of critical academic scholarship on urban water 
governance in Amman and Jordan specifically, and Middle Eastern cities more generally. 
Academic literature on Amman’s municipal water services have focused on the dynamics 
of expansion of water distribution, forms of water access, and inequalities in consumption 
(Darmame and Potter 2011; Potter and Darmame 2010; Gerlach and Franceys 2009; 
Potter et al. 2009). This scholarship, however, has not examined these issues within the 
context of national water management policies or constraints to the national and 
municipal water sectors.  
Misrepresenting these constraints as symptoms of management failures rather 
than an endemic characteristic of the municipal and national water services can shape 
perceived planning options, like privatization, capacity for reform, and ultimately the 
outcomes of water sector development projects. As such, this dissertation argues that it is 
important to understand how institutional and political constraints are produced in, and 
change, national and municipal water management. Institutional and political constraints 
are strongly related, if not mutually reinforcing. Institutional constraints reflect the 
various factors that affect the financial, policy, legal, and decision-making processes. For 
example, how do legally defined institutional responsibilities compare to realities of 
operational dynamics? Similarly, how do operational expenditures, capital investments, 
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sources of water loss and revenue, and donor financing, interest, and conditions 
collectively interact to shape a water sector’s financial flexibility? Political constraints 
represent the influence expressed by appointed officials or the ways that regime security, 
geopolitical interests, or public opinion shape decision-making processes and outcomes. 
The institutional and political constraints produced early in the state formation process 
have evolved with the implementation of water sector development and reform projects, 
and in turn shaped the outcomes of these projects in both the modernization and 
privatization eras.  
The argument in this dissertation is developed in four ways. First, the dissertation 
evaluates mainstream and academic discussions about Amman’s municipal water crises 
and reframes these debates within the political and institutional constraints affecting the 
municipal and national sectors. Second, the dissertation situates these institutional and 
political constraints within the history of state formation and institutional development of 
Amman’s municipal water services and Jordan’s national water sector. Third, the 
dissertation highlights how the political and institutional constraints have carried into the 
dynamics of the privatization reforms implemented since 1999. Last, the dissertation 
explores household experiences with municipal water services in order to reveal how 
these constraints affect access and consumption. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of mainstream perspectives on water 
management crises and advocacy of privatization. It synthesizes academic critiques of 
privatization initiatives with research on state and urban development, management, and 
governance. Further, it provides a short note on the methods used and outlines the nature 
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of the research conducted in Amman, Jordan. Finally, this chapter provides an overview 
of the four empirical chapters and the concluding remarks. 
 
Mainstream Perspectives on Water Management Crises and Privatization 
Since the early 1990s, the World Bank has advocated for the privatization of 
municipal and national water sectors and greater incorporation of demand management in 
order to alleviate the rapid decline and degradation of water resources and improve 
management practices in institutions in order to equitably expand services and achieve 
cost recovery (World Bank 2004; World Bank 1993). Without reform, the World Bank 
argued, public health crises, depleted groundwater reservoirs, and irreversible damage to 
surface water resources will continue unabated. In response to these crises, analysts have 
conceptualized “soft alternatives” to “hard path” engineering solutions and developed 
new methods of calculation and management frameworks to better monitor the intricate 
relationship between water and ecosystem services, public health and economic 
development (Gleick, Chalecki, and Wong 2002). These analytical frameworks serve two 
related purposes: 1) delineating the nature of urban water crises and 2) providing 
evidence for why privatization is necessary. Collectively, they frame the nature of urban 
water management crises and facilitate the potential for particular types of reforms. This 
framing, however, ignores how political and institutional constraints affect the water 






Water Scarcity Indices and Analytical Frameworks 
Fundamental to understanding support for privatization and demand management 
are the analytical frameworks that frame the urban water crises. One of the principal 
claims of privatization is that market practices can help restore severely depleted water 
resources and improve institutional governance. A key source of evidence used by 
privatization advocates is baseline indices of water availability and per capita stocks. The 
most prominent of these is the Water Scarcity Index (WSI), which measures and 
categorizes water availability per capita into three blocks: 1) water stress – 1,000 cubic 
meters to 1,700 cubic meters of freshwater per capita, 2) water scarcity – 500 cubic 
meters to 1,000 cubic meters, and 3) severe water scarcity – less than 500 cubic meters of 
freshwater per capita (Falkenmark 1989). Ohlsson’s (2000) Social Water Scarcity Index 
(SWSI) elaborates on the WSI by incorporating the UNDP’s Human Development Index 
as a proxy measure of adaptive capacity related to economic, technological, and political 
variables for sustainable use of water and equitable distribution (Ohlsson 2000; 
Rijsberman 2006).  
A number of institutions and researchers have developed similar indices. 
Examples include the Basic Human Needs Index, Water Resources Vulnerability Index, 
Index of Relative Water Scarcity, Index of Human Security, Human Development Index, 
and the Water Poverty Index (Gleick, Chalecki, and Wong 2002). For example, the Basic 
Human Needs Index recommends 40 to 50 liters per day per person for drinking, 
cooking, and sanitation—a quantity that has not yet been universally met. Similarly, the 
Water Poverty Index measures household and community access to potable water 
resources (Sullivan 2002; Sullivan, Meigh, and Giacomello 2003) based on the 
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International Water Management Institute’s (IWMI) definition of economic water 
scarcity, which describes the availability of water resources in relation to investment 
capacity and infrastructural development (see Rijsberman 2006). Such indices are utilized 
as evidence for the argument that new forms of market based management and resource 
governance can reverse the decline and degradation of water resources and increase per 
capita availability.  
There are several problems with such indices. First, such indices are highly 
sensitive to sudden fluctuations in numbers. For example, Jordan is often referred to as 
being among the ten most water scarce countries in the world according to the 
Falkenmark Index. In 2014 Jordan’s ranking jumped to the second most water scarce 
country in the world due to the significant increase of Syrian refugees (Namrouqa 2014). 
With respect to the Water Scarcity Index, the increase in Syrian refugees translated into 
an overall increase in demand. The index, however, ignores varying water use practices 
across socio-economic classes and water allocations between different sectors of the 
economy.  
Second, such indices are often plagued by the lack of consistency in data 
measurements and data sharing. Information about water resources is often considered a 
matter of state security and is not readily available for researchers or development 
institutions. Related, water officials do not always effectively or consistently measure 
water consumption or available resources. For example, the Water Authority of Jordan is 
unable to provide production and consumption trends from the last fifty years due to poor 
monitoring practices and the failure to maintain reliable water meters for government 
wells and springs throughout the country. This results in significant estimation of water 
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production values and non-revenue water loss. Lastly, the indices fail to reflect scale and 
geography, particularly the regional distribution of water and the type of water available 
in different locations. In the case of Jordan, water is not equally distributed between the 
northern, central, and southern governorates, forcing authorities to rely on a major bulk 
water distribution system to provide for major demand centers. The indices do not reflect 
the distribution of water throughout the country and the bulk water delivery system.  
This latter point is among the most prominent critiques leveraged in mainstream 
circles where it is argued that baseline indices privilege surface and groundwater 
resources over water embedded in soils and vegetation and the reuse of treated 
wastewater. This generates a scientifically flawed characterization of water availability 
and thus skews policy and development plans. Allan (2002) argues that it is essential to 
account for other forms of water when calculating resource stocks. For example, water 
utilized in agricultural production, such as soil moisture, is as fundamental to crop 
production as direct watering practices. He differentiates between blue water, which 
refers to surface and groundwater resources, and green water, defined as the water 
embedded in soil profiles and vegetation. Haddadin (2006) adds “shadow water” to this 
list, or water lost to evapotranspiration. Most scientific studies of water scarcity dismiss 
“green water” and “shadow water” despite their significant influence on agriculture and 
water deficits. The concept of “virtual water” attempts to redress the limitations in 
existing water scarcity studies by calculating comparative advantage in use of “blue” and 
“green water” in commodity production (Allan 2002).  
Allan (2006) also distinguishes between “big water” and “small water” scarcity. 
“Big water” scarcity refers to the negative effects on agriculture and food production 
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when water supplies are limited due to depleted surface and groundwater resources. 
“Small water” scarcity characterizes the challenges in allocating scarce water resources 
for cities and industry. For Allan (2006), the key to effective use of scarce water supplies 
is to diversify economies away from water intensive activities by importing these 
commodities, including food, which can free surface and groundwater resources for 
immediate societal and industrial needs. The problem remains, however, that food 
policies are often enmeshed in geopolitical relations across nation-states. Agricultural 
production in general is highly politicized component of most economies (Johnston et al. 
2010) in addition to the fact that it is difficult to adequately measure “virtual” or 
“shadow” water (Mahayni 2013a). 
Perhaps more worrisome than the debates over how to calculate water scarcity is 
the lack of attention to water quality issues due to the widespread implications for public 
health, livelihoods, and ecosystem services (Biswas and Tortajada 2011; see also 
UNESCO 2009; UNESCO 2006; UNESCO 2003). Policy makers, planners, and public 
health experts stress that poor water quality intensifies public health crises in the global 
South, particularly in urban areas. According to the UN World Water Development 
Report (UNESCO 2009), one to two million people, 90% of whom are children, die each 
year from preventable diseases caused by contaminated water, limited access to 
sanitation, and poor hygienic conditions. In many of these communities, structural 
barriers such as inadequate housing, subpar sanitation, and limited livelihood 
opportunities constrain their options for water access and use. Development organizations 
seeking to address public health issues involving water access risk reinforcing the crises 
or marginalizing groups within communities who do not have access to power or 
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influence if local community dynamics or the nature of water availability are not 
adequately understood (Sultana 2009).  
The number of variables that must be accounted for in urban water systems 
necessitates intricate and complex managerial frameworks and concepts. A number of 
these have been developed in recent years, including integrated water resources 
management (IWRM), water security, governance, and resilience. Most often, these have 
been linked to economic frameworks on resource allocation and prospects for 
development. The two most common, and perhaps most important for understanding the 
widespread implementation of privatization in municipal water services, are IWRM and 
governance. In the last several years, however, as climate change dominates international 
development agendas, resilience has also become a critical topic of debate, in particular 
the role of market-based management of water resources and services. Collectively, these 
topics of debate are considered to be an alternative to more traditional, engineering-
oriented solutions. 
 
Soft Path Alternatives to Hard Approaches: IWRM, Governance, and Privatization 
Since the early 1990s, mainstream analysts have advocated for “soft” path 
approaches, including integrated water resources management and governance, instead of 
“hard path” engineering solutions. For much of the 20th century, water management was 
based on large-scale engineering projects, including the construction of dams and water 
transfer infrastructure, to increase water production capacity and economic development 
(Gleick 2003). The “hard path” approach no doubt improved economic development in 
many countries, but it also produced unanticipated social, economic, and environmental 
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problems. For example, major dams that improved irrigation capacity also generated 
irreversible damages to the ecosystems, displaced thousands of families from their 
homes, and created public health crises due to exposure to waterborne diseases (Gleick 
2003; Mitchell 2002). Similarly, new technologies and infrastructure allowed for the 
major transfer of water at low prices, facilitating industrial and agricultural development. 
Over time, however, surface and groundwater resources have shown signs of stress and 
depletion due to the unsustainable rate of water use (Gleick 2003; Swyngedouw 2007a).  
By the 1970s, the “hard path” approach demonstrated its limitations as the finite 
state of freshwater resources (Postel 1997) and significant regional disparities in water 
availability (Gleick, Chalecki, and Wong 2002) heightened concerns about unsustainable 
water use, growing demand, and rapid deterioration and depletion of freshwater 
resources. Gleick and Palaniappan (2010) draw parallels between the global water crisis 
and theories of peak oil. The theory of peak oil argues that the rate of oil production, over 
time, grows as demand increases and costs of production decline. As oil reserves decline, 
costs increase and production levels off. The subsequent decline is defined as the rate of 
production eclipsing new oil reserves.  
Water’s biophysical characteristics, however, require tweaking the peak resource 
framework. Water consumption depends on human, agricultural, and industrial demand. 
Ecosystem services also have to be factored into water consumption. Further, unlike oil, 
there are no alternatives to water. Many groundwater reservoirs, for example, are non-
renewable. Thus, while oil declines can be offset through alternative forms of renewable 
energy, water cannot be replaced. The finite amount of water resources has implications 
for human, industrial, and agricultural demand, and for ecosystem services. Rapidly 
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declining water resources, therefore, must be offset by the production of new supplies, 
higher prices, and careful allocation decisions (Gleick and Palaniappan 2010).  
In light of the fears over the state of freshwater resources, scholars and 
policymakers have called for greater demand management. This “soft path” approach to 
water management shifts the emphasis from production of new supplies to more efficient 
water distribution to meet end-user needs and well-being, economic considerations like 
water prices, and social and cultural norms (Gleick 2003). One of the fundamental 
assumptions of the “soft path” approach is consumer flexibility in water use (Wolff and 
Gleick 2002), which resonate with advocates of privatization who argue that demand 
management is a critical element of water management (Brooks 2005). This requires 
greater democratization and decentralization of water management decisions and 
institutions (Wolff and Gleick 2002), treating water as a commodity in water policy, and 
taking in account the importance of water for ecosystem services (Brooks 2005).  
The prioritization of “soft path” solutions, particularly governance and integrated 
water resources management (IWRM), has taken place alongside a greater insistence on 
market-based management. In the 1992 Dublin Statement of Water and Sustainable 
Development, water policy experts first defined water as a commodity and highlighted 
IWRM as a key priority for urban water management reforms. The Global Water 
Partnership defines IWRM as “a process which promotes coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems and the environment” (Global Water Partnership 2010). By the 2002 Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, IWRM was among the 
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leading priorities for sound and sustainable water management (United Nations 2002). 
More recently, international analysts have posited adaption as a key characteristic of 
IWRM, to cope with increasingly challenging and rapidly changing environmental and 
humanitarian contexts (UNESCO 2012a).  
A principal mechanism that makes IWRM possible is governance. Governance is 
defined as “the manner in which authority is acquired and exercised on behalf of the 
public in developing, utilizing, and protecting a nation’s water resources” (De Stefano et 
al. 2010, 2).1 According to the UNESCO World Water Development Report (UNESCO 
2012a), governance is important because “water is not only a sector, but also a necessary 
element that provides benefits for all sectors, thus requiring active consultation with, and 
coordination among, the sectors and communities that depend on it” (24). The water 
crisis in the Middle East, according to one UN report, is a crisis of governance. The 
report states,  
All water resources urgently require efficient, sustainable management. As water 
becomes scarcer, governance must ensure that all sectors agricultural, industrial, and 
municipal and users have equitable, reliable, and sustainable access to water and are 
using water efficiently…Key elements of good water governance include equity, 
transparency, accountability, environmental and economic sustainability, stakeholder 
participation and empowerment, and responsiveness to socio-economic development 
needs…the Arab region’s current political and economic transformations assist efforts to 
reform water governance, while effective water governance systems can in turn catalyze 
region-wide aspirations for overall governance reform (United Nations 2014, 1–2). 
 
                                                        
1 De Stefano et al. (2010) argue that good water governance entails the following features:  
“Transparency – information should flow freely within a society. The various processes and 
decisions should be open to scrutiny by the public; 2) Participation – all citizens, both men and 
women, should have a voice, directly or through intermediate organizations representing their 
interests, throughout water governance policy formation and decision-making; 3) Accountability 
and Integrity – Governments, the private sector, and civil society organizations should be 
accountable to the public or the interests they represent; 4) Rule of Law – Legal frameworks 
should be fair and enforced impartially; 5) Responsiveness – Institutions and processes should 




Good governance helps ensure that water is equitably and sustainably allocated between 
competing sectors and ecosystem services through decision-making processes structured 
through market mechanisms.  
Market-based management and decentralization can deliver a more reliable 
valuation of scarce water resources, help finance expensive water infrastructure, ensure 
cost-recovery, and allow for the equitable distribution between competing sectors 
(Bakker 2010; Goldman 2007; World Bank 2004; World Bank 1993). One World Bank 
report notes, 
Water resources should be managed in the context of a national water strategy that 
reflects the nation’s social, economic, and environmental objectives and is based on an 
assessment of the country’s water resources. The assessment would include a realistic 
forecast of the demand for water, based on projected population growth and economic 
development, and a consideration of options for managing demand and supply, taking 
into account existing investments and those likely to occur in the private sector. This 
strategy would spell out priorities for providing water services; establish policies on 
water rights, water pricing and cost recovery, public investment, and the role of the 
private sector in water development, and institute measures for environmental protection 
and restoration (World Bank 1993, 41). 
 
Decentralization, furthermore, is a necessary step for market-based management in order 
to reduce political influence over decision-making authorities within public institutions 
and ensure that the private sector and the public are engaged in decision-making 
processes. Decentralization and the introduction of market-based management require 
new regulatory institutions and water laws friendly to the private sector. There are many 
ways that the private sector has been, and can be, incorporated into municipal water 
management, including outright privatization, concession agreements, leasing, and 
management contracts. No matter the form, the fundamental basis of privatization 
generally is to transform municipal water services in ways that enhance cost-recovery, 
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improve the conditions of water supplies and infrastructure, and expand equitable access 
to municipal water services. 
 There are several tensions inherent to the governance and IWRM frameworks, 
particularly as they relate to privatization. First, IWRM has become a prescriptive 
recommendation. Giordano and Shah (2014)(2014) note that after the 2002 summit in 
Johannesburg, international donors have increasingly required IWRM language in project 
proposals. Second, IWRM is now treated as an end rather than a means. By treating 
IWRM as an end, analytical frameworks and definitions in IWRM plans, such as river 
basins, are often presented with clear-cut and uncontroversial, which facilitates the 
repackaging of conventional development plans through IWRM frameworks and 
reinforce the ecological and developmental status quo (Molle 2009). Biswas (2004) also 
criticizes IWRM for the failure to define integration, what it looks like, or how it should 
be implemented.  
Related, governance has also become an apolitical concept despite the fact that it 
seeks to invite more collaboration from the private sector and community groups. In 
mainstream circles, governance has been reduced to a series of indicators and best 
practices that discount the importance of context (Biswas and Tortajada 2010). Some 
cases may reflect poor governance despite significant improvements in municipal water 
management while others may be said to reflect good governance because benchmarks 
are met despite failing to improve management conditions (Biswas and Tortajada 2010). 
The ultimate irony of mainstream governance debates is that political negotiations in the 
decision-making processes are supposed to operate in depoliticized environments 
(Bakker 2010). Bakker (2010) critiques mainstream perspectives on water governance 
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because they de-politicize participation in decision-making, transparency and 
accountability. Harris, Goldin, and Sneddon (2013) argue that the insistence on de-
politicizing governance has popularized governance as a research and policy topic, 
An internet search for the word governance yields 45,300,000 hits, of which, 17,000,000 
are for ‘good governance’, a theme tightly connected to words such as democracy, 
accountability, and transparency. Indeed at several recent high-profile water meetings 
and in several publications, the water community has increasingly emphasized that the 
global water crisis is centrally a crisis of governance (3). 
 
The problem here is that separating governance from politics discounts or marginalizes 
the reality of power systems in decision-making.  
In fact, research shows that decentralizing water governance reconfigures power 
structures of intermediaries at local and regional scales (Medd and Marvin 2008). There 
is an inherent tension in the decentralization and de-politicization of decision-making 
processes as community groups and private sector actors necessarily carry their own 
agendas (Herrera and Post 2014). Indeed, the pursuit of ‘good governance’ in weak 
regulatory contexts can lead to private-sector capture of water markets (Hepworth 2012). 
Bakker (2010) therefore offers an alternative definition of governance as “a process of 
decision making that is structured by institutions (laws, rules, norms, and customs) and 
shaped by ideological preferences” (Bakker 2010, 44). Bakker’s (2010) notion of 
governance differs from conventional notions as she locates politics and power at the 
center of resource allocation debates.  
Others locate social justice at the center of a politically-rooted conceptualization 
of governance, as equitable access to water and decision-making processes are essential 
for a healthy municipal water sector and society (Perreault 2014). This is key because 
public and private sector organizations can privilege and prioritize elite interests over the 
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needs of poor communities, and have the effect of limiting their capacity to petition water 
services (Bakker et al. 2008). In some cases, citizens may turn to alternative water 
services in the informal markets to the detriment of their health and socio-economic 
conditions (Bakker et al. 2008). This is alarming since citizenship and modern 
subjectivity are closely tied to formal water access (Ranganathan 2010; Kaika 2005). As 
such, Bakker’s (2010) contribution moves away from the static characterizations of 
governance, as measured or depicted through ‘best practices’ or indicators. Instead, her 
notion of governance attends to the ways that public and private institutions and 
community groups, mediated by imperatives and incentives, shape governance outcomes.  
The need to re-politicize conventional debates around governance and IWRM is 
critical because water scarcity concepts and indices have become powerful tools for 
interpreting crises and informing policy. These indices serve as reference points for 
policy recommendations through their framing of access inequalities, whether they are 
due to poor water infrastructure, management failures, or disproportionate use by 
particular sectors of the economy (Rijsberman 2006). The framing associated with these 
concepts and indices feed into policy recommendations such as IWRM, governance, and 
privatization initiatives, broadly speaking. There are, however, inherent limitations in 
what the concepts and indices seek to show and what soft path solutions seek to realize. 
Water and poverty indices do not acknowledge the power of intermediaries to shape 
access to and use of water, likely resulting in inadequate policy recommendations 
(Bakker 2010), and the politically charged decisions related to water allocation between 
different economic sectors (Rijsberman 2006). Similarly “soft path” approaches, 
specifically their relationship to privatization, decentralization, and demand management, 
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rely on a static or depoliticized understanding of the urban water sector dynamics. 
Nevertheless, these tools and frameworks have not only dominated mainstream debates, 
they have proven instrumental in ushering in a broad wave of demand management 
programs and privatization measures into water sectors throughout the global South 
(Harris, Goldin, and Sneddon 2013).  
Perhaps the most fundamental limitation of mainstream advocacy of privatization 
is the misrepresentation of municipal water management crises and the failure to 
understand the contextual history of water sector development. While academic literature 
on privatization highlight the limitations and negative effects of such programs, it does 
not examine privatization within the context of state building and relationship to the 
development of municipal water services. The next section helps close this gap by 
reviewing and linking literature pertaining representation and development, scholarship 
on the relationship between state building and water services, and the history of 
municipal water services in order to reframe debates on privatization programs in 
municipal water services. The argument is that state building and formation processes led 
to and shaped institutional and political constraints that affect urban water management 
institutions and capacity for reform both prior to privatization in municipal water services 
and during the privatization processes. This argument reconsiders the failures of 
privatizing municipal water services within an analysis of how the past development 





Critical Perspectives on Water Management Crises and Privatization 
Academics have critiqued mainstream characterizations of water management 
crises and privatization in three ways. First, scholars argue that water management crises 
stem from the power over production and distribution, which leads to a reduction of 
water supplies and unequal access. Second, scholars claim that the nature of water 
planning and management has facilitated the concentration of state power in the pursuit 
of modernization initiatives to the detriment of water resources and equitable access. 
Third, academics have critiqued privatization for the ways it reprioritizes profit over 
equitable distribution and the unequal effects on low-income communities. This section 
seeks to situate the scholarly critiques of privatization within the literatures on the 
political economic history of urban water management and state and development 
planning. Academic scholarship on histories and dynamics of state building vis-à-vis 
water management can help generate a deeper understanding of the evolution of urban 
water management in periods of modernization and privatization through an analysis of 
how political and institutional constraints arise through water sector development and in 
turn influence management outcomes today. 
 
Critiques of Representation and their Relationship to State Building 
Mainstream analysts emphasize that privatization is a necessary step for 
mitigating the crises produced by modernization programs in municipal water services. 
Scholars, however, argue that contemporary water management crises stem from a 
tension between modernist visions for municipal and national water sectors and the 
reality of human-environment relationships. As such, it is important to pay attention to 
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the ways that water management and water sector development is framed and to what 
effect. Scholarship about representation in development clarifies how state making and 
formation (Baker 2005) become viable political projects through managerial 
interventions in society (Foucault 2010; Mitchell 1988) and the environment (Agrawal 
2005; Mitchell 2002; Stengers 2000; Scott 1998).  
The ideas of abstraction (Stengers 2000), enframing (Mitchell 1988) and legibility 
(Scott 1998) offer three similar ways for understanding how society and water systems 
were empirically and conceptually framed in the modernization of national and municipal 
water sectors.2 All three argue that scientists and experts assume the social and 
environmental worlds to be divided and ultimately understood through the delineation 
and demarcation of their interactions (see Latour 1993). Stengers (2000), for example, 
argues that scientific abstraction synthesizes complex phenomena and interactions into 
easily understood data. She says, 
Abstraction is not the product of an ‘abstract way of seeing things.’ It has nothing 
psychological or methodological about it. It is relative to the invention of an 
experimental practice that distinguishes it from one fiction among others while ‘creating’ 
a fact that singularizes one class of phenomena among others. This is why the difference 
between what can be the ‘object of representation’ and what is supposed to ‘escape’ 
representations cannot be grounded a priori by a theory, philosophical or otherwise. To 
ground always means to refer to a criterion that claims to escape history in order to 
constitute a norm (Stengers 2000, 85).  
The essence of her claim, therefore, is that scientific methods reduce complex human-
environment relationships into easily measurable phenomena (Mehta 2005). Applied to 
water management, this means that hydrological science constitutes one way, and not the 
only way, of understanding water.  
                                                        
2
 For the purpose of this chapter, I will simply refer to these processes as representation. 
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Linton (2010) argues that the hydrological cycle, though a seemingly natural 
process, is a concept deeply influenced by Cold War politics. American and Soviet 
scientists disagreed on how to best represent water’s biophysical transformation and 
cycle through the environment. In the end, American scientists prevailed in their 
depiction of a water cycle that excludes human use and interactions (Linton 2010). The 
hegemony of this concept forecloses other ways of characterizing or understanding water 
resources, particularly as they relate to cultural customs or local knowledge (Mehta 
2005), and helps underwrite the powerful processes of state building and formation.  
In many cases in the global South, colonial and post-colonial officials utilized the 
scientific methods and models to map, catalogue, and order the social and environmental 
worlds in pursuit of modernization and development (Scott 1998). Development plans 
sought to transform how local communities interacted with the environment and subsume 
their knowledge within state development initiatives. Communities were counted by 
census measurements and human-environment interactions were converted into resource 
endowments (Mitchell 2002), creating a social and natural resource base ‘legible’ to 
policymakers (Scott 1998). These resource bases were framed through development 
frameworks. Mitchell (1988) calls this enframing, defined as “a method of dividing up 
and containing, as in the construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages, which 
operates by conjuring up a neutral surface or volume called ‘space’” (44). Enframing 
creates a logical framework for which categorization and quantification take on meaning 
and informs development planning in cities, water resources, or energy. In his analysis of 
Colonial British visions for Cairo’s urban planning, Mitchell (1988) argues that British 
planners perceived chaos due to the lack of planning in Egypt’s capital city. British 
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planners were thus able to construct a vision for a “modern Cairo” and implement 
systematic reordering of the city.  
This process of scientifically representing the environment and society for 
modernization purposes facilitated the development of national and municipal water 
institutions and services. The researched potential of water resources and large-scale 
infrastructure projects (Haines 2010; Swyngedouw 2007) facilitated the creation of 
hydraulic bureaucracies (Molle, Mollinga, and Wester 2009) and state building processes 
(Meehan 2014). Baker (2005) notes that state building unfolded through state making and 
state formation processes. State making involves the production of civil society through 
micro-level negotiations between state agents and local elites, and draws attention to the 
ways that the relations between state institutions and social groups are negotiated and 
renegotiated over time. State formation, however, entails the creation of institutions and 
knowledge that systemize practices that constitute the state’s sanctioned and legitimate 
authority (Baker 2005). Such processes have taken place in cities through the creation of 
modern municipal water systems (Meehan 2014; Kaika 2005; Joyce 2003) and in rural 
areas through the development of irrigation systems and national water distribution 
systems (Swyngedouw 2014; Birkenholtz 2010; Harris and Alatout 2010; Baker 2005; 
Gelles 2000; Wittfogel 1981). 
The creation of national water sector institutions has entailed detailed and 
deliberate interventions in rural areas. Early scholarship argued that irrigation-based 
societies necessarily lead to centralized political authority (Wittfogel 1981) at the 
expense of irrigation communities that had developed through cultural responses to 
environmental conditions (Geertz 1972). Others argue that community irrigation practices 
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are produced and conditioned by a dynamic interaction of local powers, centralized 
colonial or state authorities, and religious and cultural perceptions and institution (Gelles 
2000). For example, Patrick Lansing (1991) revisited an area of Bali where sustainable 
irrigation systems were collapsing due to water shortages, pests, and disease in rice crops 
following the introduction of the Green Revolution under Dutch colonialism. He argues 
that the Dutch mistakenly believed that indigenous royal powers controlled the irrigation 
systems (Lansing 1991). As such, the Dutch attempted to recreate this royal hydraulic 
bureaucracy in order to increase tax revenues and justify their colonial control. They did 
not, however, recognize that water temples, and not royal authorities, linked the irrigation 
systems to social units. The temple Gods provided symbolic meaning that united farmers 
in the coordination of their irrigation practices.   
Consequently, colonial-era and post-colonial state institutions were not highly 
successful in transforming rural communities as envisioned in development plans. 
However, rural communities and environments did come to reflect the influence of local, 
state, and internationally financed development priorities. In many cases, community 
governance of irrigation systems evolved with the formation of the state in the form of 
subsidies, expert support, or infrastructural development (Gelles 2000). For example, 
agricultural production in Syria significantly increased after government officials adopted 
modernization plans, which included significant fuel subsidies for expanded irrigation 
and land reform policies. This revitalized a political economic alliance between the 
Ba’ath Party authority and the agriculturalist and peasant classes (Barnes 2009; 
Hinnebusch 1989). A key aspect of this modernization was the scientific mapping of 
water basins, which bolstered the authority of the Ministry of Irrigation and its 
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jurisdiction over all water resources in Syria. The maps, however, did not correspond to 
the biophysical boundaries of watersheds or the historical demarcations of peasant use 
(Barnes 2009). Over time, this exposed many farmers to precarious conditions as water 
scarcity increased due to a multi-year drought, declining water table, and a poorly timed 
reduction in fuel subsidies. Between 2008 and 2010, one year before the Syrian uprisings, 
several hundred thousand Syrians in the northern agricultural provinces left to urban 
areas as livelihoods collapsed, leading to greater pressure on urban services and the labor 
market (De Châtel 2014; Mahayni 2013b).  
The example in Syria reflects Mosse’s (2003) claim that water’s mediations of 
social relations varies significantly from place to place. These interactions between state 
policies and institutions, local communities, and environmental dynamics are produced 
within complex histories of settlement, cultivation patterns, revenue regimes, social 
structures, and tenancy arrangements, all of which contribute to the present-day forms of 
collective resource management. In turn, dichotomies of state/society, pre-
colonial/colonial, and tradition/modernity need to be reconsidered in light of the ways 
that local forms of organization, practice, and cultivation are produced through 
converging, competing, and interweaving relationships between colonial and state 
administrators and communities (Mosse 2003). For example, Mosse (2003) finds that 
shifting political systems imprinted irrigation regimes in southern Tamil, India. Each 
political regime – the warrior state, the Zamindaris under colonialism, and the post-
colonial government – ideologically incorporated water tanks and irrigation systems into 
their representations of rural order. Irrigation collapse or other ecological calamities were 
blamed on the failure and illegitimacy of previous regimes. Such representations thus 
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stood in contrast to the reality that the irrigation regimes were inherently unstable and 
always changing.   
The legitimacy of rule over water systems and society has been reinforced 
through codification of law, administrative codes, and widespread utilization of scientific 
technology (Mosse 2006). These techniques of representation have also been conducive 
to the securitization and centralization of state power and institutions. Alatout (2009, 
2007) notes that scientific characterizations of water abundance and scarcity were 
instrumental in encouraging Zionist immigration and securitizing the Israeli state.3 
Zionist narratives of abundance in the 1920s and 1930s were based on the results of “new 
geophysical methods” used to map water resources in Palestine. This enhanced the aura 
of Zionist authority as a scientifically and technologically advanced institution and 
legitimized migration to the lands of Palestine (Alatout 2009). By the 1960s, Israeli 
narratives shifted to water scarcity, which heightened security concerns and empowered 
the state’s control over and management of water resources and populations (Alatout 
2007).  
Similarly, state security was a key driver of modernizing Spain’s national water 
systems (Swyngedouw 2014). In the mid-1800s, liberal intellectuals sought to revive 
                                                        
3 The idea that water scarcity in the Middle East is a foregone conclusion largely originates with increased 
European involvement in the region. Davis (2011) writes, 
With the rise of Anglo-European imperial power in the region, though, in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, an environmental imaginary began to be constructed that 
frequently portrayed the Middle East and North Africa as being on the edge of ecological 
viability or as degraded landscape facing imminent disaster. Because the local inhabitants 
were most often blamed for the environmental degradation, by deforestation, 
overgrazing, or over irrigation, for example, this environmental imaginary allowed the 
telling of stories, or narratives, that facilitated imperial goals in the name of 
“improvement” and later, of environmental “protection” (2). 
Such depictions, however, were rooted in colonial dreams, in which Europeans could bring order to a 
region plagued by environmental catastrophe. 
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Spain’s economy after the demise of its colonial empire by addressing the country’s 
uneven distribution of water in order to expand irrigation-based agricultural production 
(Swyngedouw 1999). Policymakers scientifically defined regional water deficits in order 
to transfer water from abundant to scarce places through a national hydraulic network 
(Swyngedouw 2007). Like the Syrian and Israeli experiences, this project, which was 
realized during Franco’s fascist rule, was politically motived by a desire to eradicate 
autonomist aspirations (Swyngedouw 2007).  
Likewise, officials in Pakistan centralized institutional power through large-scale 
infrastructure designed to modernize rural water systems (Haines 2010). Local 
communities in the Sindh region had long relied on a series of canals to manage the 
fluctuations in the Indus River, but neglect of the canals resulted in silt and sediment 
buildup (Haines 2010). In an effort to stimulate agricultural production and justify the 
building of a dam, Pakistani officials borrowed from their former British colonizers to 
characterize Sindhis as backwards and a barrier to the state’s pursuit of progress. This 
dam ultimately deepened the poverty of the Sindhi communities. This perception of 
progress was common to many settler colonies as well. Gibbs (2009) argues that 
contemporary water crises in Australia can be traced to the construction of boreholes and 
river diversions by British settlers as a way to maximize local development at the expense 
of indigenous communities. It is, therefore, no accident that ongoing water crises have 
emerged in Syria, Israel/Palestine, Spain, Pakistan, and Australia. Hydrological science 
and development programs characterized communities and environments through stable 
frameworks that were ultimately instrumental for the creation of modern states, albeit at 
significant social and environmental costs.  
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These examples reflect the various ways that scientific representations are 
inherently political or politically deployed in development paradigms. In many states, the 
water sector emerged as an outcome of deliberate measures by government officials to 
order and manipulate social groups, the environment, and the interactions between them 
through their systematic ordering and cataloguing. As several academics highlight, the 
production of humanitarian, public health, and ecological crises after the implementation 
of such development programs reflect the ways that the development frameworks based 
on the representations of society and the environment are limited. In essence, social 
groups, water systems, and state institutions co-evolve through the deliberate state 
formation and making processes leading to the continual production of an always 
uncertain and unstable water sector.  
One under acknowledged dimension of these processes is the fact that these state 
building processes also shape the evolution of municipal water services through political 
and institutional constraints that ultimately become endemic to national and municipal 
water sectors. The nature of changes to water sector institutions, communities, and water 
resources is context dependent. Consequently, attention to the histories of urban water 
systems and the eras of privatization must attend to the nature of the constraints affecting 
the ability to realize and reform municipal water services. Understanding how these 
constraints impact municipal water services, however, requires clarifying how urban 





The Creation of Municipal Water Systems, Decline, and the Rise of Privatization 
Scholars argue that municipal water systems reflect the dynamic interplay of 
many factors, including modernist visions, political power, and capitalist influences over 
urbanization processes (Kooy and Bakker 2008; Gandy 2006; Swyngedouw 2004). The 
origins of many modern urban water systems, especially in the global South, are 
intricately tied to European beliefs about hygiene and order (Joyce 2003) as city planners 
and engineers designed systems to produce, circulate, and metabolize water and its waste 
(Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw 2006; Swyngedouw 2006; Gandy 2005). Throughout 
Europe and European colonies, cities came to reflect several layers of technological, 
social, and environmental systems (Swyngedouw 2006; Gandy 2005). Subterranean 
water networks and private household connections became the norm following greater 
understanding of the benefits generated by municipal water and sanitation services 
(Kaika 2005). The ubiquity of household connections, however, exists in tension with 
access inequalities to potable water, which surged onto the global agenda in the past 
twenty years, and has become a key element in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals 
(see UN 2011, UNDP 2006). This tension explains why household connections to formal 
water networks are characterized as a trait of modern cities whereas slums are described 
as disorderly and unhygienic (Ranganathan 2010; Coelho 2005).  
Though the push to create sanitized cities by treating and circulating drinking 
water through subterranean networks and removing waste to the periphery is a goal 
common to most modern cities, it has not been equally applied in urban environments. In 
fact, one could say that the outcome of this drive was the creation of sanitized 
neighborhoods, not cities. This produced cities characterized by neighborhoods 
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connected to urban water services surrounded by areas of disconnection and network 
deterioration (Bakker 2003c). Unequal urban water networks have emerged in part 
through a dynamic urban political economy that ultimately regulated access to drinking 
water and sanitation services (Joyce 2003).  
This political economic urbanization is closely tied to colonial and post-colonial 
modernization initiatives. In many cities of the global South, colonial authorities and later 
newly independent governments financed the construction of urban water networks and 
sanitation systems in European and elite neighborhoods but did not attend to the needs of 
indigenous and low-income communities (McFarlane 2008; Dill and Crow 2014). For 
example, Gandy (2006) argues that stark access inequalities in Lagos, Nigeria, stem from 
British policies that prioritized formal water provisions for colonial subdivisions but not 
for indigenous neighborhoods. Following independence, fiscal deficits and 
underinvestment led to rapid deterioration of water networks, which reinforced access 
inequalities. Kooy and Bakker (2008) similarly argue that contemporary fragmentation in 
Jakarta is rooted in colonial planning decisions that favored Dutch elites and upper 
middle class interests. The impacts of these colonial preferences have carried into post-
colonial eras as the impact of political power and economic influence over municipal 
water services persisted (Swyngedouw 2004).  
The case of Guayaquil, Ecuador exemplifies the influence of political and 
economic power over urbanization processes. This city is quite water abundant and yet 
thousands of urban poor do not have access to potable water (Swyngedouw 1997). The 
reason is that water network expansions were connected to urban development financed 
by elites in the cocoa, banana, and petrol industries from the late 19th to the late 20th 
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centuries (Swyngedouw 2004). The political and economic influence of capitalist elites 
over city planners resulted in the city’s uneven urbanization, in which basic services and 
water networks were only extended to newly built neighborhoods. The end result was that 
Guayaquil’s water networks came to be characterized by pockets of formal connections 
inter-penetrated by alternative water delivery systems, including water vendors, bottled 
water, water coops, illegal connections to infrastructures, and direct access to rivers and 
streams (see also Bakker 2003b). Indeed, non-formal water provisions are common in 
many cities around the world (Kjellén and McGranahan 2006). In Amman, for example, 
some neighborhoods rely on a combination of both water trucks and formal water 
connections in order to meet their daily water needs (Gerlach and Franceys 2009). The 
prevalence of these non-formal services, furthermore, exposes low-income households to 
other forms of exclusion, as powerful businesses, mafias, and elites control these water 
services (Anand 2011; Bakker 2010) 
Nevertheless, non-formal access, especially in the eyes of development 
practitioners and city planners, reflect urban water crises. Rather than attending to the 
colonial or politically influenced planning decisions, mainstream analysts and experts 
argue that such unequal access reflects the failure of public sector to manage urban water 
resources (World Bank 1993). Urban water crises throughout the global South emerged 
as a key development issue in the 1980s and early 1990s. Led by World Bank, 
development elites pushed for reforming urban water services in the name of the poor by 
arguing that governments had failed to adequately value water resources and services and 
failed to invest in and rehabilitate water sector infrastructure. Additionally, development 
economists criticized government institutions for bloating their bureaucracies through 
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public sector employment opportunities, which created inefficient institutions operating 
at widespread deficits. These claims were part and parcel of a more general push to 
reregulate state involvement in the economy through which new forms of governance and 
management practices were introduced and producing variegated outcomes (Brenner, 
Peck, and Theodore 2010; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; J. Peck and Theodore 
2007; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jamie Peck and Tickell 2002). 
Consequently, development institutions advocated for the de-regulation of the 
water sector in two ways. First, they called for privatization, private sector participation, 
or commercialization of public water utilities. Second, they called for market valuation of 
water resources and demand-management in order to regulate inefficient consumption 
and finance the rehabilitation and expansion of urban water networks. Since the early 
1990s, municipal water services have been privatized in various ways (Budds and 
McGranahan 2003). Two of the most popular forms are privatization or public-private 
partnerships and commercialization. Bakker (2003a) defines privatization as “the shift in 
control from the public to the private sector, through the transfer of ownership or 
management responsibility for water supply infrastructure” (38) whereas 
commercialization entails “changes in resource management practices that introduce 
commercial principles (such as efficiency), methods (such as cost-benefit assessment), 
and objectives (such as profit maximization)” into water governance (Bakker 2005, 544). 
The experiences and outcomes of water sector privatization experiments have not been 
straightforward as state institutions, development organizations, and municipalities 
negotiated different types of arrangements (Bakker 2003a). 
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State institutions have been key partners in the privatization of municipal water 
services (Bakker 2002). In particular, governments are often incentivized to create private 
sector friendly laws that facilitate the incorporation of private sector participants or 
commercialization of water utilities in exchange for financial support (Swyngedouw 
2005). Reregulation of water sectors has succeeded in strong regulatory environments 
(Smith and Hanson 2003; Freire and Stren 2001; Klein 1996). Most privatization reforms, 
however, are often negotiated within elite circles with little understanding of context 
(Goldman 2007) and implemented in places with weak public sectors and little power to 
negotiate more favorable agreements (Smith 2004). The results of such reforms have 
undermined equal access to water (Bakker 2003a) and reconfigured inner city, peri-
urban, and rural water governance to the detriment of poor communities (Budds 2009; 
Perreault 2005; Budds 2004).  
In Spain, for example, authorities adopted market-based management in order to 
mitigate the hydrological and financial crises created by state-led development initiatives 
of early and mid-20th century resulted in higher prices for farmers (Bakker 2002). 
Similarly, in Chile, government officials revised the national water law in 1981 around 
the principle of private property rights in conjunction with widespread implementation of 
economic deregulation and privatization initiatives (Budds 2004). Though the water law 
has since been revised, the principle of private property has remained, creating a long 
term effect of wealthy landowners and farmers consolidating ownership over surface and 
groundwater resources, leading to rapidly deteriorating water supplies (Budds 2009). In 
other cases, state water institutions have become targets of commercialization and 
privatization initiatives. For example, in South Africa, a bulk water supplier owned by the 
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state was commercialized to sell water to municipal utilities at market rates in order to 
reduce its capital deficits. This resulted in higher costs for urban water consumers as 
municipal water utilities increased prices to cover the higher cost of bulk water supplies 
(Loftus 2006a).  
Indeed, local context is critical for determining the success or failure of 
privatization initiatives. Protests and resistance measures against privatization have 
become common throughout the global South, the most famous of which is the 
Cochabamba Water War in 2002. Protesters shut down the city in a violent standoff with 
government troops after the Bolivian government negotiated the full privatization of 
Cochabamba’s water utility with Bechtel Corporation, leading to severe increases in 
water price (Shiva 2002). Similarly, protesters in Cape Town challenged higher prices 
resulting from tariff reforms and disconnection policies for failure to pay water bills. The 
tariff reforms, however, assumed households had equal capacity to pay and consequently 
the disconnections disproportionately affected poor, primarily black communities, an 
enduring legacy of apartheid inequalities (Smith and Hanson 2003). Increased water 
prices, however, are not the only outcome of privatization measures as technical 
interventions at the household level have accompanied privatization reforms.  
Direct neighborhood and household interventions designed to reinforce or support 
privatization initiatives have also become widespread. For example, in the Soweto 
Township in Johannesburg, South Africa policymakers recommended the installation of 
pre-paid water meters and granting 6,000 liters for free to low income families alongside 
network rehabilitation in order to reduce financial deficits (von Schnitzler 2008). In 
exchange for pre-paid meters, outstanding household bills were forgiven on the condition 
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that they did not tamper with meters. Any water use in excess of the free water allocation 
required advance purchases by households, which would be recorded on a magnetic chip 
and read by the meter (von Schnitzler 2008). Similarly, water officials in Durban, South 
Africa introduced free allocations in exchange for the installation of flow-regulating 
meters at each household. These meters were considered to be an upgrade as households 
were previously required to visit local water kiosks in order to purchase water (Loftus 
2006b). The new meters and lifeline deliveries were intended to help households budget 
their water consumption while keeping prices low.  
The stark urban inequalities in South African cities were compounded by the lack 
of democratic accountability in such policy measures (Smith 2004). These interventions 
invoked urban consumers as market participants and shifted capital and operational costs 
to consumers through increased prices with little public input. These processes 
accentuated inequalities as higher prices were often unaffordable for poor urban residents 
and reduced autonomy over water use (Bakker 2010; McDonald and Ruiters 2005; 
Swyngedouw 2005; Bakker 2003; Shiva 2002). Many households on the receiving end of 
such direct interventions opted out of these programs through non-payment or pursuing 
alternative forms of water access (Bakker et al. 2008), in part because they claimed to 
receive less water after the interventions. Common reasons cited were water leaks and 
meter malfunctions that led governments to prematurely cut a consumer’s water supplies 
(Loftus 2006b; Bond 2003). More critically, such initiatives dispossessed urban 
households of their autonomy over water access and use as the pre-paid meters automated 
policing and enforcement in municipal water services (von Schnitzler 2008).  
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Ultimately, privatization and corporatization reforms have failed to realize their 
expected outcomes and have disproportionately affected low-income households. In 
many cases reforms prioritized profit over equity (Bakker 2000), which increased the 
likelihood of corruption in places with weak institutions (Smith and Hanson 2003) and 
reduced public accountability (Bakker 2010; Smith 2004). The combination of these 
factors interacted with a failure to understand dynamics of household access and 
consumption, leading to highly unequal municipal water systems (von Schnitzler 2008; 
Loftus 2006b; Bond 2003). The failures of privatization programs, however, are not 
evidence that public sector management regimes are better. The modernization and 
privatization eras differ in their economic and institutional priorities (Swyngedouw 
2005), but research has not sufficiently examined how political and institutional contexts 
shape water management services.  
Perhaps the most important institution shaping these contexts in both the 
modernization and privatization eras is the World Bank, which has financed development 
and reform projects throughout the global South (Bakker 2013). One way of assessing the 
context-dependent institutional environments produced by the interactions of World Bank 
and government priorities is through Bakker’s (2010) reassessment of governance. Her 
contribution to the governance debates focuses on market-based management (see Bakker 
2010; Bakker et al. 2008). One of the limitations of scholarly research about privatization 
programs, even when adopting a critical governance approach, is that they do not attend 
to the links between the past and the present. Contemporary crises in municipal and 
national water services and the dynamics and outcomes of privatization are strongly 
influenced by politically driven state building processes underlying public sector 
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management regimes. In other words, the outcomes of privatization programs cannot be 
disassociated from public sector management regimes or their failures.  
Consequently, institutional contexts must be historicized in order to understand 
how politically driven state building programs produced endemic and continuously 
evolving constraints to water sector operations. Building on Bakker’s (2010) argument, 
this dissertation examines the ways that past and contemporary urban water crises are 
represented and addressed in mainstream circles and explores the relationship between 
the challenges afflicting past development projects and current privatization programs. 
The claim of this dissertation is that the dynamics of state building programs and 
evolution of municipal water services produced institutional and political constraints that 
today shape the dynamics of privatization initiatives. The failure to understand these 
relationships explains how and why households in different socio-economic conditions 
are differentially impacted. Mainstream characterizations tend to treat many of the 
institutional constraints as symptoms of the public sector’s failures while the political 
constraints are seen as exogenous shocks to water sectors. Instead, the institutional and 
political constraints should be seen as part and parcel of the water sector’s operational 
system. Failure to understand the production of institutional and political constraints and 
their evolution over time can lead to mischaracterizing why policy reforms, such as 
privatization, have not met their intended goals.  
The case of Jordan suggests that Amman’s water management crises and 
privatization dynamics are deeply tied to Jordan’s state building and formation processes. 
The corporate restructuring programs, starting in 1999, have been strongly influenced by 
the institutional and political constraints produced through past development projects and 
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state building efforts. Privatization programs not met their intended goals. They have, 
however, generated new challenges and constraints to the municipal and national water 
sectors. As such, it is important to examine how these constraints are represented in 
mainstream circles and critically analyze how these constraints were initially produced 
and evolved over time. Further, understanding this deeper historical context will shed 
light on how households perceive and experience the corporate restructuring programs 
under way. As such, it is important to undertake a critical analysis of how the formation 
of state water sector institutions and the negotiation and implementation of privatization 
are linked by constraints inherent to and embedded in Jordan’s water sector dynamics. 
 
A Note on Methods 
Several methods are utilized in this research. First, using content analysis, World 
Bank, USAID, and governmental proposals and project completion reports, in addition to 
mainstream academic articles, government reports, and news articles were analyzed in 
order to deduce and synthesize the emergence and evolution of the institutional and 
political constraints affecting the water sector over the course of five decades. Second, 
key-informant interviews were conducted with public and private sector officials working 
in the water sector in order understand their opinions and dynamics of their work and 
challenges they face. Third, extended household interviews and Exploratory Spatial Data 
Analysis (ESDA), a type of geographic information science, were conducted to assess the 
factors shaping household experiences with respect to access and consumption. The 
ESDA provided a statistical evaluation for water consumption and billing trends for 
urban consumers registered with Amman’s water utility, Jordan Water Company 
 38 
Miyahuna, in 2003, 2007, and 2011. Household interviews addressed experiences with 
privatized municipal water services operating an intermittent distribution system and 
changing state/society relationships in an era of subsidy reductions and changing forms of 
governance. The household respondents varied by geography, socio-economic status, 
gender, and citizenship status in the goal of capturing a general snapshot of societal 
perspectives in Amman. 
 As an Arabic-speaking expatriate living in Amman, I conducted interviews in 
Arabic. All interviews were recorded with permission and transcribed into English. 
Officials in the public and private sector were contacted through networking facilitated 
by local contacts and referrals from interview participants. Households were accessed 
through my social networks at a non-formal school for host and refugee communities in 
east Amman where I volunteered as an English instructor and through my own contacts, 
including local grocers, colleagues, my landlord, and neighbors.   
 
Objective and Structure of the Dissertation 
The overall goal of the dissertation is to analyze the production, evolution, and 
impacts of institutional and political constraints on municipal and national water services 
in Jordan. Through the course of this research, several key claims are developed. First, 
the case for corporatization and privatization is strongly built on the representation of 
water sector crises through narrow engineering and economic frameworks in ways that 
depoliticize the portrayal of water management crises. Such representation 
mischaracterizes regulatory landscapes, particularly the evolving interaction between 
institutional and political constraints and operational processes. Second, these 
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contemporary water sector crises that corporatization seeks to address are rooted in the 
history of water sector development and state building processes, on the one hand, and 
the imbricated evolution municipal and national water policies and institutions. In other 
words, these processes have resulted in political and institutional constraints that have 
become part and parcel of the water sector’s operational dynamics and continued 
transformation. Third, the privatization and corporatization reforms are strongly shaped 
by the ongoing and ever-changing institutional and operational dynamics at the municipal 
and national level. Such reforms also introduce new constraints to water sector services. 
Fourth, reform programs fail to consider how the design of municipal water services 
shape household experiences and the production of access inequalities, which also shape 
public opinion of reform and affect the likelihood of political contentious reform 
processes.  
The dissertation is divided into six chapters, including the introduction. Chapter 
Two synthesizes the mainstream debates on Jordan’s water management crises, provides 
a critical re-reading of these themes, and discusses why a more careful framing of the 
water management crisis is necessary. Chapter Three builds on this re-evaluation of 
mainstream framing by examining how Jordan’s political and economic contexts, 
particularly regime security and donor conditions, crucially shaped the formation of 
institutional capacity and operations within the water sector between the early 1960s until 
the 1990s. Chapter Four examines how these institutional and political contexts have 
shaped the dynamics of privatization and corporatization starting in 1999 until today. 
Chapter Five examines household experiences with municipal water services in an era of 
corporatization, particularly the creation and reinforcement of access and socio-economic 
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inequalities through the design of the intermittent distribution system. Chapter Six 
concludes the dissertation with a brief summary of the claims and research contributions 




Chapter 2 Representing Water Crises 
Introduction  
Justification for privatization of municipal water services and the introduction of 
demand management throughout the global South draws extensively on public sector 
failures and deteriorating environmental conditions (Bakker 2010; Swyngedouw 2005).4 
Mainstream characterizations of these crises, they argue, are portrayed through economic 
and engineering frameworks, with hydrological science playing a key role in advocacy of 
privatization (Linton 2010). These characterizations, however, are based on a collective 
“amnesia” on the successes of the public-sector development programs, particularly in 
developing and extending water services at low costs to consumers. Consequently, 
political economists argue that water sector crises intensified after structural adjustment 
programs were introduced at the behest of international donors (Swyngedouw 2005; 
McDonald and Ruiters 2005). Though there is extensive research on how privatization 
programs came to dominate water sector development and to what effect (Bakker 2010), 
there has been limited research into the frameworks utilized by mainstream experts in the 
push for privatization. 
 This research is necessary for explaining why privatization and demand 
management persist despite their poor record and helps shed further light on why such 
reforms continue to fail. Critical scholars argue that representing social and 
environmental processes through engineering or economic frameworks (Linton 2010; 
Stengers 2000; Scott 1998; Mitchell 1988) depoliticize inherently political development 
                                                        
4
 For the sake of simplicity, this chapter refers to privatization generally, and thus includes outright 
privatization, commercialization, corporatization, public-private partnerships, management contracts, and 
other regulatory mechanisms designed to shift public institutions towards private sector logics. 
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processes and goals (Alatout 2009; Barnes 2009; Alatout 2007). Critiques of privatization 
do address how reform advocates frame public sector failures, which contextualizes why 
privatization programs are implemented and to what effect. Their engagement can be 
further elaborated by examining the particular ways that mainstream analysts build the 
case for corporatization, and in turn, what they miss. As such, this chapter builds on the 
contributions of research on representation and development to better understand how 
privatization programs are framed as necessary for reforming municipal and national 
water services. 
Using the case of Jordan, this chapter argues that mainstream characterizations of 
its water management crises and the justification for corporate restructuring draw on 
economic and engineering frameworks in ways that obscure the underlying constraints 
producing Jordan’s water management crises. In particular, three themes are commonly 
highlighted in the recommendations for corporatizing Jordan’s water sector and 
mainstream research developed by Jordanian institutions, international organizations, and 
academics. First, there is a mismatch between Jordan’s scarce water supplies and rapidly 
increasing demand, and consequently the public sector model predicated on providing 
cheap water to urban households is no longer sustainable. Second, institutional overlap 
and mismanagement have delayed necessary reforms and rehabilitation to infrastructure. 
The third point is that the rising operational costs and large deficits threaten the viability 
and fiscal solvency of the water sector. This chapter reexamines these themes through a 
discussion of the ways that institutional and political constraints underlie Jordan’s 
municipal and national water management crises. The goal is not to provide a descriptive 
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context for the research on privatization in Jordan, but rather to articulate how it is that 
mainstream analysts frame the water crises and what their framing ignores. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. First, it reviews mainstream analyses and 
representations of water supply and demand, institutional overlap and mismanagement, 
and water costs and deficit concerns. Part two demonstrates the limitations of this way of 
framing the water crisis by explaining how these crises are outcomes of the institutional 
and political constraints affecting municipal and national water management. The chapter 
concludes by summarizing the argument and revisits the scholarly contribution. 
 
Mainstream Representations of Jordan’s Water Crises 
Jordan’s ranking among the ten most water scarce countries in the world 
(UNESCO 2012b; USAID 2011) anchors mainstream characterization of its water 
management crises. Three main issues underlie Jordan’s perilous ranking and represent 
the key facets of the justification for corporate restructuring. First, Jordan faces a severe 
mismatch between domestic water supplies and rapidly growing demand, thus leading to 
calls for more widespread adoption of soft path solutions. Second, Jordan’s water sector 
institutions are plagued by mismanagement and institutional overlap, which delay timely 
responses to the water crises. Third, the water sector suffers from an inability to cover 
rising costs and payoff financial deficits, thereby threaten sector’s long-term viability. 
Officials therefore claim that corporate restructuring can solve these three problems by 




Supply and Demand 
There is widespread worry about Jordan’s supply and demand mismatch. Jordan 
lacks sufficient access to surface waters, especially since most rivers originate outside the 
country. Jordanian authorities have been forced to engage in politically fraught 
negotiations over access to the Jordan River and its tributary, the Yarmouk River, as both 
Syria and Israel confront their own domestic challenges. Map 2.1 depicts Jordan’s twelve 
administrative governorates and its neighbors. 
Map 2.1 Administrative Map of Jordan 
 
Map Produced by Basil Mahayni 
The Jordan River’s second major tributary, the Zarqa River, was once a key water source 
for Amman but is now considered unusable for household consumption due to heavy 
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pollution from industrial activity, poor wastewater treatment, and agricultural runoff 
(Hussein, Abu Sharar, and Battikhi 2005). Additionally, groundwater resources, which 
experts place at 90 million cubic meters (Khaleq and Dziegielewski 2006), have been 
exploited at unsustainable rates in order to meet agricultural, industrial, and municipal 
demand, leading to widespread deterioration and contamination of supplies (Abu-Sharar 
and Battikhi 2002).  
Growing demand further threaten water supplies (Haddadin 2006). The World 
Bank (2001) reported that “Despite ongoing projects and plans to mobilize additional 
water resources, current projections of water balance are that the neck-and-neck race 
between supply and requirements will continue” (1). Some analysts argued that the 
mismatch between supply and demand would create chronic water shortages in Jordan by 
2010 (Alkhaddar, Sheehy, and Al-Ansari 2005). Others believe that by 2020 Jordan will 
not be able to meet municipal, industrial, and agricultural demand (USAID 2007). The 
rapid increase of Syrian refugees since 2011 accentuates fears about the supply and 
demand mismatch. Hazem al-Nasser, the current Minister of Water and Irrigation, 
stressed “We live in a chronic water problem, and we are now at the edge of moving from 
a chronic water problem into a water crisis” (Whitman 2013).  
Refugee resettlement in Jordan has been a principal driver of increasing water 
demand since the late-1940s, making Amman one of the fastest growing cities in the 
world.5 Amman was a small town until Emir Abdullah I selected it as the seat of 
                                                        
5
 Modern urban settlement in Amman population began with the arrival of Circassian communities fleeing 
Russian persecution in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Hanania 2011). The construction of the Hijaz 
Railroad in 1902 intensified settlement activity as Amman became a key node between the region’s major 
urban centers and Mecca (Hanania 2011; Potter et al. 2007). By 1921, following securing British support 
for his rule over the Trans-Jordan Mandate, Emir Abdullah I selected Amman as the seat of government 
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government for the Trans-Jordan Mandate in 1921 (Tell 2013). Amman’s transformation 
into an administrative and economic hub (Potter et al. 2007) attracted migrants from 
Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and other parts of Jordan pursuing new public-sector job 
opportunities (Potter et al. 2009; Potter et al. 2007). Between 1921 and 1947, Amman 
grew from 5,000 residents (Pavanello and Haysom 2012) to 60,000 just before the 
Arab/Israeli war (Pavanello and Haysom 2012). Since 1948, Jordan received several 
hundred thousand more refugees in sudden bursts in 1948, 1967, 1991, 2005, and 2011.6 
This affected planning projections and scenarios7, especially in Amman.8 
Jordan’s rapid population growth shaped planning scenarios in the water sector. 
The National Water Master Plan (NWMP) (MWI 2004) provides the basis for sector 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Tell 2013) and in turn transformed Amman into the administrative and economic hub of the Mandate 
(Potter et al. 2007).5 Amman attracted migrants from Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and newly independent 
Iraq, while domestic migrants relocated for new public-sector job opportunities (Potter et al. 2009; Potter et 
al. 2007). 
6
 In 1948, several hundred thousand Palestinians resettled in refugee camps throughout Jordan, including 
al-Wehdat and al-Hussein in Amman, increasing the population to 200,000 by 1961 (IDA 1961b). The 
1967 “Six Day War” produced a second wave of Palestinian refugees, increasing Amman’s population to 
500,000 (Potter et al. 2009). Amman continued to grow throughout the 1970s, with 521,000 people in 1971 
(Al-Khafaji et al. 1973) and 777,855 people in 1979 (Potter et al. 2009). Population growth stabilized 
throughout the 1980s until nearly 300,000 Palestinians and Jordanians returned after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1991 (USAID 2007). In the last ten years, Jordan’s population increased by nearly two million 
with Iraqi and Syrian refugees resettling in Jordan. 
7
 In the early 1960s, the Greater Amman Municipality drew up a 25-year master plan in response to the 
rapid population growth. The plan’s projected population of 360,000 by 1972 (IDA 1961b) yet uncertainty 
due to ongoing regional crises plagued their projections. Jordan also hosts significant numbers of migrant 
workers, particularly Egyptians, and its own population has experienced longer lives and maintained high 
birth rates (Dougherty 2006). Jordan’s population growth has been high, estimated at 3 percent annually 
(Salman, Al-Karablieh, and Haddadin 2008; MWI 2004), with Amman experiencing some of the most 
rapid rates of growth due to rural-to-urban migration and refugee resettlement (Hanania 2011). 
8 One particular impact is the expansion of Amman’s urban extent from a mere 2.5 square kilometers in 
1947 (Potter et al. 2007) to 250 square kilometers by 2009 (Makhamreha and Almanasyeha 2011).8 Strong 
division between poorer eastern and wealthier western parts of the city developed as Jordanians and 
Palestinians sent remittances from Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s (Potter et al. 2009) and invested in 
significant urban development projects in west Amman (Al Rawashdeh and Saleh 2006). Similar 
investments in large-scale development projects by Gulf and Jordanian elites and wealthy Iraqis fleeing the 
war from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s (Parker 2009) accentuated the divisions. Today, west Amman is 
wealthier and has lower population densities, with only 2,500 to 6,000 people per square kilometer whereas 
east Amman is much more densely populated, varying from 14,000 to 30,000 inhabitants per square 
kilometer (Potter et al. 2007).  
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planning and budgeting (Policymaker Six 2013). A central goal of the NWMP is to 
ensure adequate water supplies per capita, which declined from 3600 cubic meters in 
1946 to 160 cubic meters per capita by 2004 (MWI 2004). Jordan’s current water supply 
per capita places it in the “severe water scarcity” category according to the Water 
Scarcity Index (Falkenmark 1989), a fact referenced in several policy papers outlining 
corporate restructuring plans (USAID 2011; USAID 2010).  
Per capita supplies are likely to continue their decline due to population growth 
from high birth rates, improved health services, and refugee resettlement. Currently, 
Jordan’s renewable water availability is below 130 cubic meters per person per year 
(Humpal et al. 2012), with a total of 850 million cubic meters of available water (Khaleq 
2008). Experts have offered a variety of forecasts for future water availability and 
demand. One analyst estimates that total available water resources will increase to 1,289 
million cubic meters by 2020 (Khaleq 2008) whereas the National Water Master Plan 
projects that total renewable supplies will not be more than 1,150 million cubic meters by 
2020 (MWI 2004). Another expert estimates that water availability will fall to 90 cubic 
meters per person by 2025 (Humpal et al. 2012). Demand forecasts, in contrast, is range 
from 1,616 million cubic meters by 2020 (MWI 2004) to 1,685 million cubic meters by 
2020 (Khaleq 2008). As such, by 2020, Jordan will face an annual water deficit of 396 to 
466 million cubic meters.9 
Because of the large gap between supply and demand, advocates of corporate 
restructuring also propose increases in water supply production capacity. First, they argue 
that alternative sources of water supply must be developed in lieu of continued diversion 
                                                        
9
 The water availability and demand forecasts published by the MWI (2004) and Khaleq (2008) include 
requirements for the municipal, industrial, tourism, and agricultural sectors. 
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of surface water resources. They also call for increasing Jordan’s capacity for wastewater 
treatment from 34 million cubic meters per capita in 2005 to 101 million cubic meters by 
2020 (MWI 2004). Plans call for diverting treated wastewater into dammed reservoirs, 
which will alleviate demand for surface water resources. Increasing the production 
capacity will require an increase in the number of treatment plants from 28 to 36 – a 
costly endeavor requiring significant levels of investment in infrastructure in addition to 
increased operational costs (MWI 2004).  
Second, the plan calls for reducing groundwater extraction to safe yields by 2020. 
This will require effective regulation and application of several groundwater laws (MWI 
2004) which to date has been unsatisfactory (Humpal et al. 2012). Third, the plan 
proposes significant increases in desalination, water importation, and cloud seeding. The 
plan also recommends adopting new irrigation technology and restrictions on agricultural 
production (MWI 2004). The principal rationale for this is that the contribution of 
agricultural production to economic growth declined from 14.4 percent in 1972 to 3.5 
percent in 2002 (MWI 2004).  
Authorities also call for widespread adoption of demand management programs 
alongside adjustments in water use and development of new supplies. In 1997, the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation created a National Water Demand Management Strategy 
for water utilities, irrigation, wastewater and groundwater management (MWI 1997). 
Two years later, USAID and the MWI launched the Water Efficiency and Public 
Information for Action (WEPIA) project to promote water conservation among urban 
households (Albani, Soer, and Tarawneh 2011), and in 2002, the Ministry established a 
Water Demand Management Unit (WDMU). A core part of the WDMU’s mission is the 
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promotion of water efficiency and conservation policies, and public awareness programs 
(Khaleq 2008). From 2002 until 2007, the WDMU conducted public awareness 
campaigns to address water conservation in tourist venues, utilities, and households but 
they did not participate in demand management policy formulation or implementation.  
In 2007, USAID and the MWI launched the IDARA10 demand management 
strategy for Jordan’s municipal water services. IDARA had two key objectives: 1) build 
capacity in the WDMU and 2) establish a Water Demand Management System that 
oversees household water use and savings (Albani, Soer, and Tarawneh 2011). The 
overall purpose of the IDARA project was to create a mechanism for updating the 
National Water Master Plan’s forecast models used in planning, management, and 
conservation strategies in municipal water services. WAJ’s operations directorate and the 
water utilities were expected to provide information about water sales and consumption 
trends to the Ministry for the updates to the NWMP.  
The benefits of producing new supplies and the implementation of demand 
management through the WEPIA and IDARA projects are being united under a 
wholesale structural transformation of Jordan’s water sector through corporate 
restructuring of the municipal and national water sectors. The ISSP is implementing the 
corporate restructuring reforms through a transformation of institutional responsibilities 
at all levels of the water sector. The reason for this is that Jordan’s water sector is plagued 
by inefficiencies and unclear responsibilities between the MWI, WAJ, and municipal 
water utilities. Officials in the different institutions fail to cooperate due to excessive and 
overlapping responsibilities, leading to decision-making delays that project progress and 
                                                        
10
 IDARA is an Arabic term for management.  
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timely responses. The ISSP seeks to improve collaboration between water institutions at 
the national and municipal scales to create a more sustainable management system built 
on the foundations of corporate efficiency and effectiveness.  
Institutional Overlap and Mismanagement 
Jordan’s national and municipal water services are characterized by the lack of 
clearly defined roles and institutional overlap and the water sector’s incomplete 
corporatization. In particular, the national and municipal institutions do not have 
powerful incentives and mechanisms that lead to better and more efficient performance, 
which undermines both transparency in policymaking and implementation and effective 
water allocation plans (Humpal et al. 2012). Figure 2.1 depicts the current institutional 
arrangement of the water sector: 
Figure 2.1 Jordan’s Water Sector Institutions 
 
 
Source: Basil R. Mahayni 
















Prior to the implementation of the ISSP, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation was 
responsible for devising development goals and plans for Jordan’s water sector. In the 
second tier of management, the Jordan Valley Authority was responsible for bulk water 
production and allocations in the Jordan Valley. The Water Authority of Jordan, on the 
other hand, divided its responsibilities between production of bulk water supplies, direct 
operations in municipal areas, and oversight of limited liability companies. The limited 
liability companies, which are state-owned enterprises wholly owned by WAJ, are 
currently operating in Aqaba, Amman, and the north of Jordan. The Performance 
Monitoring Unit is a sub-unit within WAJ, which monitors, but does not regulate, the 
operational performance of the limited liability companies. The reality of this institutional 
arrangement, however, is one of overlapping responsibilities and fragmentation of 
decision-making processes and institutional cooperation (Hagan 2008). 
 The main concern for advocates of corporate restructuring is the water sector’s 
incomplete corporatization (USAID 2011). Privatization initiatives have been launched in 
Amman, Aqaba, and northern Jordan. In 1999, the MWI agreed to implement a private 
sector management contract in Amman and in 2007 created a Jordan Water Company – 
Miyahuna to oversee Amman’s municipal water services. Limited liability companies 
were also created in Aqaba and northern Jordan in 2004 and 2011 respectively. These 
limited liability companies, however, are wholly owned by WAJ, which also regulates 
and sells bulk water supplies to the companies. This inherently creates a conflict of 
interest, thereby subjecting the companies to significant influence by WAJ and constrains 
the autonomy of the three companies (Humpal et al. 2012).   
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WAJ plays an important role as a flagship institution in the water sector. It is 
characterized as an overly bureaucratized system that is slow to respond to water crises 
and ineffectively coordinates with other water sector institutions. WAJ became a political 
intermediary for Jordanian authorities using public sector employment to diffuse 
simmering tensions between Jordanians and Palestinians. The institution is also plagued 
by a rigid civil service law that prevents termination of public-sector employees for non-
performance (Hagen 2008).11 Over time, this inflexibility and over-bureaucratization 
diminished WAJ’s operational capacity. In 1996 and 2007 the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and the Jordanian Ministry of Public Reform 
recommended delegating WAJ’s management and policy responsibilities to the Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation and decentralizing municipal services (Hagen 2008).  
This recommendation, however, was offset by political expediency. The current 
law inadequately defines institutional responsibilities and disregards the reality of how 
the water sector operates (MWI 2004). Under the current water law, WAJ is legally 
institutionalized through a law and the Ministry through a by-law. This means that the 
MWI technically reports to WAJ despite the fact that the MWI is responsible for the 
whole water sector (Policymaker Eleven 2013). This has fostered a dynamic in which 
ministers rely on their political influence to shape water sector recommendations. For 
example, the recommendation made by CIDA to shift WAJ’s management 
responsibilities to the MWI and decentralize municipal water services was reversed by a 
                                                        
11
 This has been a key target in the reform of the water sector and one of the principal reasons for the 
private management contract for Amman’s municipal water services in 1999. After LEMA assumed 
managerial control of Amman’s water services, it gained the right to hire WAJ employees at private sector 
rates, with the remaining employees were reassigned to different positions within WAJ (Abu-Shams and 
Rabadi 2003). This initiated a preliminary differentiation between public and private sector employees 
within the water sector, with the latter receiving higher wages than WAJ, JVA, and MWI officials. 
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newly appointed MWI minister despite governmental approval (Hagan 2008). There has 
been a strong tendency for ministers to express significant influence over the direction of 
the water sector (Policymaker Twelve 2013). A former Minister of Water and Irrigation 
noted that minister involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the water sector undermines 
long-term planning in the water sector, stating,  
… because of the interference of the newcomers, of the new ministers, “no I don't want 
this project I want that project”…it's not systematic. If it is institutionally well 
structured, the minister would come only just to manage. You know maybe he will be 
more of a politician rather than a technocrat. He would work on future plans rather than 
interfering what is on the table (Policymaker Fourteen 2013). 
 
Some ministers are hands-off in their approach to leadership whereas others engage 
themselves in day-to-day tasks of the MWI and WAJ, and, in some cases, at the level of 
the limited liability companies (Policymaker Six 2013). Similarly, the Council of 
Ministers affect long-term water management plans and strategies as they hold ultimate 
veto power over key issues, including tariff reforms and water law revisions (Humpal et 
al. 2012).  
The lack of a strong legal code limits the MWI’s capacity to enforce cooperation. 
This affects critical programs, such as the demand management programs. For example, 
the Water Demand Management Unit must receive billing and demand projections from 
WAJ-operated municipal water services in order to adequately inform MWI plans and 
strategies. WAJ, however, rarely cooperates with such requests because it is not legally 
required to do so. Similarly, the IDARA project, which was implemented between 2007 
and 2012, was hailed as a success for improving demand management and enhancing 
institutional capacity within the Ministry (Albani, Soer, and Tarawneh 2011). Despite this 
progress, WDMU officials argue that USAID participation was necessary for the 
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project’s progress. After USAID closed the project, the WDMU’s capacity to advocate 
for demand management diminished because it could not compel the limited liability 
companies, wholly owned by WAJ, from providing it with the necessary data to update 
forecast models (Policymaker Eleven 2013). The reason is because the WDMU cannot 
require WAJ to enforce the cooperation of limited liability companies in the sharing of 
information. As such, the calls for integrated water management plans as detailed in the 
National Water Master Plan (MWI 2004) and the Water for Life Strategy report (MWI 
2009) are left unfulfilled.  
The ISSP seeks to mitigate these issues through a legally enshrined corporate 
framework based on revised institutional responsibilities. Figure 2.2 depicts the changes 
being implemented as part of the ISSP. Under the ISSP, the water sector will be governed 
through a corporate framework. This entails several revisions to institutional jurisdictions 
and channeling decision-making process through appropriate frameworks. Central to this 
framework is new water law and the institutionalization of the PMU as a water sector 
regulator anchoring the corporate restructuring program. The PMU will be moved from 
WAJ to the MWI and will be legally empowered to monitor and regulate WAJ and the 
limited liability companies based on key performance indicators. It will also have the 
authority to make recommendations on tariffs and other related issues subject to strong 
political influence. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation will continue to oversee the 
water sector as a whole, but the minister’s influence will be severely constrained. Rather, 
the minister will be required to participate in broader stakeholder debates about water 
policy in a Water Council forum for interest groups and stakeholders to debate and 
provide recommendations to the PMU and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
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(Policymaker Four 2012). The PMU, in turn, will track these policy debates as a legally 
protected institution empowered with the authority to make final recommendations on 
water management contracts, sector allocations, and prices (Policymaker Four 2012). The 
biggest change will be in the revision of WAJ’s responsibilities, and ultimately its 
influence over the water sector. WAJ’s operational scope will be severely curtailed to 
bulk water supply production. WAJ-operated municipal water services, furthermore, will 
be converted into limited liability companies.  
 
Figure 2.2 Proposed Changes to Jordan’s Water Sector Institutions 
 
Source: Basil R. Mahayni 
 The ISSP’s proposed institutional transformation intends to mitigate 
mismanagement and overlapping responsibilities through wholesale corporate 
restructuring. Institutional responsibilities are in the process of being revised so that 
corporatization is scaled up from the municipal to the national scales. Authorities are 
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working to protect this framework by legally institutionalizing these reforms, particularly 
the significant power granted to the PMU. As such, analysts believe that the water sector 
will overall become healthier through more efficient and effective management practices 
and frameworks. This benefit will be especially acute in the water sector’s finances. 
 
Water Costs and Financial Deficit Concerns 
Debt financing and state subsidies have ensured the water sector’s fiscal solvency 
in the short-term, but the sector’s financial outlook is dire. Current cost recovery trends 
barely cover operating costs, delaying necessary investments in capital rehabilitation. The 
National Water Master Plan outlines this burden,  
The annual subsidies to WAJ and JVA amount to about 60 million JD, three quarters of 
which are “swallowed” by WAJ. Out of this amount, 15 million JD are interest payments 
on external loans contracted for investments in hydraulic infrastructure. In addition, there 
are indirect energy subsidies given to farmers reaching a sum of 4 million JD annually. 
Only 50% of the total cost (O&M + depreciation + interest payments) of water sector 
operations are covered from tariffs and related fees (MWI 2004, 88). 
 
The combination of interest payments on loans, poor cost recovery, higher operating 
costs, and limited investment in infrastructure has undermined demand management 
programs. Extensive donor support and subsidization from the Ministry of Finance, 
which is responsible for managing loans, grants and other forms of financial assistance 
given to the water sector, has been necessary to keep the water sector solvent. Currently, 
WAJ and the Ministry of Finance divide responsibilities for interest repayment on 
international and public bonds that are used to finance major infrastructural projects.  
WAJ’s inability to generate enough revenue to cover direct operating costs has 
restricted its capacity to repay loans and interest charges. In 1999, the Ministry of 
Finance indirectly subsidized WAJ by cancelling forty years of accrued debt. Since the 
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cancellation, WAJ’s debt has risen at an alarming rate, reaching 0.7 billion Jordanian 
Dinars in 2010, and is expected to reach 1.9 billion Jordanian Dinars by 2016 
(Sommaripa 2011).12 Current revenue streams cover only 60 to 70 percent of capital 
expenditures and operating costs (Sommaripa 2011). This requires extensive financial 
support from the Jordanian government, which is already mired in debts (Humpal et al. 
2012). In 2010, the net deficit of the water sector was equal to 20 percent of the 
combined deficits of ministries, departments, and other government units (Sommaripa 
2011), forcing the government to spend between 5 and 18 percent of the national budget 
on the water sector (USAID 2011).  
One reason for the cost recovery problem is the sector’s failure to address the 
sources of revenue loss. Jordan faces persistently high rates of non-revenue water (NRW) 
loss, which is water distributed in the network but not billed due to water leaks in the 
network or theft. It is estimated that nearly half of WAJ’s potential revenues are lost to 
water leaks and theft (MWI 2004). Overall, the total estimated annual NRW for the three 
limited liability companies are 80 million cubic meters per year. Miyahuna averages 
around 50 million cubic meters lost annually, or around 40 to 50 percent of the 
circulating water (Humpal et al. 2012). This is alarmingly high considering that 
households only receive water 24 to 48 hours each week. 
Increasing water supplies in Amman’s intermittent distribution system can 
compound the crisis. For example, the Disi Conveyance Project is a major water transfer 
initiative completed in summer 2013.13 The project is supposed to increase Amman’s 
                                                        
12
 One Jordanian Dinar is equivalent to $1.41. 
13 In the mid-2000s, a capital enhancement project was implemented to improve the state of the water 
networks in Amman. It converted the network into a gravity-based pumping and intermittent distribution 
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bulk water supplies for daily distribution to the whole city. However, continuous 
distribution in an intermittent system risks increasing NRW. Further, Disi water 
production costs, excluding operational expenses, is quite high (Humpal et al. 2012) due 
to the complex geography of water production, transfer from low to high elevation, and 
the rising energy prices. The total cost of producing and delivering each cubic meter of 
non-Disi water in 2011 was 1.34 Jordanian Dinars whereas the average price charged to 
the companies was 0.67 Jordanian Dinars (Najjar and Telfah 2012). Disi water 
production costs two to three times as much, but will be sold to the limited liability 
companies at rates similar to non-Disi waters (Policymaker Twelve 2013).14 Subsidies 
from the Ministry of Finance generally allow WAJ to sell bulk water at prices less than 
the cost of production to the limited liability companies (Humpal et al. 2012). This 
arrangement, however, is unsustainable because it obscures the sector’s financial reality 
(USAID 2011), and will likely be compounded by the Disi project.  
The ISSP project intends to close the deficit by restructuring bulk water prices 
according to PMU recommendations (Policymaker Four 2012). Accordingly, the ISSP 
proposes to revise the tariff recommendation process to enhance revenue generation. 
Once it is fully empowered and protected, the PMU will have the authority to propose 
carefully studied tariff revisions to the Council of Ministers. Currently, there are two 
block tariffs in place for urban water supplies: one for Amman and one for the rest of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
system. This was designed to reduce water loss and reduce energy consumption (Abu-Shams and Rabadi 
2003b). Yet, intermittent distribution systems also accelerate deterioration of water networks because of 
pressure fluctuations. Water pipes last longer with continuous circulation of water. Under intermittent 
systems, changes in water pressure affect pipe and connection points and can accelerate corrosion. Repairs 
are therefore frequently needed but hard to track. There are also increased health concerns as back flow 
from negative pressure in the water network can pull contaminants into the water supply system if not 
carefully monitored (Ainsworth and World Health Organization 2004). 
14
 These are bulk water prices imposed on the limited liability companies. They are not the prices 
households pay for each cubic meter consumed. 
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Jordan (Najjar and Telfah 2012). The current tariff structure has been criticized because it 
does little for cost recovery and subsidizes wealthy households (Hagan 2008). Najjar and 
Telfah (2012) argue that the tariff does not differentiate between subscribers according to 
their income. For example, low-income households tend to be larger and thus their water 
use may place them higher price blocks (Ray 2010). Nevertheless, the tariff reforms are 
seen as necessary to cover production costs, especially because electricity prices, a 
critical input for the production and distribution of water, have significantly increased in 
recent years.  
In the last five years, Jordan imported over 90 percent of its energy needs 
(USAID 2010) – the majority from Egypt (IMF 2012a) – with the water sector utilizing 
12 percent of the country’s energy capacity (Najjar and Telfah 2012). Significant 
amounts of energy are needed to access declining groundwater reservoirs and pump 
water from low to high elevations. The heavy reliance on energy imports has left Jordan 
susceptible to regional and market crises. For example, Jordan had to explore alternative 
energy options after international oil prices spiked in 2008 and in 2011 after Egyptian 
protesters in the Sinai destroyed the Arab Gas Pipeline bringing cheap natural gas to 
Jordan.15 The Jordanian government responded with new subsidies as power plants have 
resorted to burning heavy oil and diesel for electricity generation, which are four times 
more costly than natural gas (IMF 2012b). Energy production alone has become a major 
burden on the Jordanian government, consuming as much as 16 percent of the 2011 GDP 
(IMF 2012a). The high cost of energy production has significantly increased operating 
                                                        
15
 The destruction of the Arab Gas Pipeline coincided with the popular uprising against President Hosni 
Mubarak. The pipeline provided natural gas to Jordan via Israel. 
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costs and further constrained investment in capital enhancement and rehabilitation, which 
has reinforced water loss.  
Ultimately, advocates of the ISSP argue that, without reform, Jordan will risk 
losing donor confidence (Sommaripa 2011). Corporate restructuring, it is argued, will 
close the gaps in governance, address institutional overlap concerns, and create a more 
sustainable financial situation by easing the conditions of decision-making. This 
argument is only feasible by characterizing the supply and demand mismatch, 
institutional mismanagement, and energy and cost concerns are framed through 
engineering and economic frameworks. Such representations, however, obscure political 
realities and neutralize critical institutional dynamics in water management. 
 
Reconsidering the Evidence: Critiques of Mainstream Representation 
 Mainstream characterizations of Jordan’s water crises suggest dire outcomes if 
reforms are not implemented. These descriptions generally, and the rationale for 
corporate restructuring specifically, however, are based on overly technical 
characterizations of supply and demand, institutional, and financial issues. Missing from 
these characterizations are the ways that these issues are embedded within and shaped by 
political and institutional constraints. In this section, the three themes will be reexamined 
through an analysis of empirical examples from Jordan and explain how reliance on 
engineering and economic frameworks misrepresent the sources of the water sector’s 




The Politics of Water Supply and Demand 
 Advocates of corporate restructuring in Jordan have criticized the water sector for 
its failure to achieve balance between water supply production and growing demand. This 
claim is depicted through quantitative measurements of water resources, per capita 
availability, and degrees of household consumption. While these characterizations allow 
for comparisons over time, they also obscure critical contexts within which the state of 
water resources, production of new supplies, and consumption are embedded. A more 
effective characterization of the supply and demand mismatch can be developed through 
careful consideration of existing water supplies and the realities of producing new 
resources, regional geopolitical tensions and negotiations over surface and groundwater 
resources, and dynamics of household consumption and access across geographies and 
socioeconomic conditions. 
The first main political constraint ignored in mainstream representations is the 
effect of Jordan’s contentious regional political affairs on water supplies and production 
capacity. Proposed plans to increase water supply production exclude the Jordan and 
Yarmouk Rivers from consideration because the 1994 peace treaty with Israel requires 
institutional collaboration on water supply projects (Beaumont 1997). According to the 
treaty, Israel has the right to pump 12 million cubic meters during the summer and 13 
million cubic meters during the winter from the Yarmouk River. Jordan, on the other 
hand, has rights to any water unused after Israeli consumption (Beaumont 1997). This 
means that Jordan’s guaranteed access is subject to precipitation trends annually, and thus 
nullify any guarantee it may have had to water. Further, Israel also has the right to pump 
up to 20 million cubic meters from the Yarmouk in the winter in exchange for equal 
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transfers back to Jordan from the Jordan River in the summer (Beaumont 1997). The 
headwaters of the Jordan River, however, remain entirely under Israeli control and were 
excluded from treaty negotiations and thus leave Jordan with little legal and or political 
recourse to ensure the water transfers will be realized.  
Similarly, advocates of corporate restructuring call for reducing groundwater 
abstraction to safe yields. The majority of water for municipal, industrial, and agricultural 
demand, however, comes from groundwater resources. Analysts calling for corporate 
restructuring overlook the power of key lobbies, principally agriculture, in water policy 
and planning. Though the Water Council is intended to channel this political influence, it 
is unlikely that the state will insist on radical conservation measures out of fear of public 
discontent. Programs designed to encourage more sustainable irrigation practices and 
community-participation in rural conservation schemes have been met with widespread 
resistance from farming communities (Policymaker Six 2013). Their reluctance to 
participate stems from fears about reduced support and collapse of livelihoods.  
Further, reductions in groundwater abstractions would have to be offset by 
development of alternative supplies. Jordan’s production capacity is significantly 
underdeveloped (Beaumont 1997). Production of new supplies requires significant capital 
investments and energy requirements. Desalination is one such example. In 2013, 
political pundits hailed an Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian agreement to coordinate the 
design and implementation of the Red Sea- Dead Sea desalination project. There are 
multiple goals for this project. First, authorities hope to reverse the decline of the Dead 
Sea stemming from reduced inflow from the Jordan River. Brine from desalinated Red 
Sea water will be transferred to the Dead Sea. Second, the desalination process will 
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generate electricity for the three parties. Third, the plant will produce at least 80 million 
cubic meters of water annually (IRIN 2014).  
The plans are based on a complex purchasing and allocation arrangement between 
the three parties. Israel is expected to buy 50 million cubic meters at 0.29 Jordanian 
Dinars per cubic meter. The rest of the water produced will be reserved for the Aqaba 
Governorate. In exchange, Jordan can purchase about 50 million cubic meters of water 
from Israel’s northern water resources to provide water to Amman and north Jordan. The 
degree of engineering and institutional collaboration required is going to be a challenge, 
particularly as Jordanian authorities become increasingly more cautious with respect to 
open collaboration with the Israeli government. Further, many argue that this project is 
simply too expensive, with $4 billion price tag, and that the potential environmental 
consequences for the Dead Sea outweigh the potential benefits (IRIN 2014). The World 
Bank’s feasibility study raised a number of additional issues, including environmental 
impacts on the Red Sea, disturbance to important archaeological sites, societal impacts 
through land reclamation and land use changes, and energy inputs required for pumping 
and desalination (Barrett 2012). These feasibility questions and the high cost of the 
project has thus far deterred donor interest (IRIN 2014). 
While these examples reflect the political and institutional challenges shaped by 
Jordan’s geopolitical relationships, Jordan has not performed well when it comes to 
realizing major projects domestically. It is not uncommon for major infrastructure or 
development projects to experience significant delays in Jordan. The completion of the 
Disi water conveyance project, for example, was supposed to coincide with the 
completion of the rehabilitation of Amman’s water network in the early 2000s. The Disi 
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project is supposed to transfer waters from the Disi aquifer on the border with Saudi 
Arabia to Amman, and allow for the continuous distribution of water throughout the city. 
However, the Disi project experienced several setbacks due to continual calls to revisit 
contracting negotiations and project plans by changing authorities within the MWI, 
increases in steel prices internationally, and rising operational costs (Policymaker One 
2012). Consequently, the delays forced project officials to abandon the construction of a 
continuous supply network, and instead refurbished the system based on an intermittent 
distribution design (Policymaker Three 2012). The project was finally completed in 2013; 
though officials now worry that non-revenue water loss will increase, as higher volumes 
of water pumped through a network designed for intermittent distribution will accelerate 
the deterioration of the water networks.  
A clearer understanding of why Jordan faces significant challenges in producing 
new supplies requires reconsideration of how demand is characterized. The reason is that 
most mainstream characterizations of demand are tied to supplies through per capita 
availability. For example, most mainstream characterizations of Jordan’s supply and 
demand mismatch note that Jordan has risen in the water scarcity rankings since its 
independence in 1946.  The baseline benchmark for per capita availability in the NWMP 
is from 1946, the year of Jordan’s independence. Nearly 70 years later, per capita 
availability has declined such that Jordan is characterized by “severe water scarcity.” 
Forecasted supplies and demand suggest that this gap is likely to grow. Yet, much like 
declining water supplies and forecasted production do not reflect the political and 
institutional challenges affecting the water sector, declining per capita availability does 
not reflect how, why, or when the mismatch was produced. For example, per capita 
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availability measurements for periods of refugee influx or intervals between the refugee 
crises do not exist. Such measurements could help policymakers plan for a number of 
water management scenarios and diminish the need for emergency responses – albeit to a 
limited extent.  
Further, such measurements do not adequately characterize household access and 
consumption trends across geography and socio-economic class. For example, since 
2011, Jordan has received approximately 600,000 Syrians. This no doubt presents key 
challenges for water officials. Miyahuna’s Director of Customer Services states, 
Natural growth is high. The birth rate is around 3.8 percent…we have been lucky 
with forced migration…These forced migrations affect us a lot. Even in planning 
because when you do long term plan for 10 or 15 years, you predict that the city will 
grow under natural growth, about 3.5 percent, this is the normal growth…but since 
1967 till now, we have not planned well and we cannot because every 10 to 12 years, 
we have jumps – million or half a million. So the plan goes with the wind 
(Policymaker Thirteen 2013). 
 
His claims reveal the frustration of being unable to keep up with Jordan’s rapidly 
changing demographics. Yet, a careful analysis suggests that his frustrations should not 
necessarily be targeted towards urban households.   
Trends show that municipal water consumption has remained steady since 1994, 
despite a near 50 percent increase in population (Humpal et al. 2012). Households 
already have limited consumption capacity and practice water conservation (Potter and 
Darmame 2010). Indeed, a Syrian refugee family of eight people living in a small 
apartment in Irbid is unlikely to consume the same amount of water as a wealthy family 
in Amman living in a single-family home with a garden and a swimming pool. Part of the 
problem, therefore, is that there is a lack of good data. For example, the National Water 
Master Plan’s demand forecasts are based on only five years of billing data (1996 to 
2001) provided by the Water Authority of Jordan (MWI 2004) – well before the Iraqi and 
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Syrian crises. As such, these forecasts estimate that 9.20 million people will be living in 
Jordan by 2020 in contrast to the reality of nearly 8 million people living in Jordan by 
2012. This naturally enflames debates about the exact amounts of future water supply and 
demand (Humpal et al. 2012) and also raises questions about why supply and demand 
analyses are not situated within their political and institutional realities. 
It can be argued that the representations of per capita demand and debates over 
new water supplies are politically charged and politically expedient. Politically, water 
authorities regularly cite Jordan’s ongoing refugee crisis as the culprit for its recent 
problems while neglecting the nature of its political treaty with Israel or its own 
institutional challenges. Similarly, the case for corporate restructuring depoliticizes the 
characterizations of the supply and demand mismatch and generate consensus on the 
risks, especially for poor households, if the status quo prevails (Humpal et al. 2012; 
Khaleq and Dziegielewski 2006; Khaleq 2008; Hazaimeh 2008; Hadadin and Tarawneh 
2007; Abu-Shams and Rabadi 2003a).16 Such characterizations, however, obscure the 
political and institutional realities that underpin the water sector’s supply and demand 
challenges. As such, a closer look at the central government’s political influence over the 
water sector points and the institutional constraints impeding on the sector’s ability to 




                                                        
16 The National Water Master Plan is a key source of framing for this particular aspect of the crisis. The 
plan reports on a number of different facets of demand, including drinking water and irrigation, noting that 
demand will reach 1565 million cubic meters per capita by 2020, with municipal demand likely to grow 
from 83 liters per capita per day to 142 liters per capita per day (MWI 2004).  
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Politics of Institutional Overlap and Mismanagement 
Since the mid-1990s, Jordan’s public water sector institutions have been criticized 
for mismanagement, institutional overlap, and overly bureaucratic nature. (Hagan 2008). 
Corporate restructuring advocates have utilized these characterizations in their 
justification for reform, especially as mainstream assessments detail the impacts of 
inadequate water laws and political influence on the water sector. These assessments, 
however, are based on ahistorical and apolitical representations of institutional dynamics 
and near exclusion of political realities. Attempting to transform institutional 
responsibilities without addressing these factors may end up the sector’s management 
crises.  
The principal factor that first and foremost guides the water sector is regime 
security. This plays an instrumental role in shaping how the water sector operates. The 
King’s Council of Ministers, which is responsible for all political decisions, acts as a de 
facto institution protecting the status quo in which the central government balances 
reform, public opinion, and regime security. Ministerial executive decisions, such as a 
reversal of agreed upon development programs, operate within this balancing act 
(Hussein, Abu Sharar, and Battikhi 2005). This political influence over the sector is 
expressed through formal and informal means. Formally, the Council of Ministers 
remains in control over major decisions, such as adoption of new water laws, 
transformation of institutional responsibilities, or tariff revisions. Informally, this means 
that the Council of Ministers clips the capacity of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation to 
be responsible for water sector strategy and planning, especially as ministers take 
decision reflecting the short-term interests of the Council rather than the long-term 
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interests of the water sector. While the corporate restructuring program seeks to divert the 
influence of the minister through the Water Council, at no point do ISSP 
recommendations discuss the influence of the Council of Ministers nor suggest that it be 
subject to reforms. The irony is that the Council of Ministers has proven to be a key 
institutional barrier to the sector’s long-term sustainability, but any measure that would 
seek to either channel or diminish this influence would require their participation.  
Consequently, ISSP recommendations calling for centralizing management 
responsibilities within the MWI and granting regulatory responsibilities to the PMU will 
do little to change the water sector’s managerial landscape without reforming the power 
of the Council of Ministers. Further, this influence of the Council of Ministers will have 
the effect of continually centralizing public opinion, even if informally, in water policy 
debates. Authorities are concerned about how Jordanians will react to price increases and 
subsidy reductions and how public sector employees will react to reform programs. Will 
the employees be convinced or coerced into participating in the reform process? On the 
one hand, a new water law is required for WAJ to be legally bound to its new 
responsibilities as a bulk water supplier, but in reality the adoption of a new water law 
will only happen after years of negotiation – perhaps after the corporate restructuring 
program has concluded. On the other hand, even if WAJ leaders agree to the shift, they 
may find it difficult to convince public sector employees to take on new responsibilities. 
WAJ employees are strongly positioned to resist these efforts because civil service laws 
protect their tenure.  
Consequently, ISSP recommendations for institutional transformation come off as 
naive. This naivety, however, stems from a failure to adequately understand or situate the 
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management crises within a systematic understanding of how the sector operates. Indeed, 
there is little reason to think that institutional transformations and corporate frameworks 
will mitigate the sector’s fragmented coordination when in reality most of the public 
sector employees are likely to remain the same. Without effective buy-in from civil 
service employees, it should be expected that reforms will be slow to proceed, and 
perhaps even reversed after project funds are completely dispersed. Indeed, the demand 
management programs discussed earlier are highly indicative of what may be to come. It 
is unreasonable to expect institutional cooperation with significant numbers of employees 
knowing that civil service laws protect their livelihoods.  
Consequently, initiatives that produce no immediate benefit for the employee are 
likely to be dismissed as added work or a threat to their job security. For example, the 
MWI’s demand management programs produce little direct benefit to the limited liability 
companies and WAJ operations directorates. This is compounded by the fact that 
municipal water institutions are set up as independent authorities that are competing for 
limited capital in order to treat and distribute water within their defined geographical 
jurisdictions. As such, these municipal water services have little incentive to support or 
prioritize national level planning. The result of this is that programs like demand 
management become fractured at the national and municipal scales, with the MWI 
scrambling for data in order to generate national master plans (Policymaker Eleven 2013) 
and Miyahuna pursuing its own awareness campaigns, media advertisements, and youth 
programs with limited support or consultation from the MWI (Policymaker Seven 2013). 
It is important to keep in mind that mainstream claims about institutional mismanagement 
and overlapping responsibilities are not principal sources of the sector’s crises. Rather, 
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they are symptoms of underlying political realities and institutional constraints affecting 
the national and municipal sectors. 
This reiterated point is exemplified by Miyahuna’s constrained capacity to plan. 
For example, Miyhauna officials lamented the lack of communication about the Disi 
conveyance project from WAJ and MWI officials. Miyahuna authorities were told to 
prepare for higher volumes of water and provide continuous supplies to all households 
without detailed information of when deliveries would commence (Policymaker One 
2012). Further, Miyahuna authorities had little say in the negotiations over how much 
water would be sold to them by WAJ and at what price (Policymaker Twelve 2013), 
while Miyahuna has no say over water prices charged to consumers. Consequently, 
Miyahuna has had to finance the replacement of several hundred thousand water meters 
to accommodate the shift from intermittent to continuous supplies along with adjusting 
billing procedures and operations. Naturally, this heightened fears that progress in billing 
and water use monitoring since the network rehabilitation project in the early 2000s 
would be set back by higher operational expenditures and increases in non-revenue water 
loss (Policymaker One 2012). The issue here, however, is not that WAJ and the MWI 
failed to communicate effectively with Miyahuna authorities. 
Even if WAJ and MWI were completely transparent about when deliveries would 
commence and at what pace, Miyahuna would still scramble to accommodate the 
continuous supplies. This all stems from the failure to coordinate the completion of the 
network rehabilitation project and the Disi conveyance project. Institutional constraints 
on Miyahuna’s financial management reinforce its inability to effectively respond to or 
coordinate the reception of Disi water. Miyahuna is unable to set water prices or secure 
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financing for infrastructure development or rehabilitation, both of which are tightly 
related to the state and quality of water networks. As such, the push for corporatizing 
municipal water utilities throughout the country must critically reflect on the conditions 
through which the corporatization process is taking place and how such institutions will 
be constrained institutionally.  
Mainstream characterizations of institutional overlap and mismanagement fail to 
acknowledge the political and institutional realities within which the water sector 
operates. Advocates of privatization draw on these characterizations to argue that the 
sector’s crises can easily be modified through corporate restructuring. However, this 
assumes that all levels of the national and municipal water sector institutions can be 
neatly repackaged. Instead, the influence of political and institutional constraints on water 
management must be acknowledged because they become an inherent part of the design 
and operation of the water sector. The examples of the previously implemented demand 
management programs and coordination of major water supply projects reflect how these 
constraints play out in different ways. The stakes of not addressing these realities are 
high, especially since operational and capital costs continue to determine how well the 
water sector can accommodate change.  
 
Politics of Water Costs and Deficits 
Financial stability is essential for a stable water sector. Failure to implement 
meaningful reforms that reduce financial deficits while also streamlining capital 
expenditures, operating costs, and revenue streams may deter donor interest in financing 
future projects (Sommaripa 2011). Mainstream analysts argue that Jordan’s water sector 
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is financially unstable because it has failed to integrate revisions to water tariffs and bulk 
water prices with strategic investments in alternative energy sources, production of new 
water supplies, and infrastructure expansion and rehabilitation ( USAID 2012b; 
Sommaripa 2011). Such conclusions about the water sector’s financial health are accurate 
but they also neglect why the water sector has been unable to stabilize.  
The main source of the water sector’s financial struggles, an issues missed in 
mainstream reports, is the dynamic relationship between state subsidies and donor 
lending. Donors have played a key role in financing the sector’s development since 
independence in 1946 (Ditzel 2008). Since 1952, the US government, through 
USAID/Jordan, has provided approximately $6 billion in economic assistance to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Half of that amount was allocated after 2002 (Bell 2011). 
Consequently, donor support has become as a critical lifeline for the water sector, 
particularly for capital expenditures. Between 2005 and 2010, donors covered 46 percent 
of the total capital costs, 73 percent of which came from USAID (Humpal et al. 2012). In 
the same time period, WAJ financed 39 percent of their investments in the construction 
and rehabilitation of infrastructure (totaling to 900 million Jordanian Dinars) through 
international and public bonds (Humpal et al. 2012).  
The extensive support provided by donors raises questions about how this has 
shaped the managerial and financial dynamics of the water sector. On the one hand, 
without donor support, it is unlikely that the water sector would be able to continue 
investing in infrastructure expansion and rehabilitation. On the other hand, donor lending 
has saddled the water sector with extensive debt. Between 2005 and 2010, debt surged 
from 64 million Jordanian Dinars to 621 million Jordanian Dinars – an increase of 900 
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percent (Humpal et al. 2012). Jordan’s water sector is thus stuck within the institutional 
reliance on donor support for capital expenditures because without them operational costs 
would skyrocket and services would rapidly deteriorate. 
Municipal water services operated by WAJ and the limited liability companies are 
financially afloat only because the central government provides direct and indirect 
subsidies and assists with debt repayment. Mainstream characterizations of Jordan’s 
water sector cite these subsidies as a key reason for the sector’s financial instability and 
as such recommend cutting subsidies to the water sector and requiring bulk water and 
energy prices to reflect their real market cost of production. If such measures are 
implemented, bankruptcy becomes a real possibility for Miyahuna and the limited 
liability companies. This is due to the fact that the limited liability companies, and WAJ, 
rely extensively on government support to cover operating costs and capital expenditures 
(Policymaker Twelve 2013). Granted, this is not a problem unique to Jordan as one of the 
common criticisms of public sector institutions is that they almost universally fall into 
debt in their efforts to subsidize universal access to water. What is often excluded in 
mainstream criticisms of public sector debt, however, is that debt cycles produced by 
donor conditions reinforce the subsidization of municipal water services.  
These institutional constraints to the debt cycle are reinforced by political factors 
outside the control of water sector officials. First, mainstream characterizations do not 
adequately address the fact that water sector authorities in the MWI and WAJ cannot 
introduce new tariffs without approval from the Council of Ministers and tariff 
negotiations are politically fraught as ministers are afraid of upsetting the general public. 
Second, mainstream characterizations have not produced tailored recommendations that 
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address the water sector authorities energy costs. Electricity costs account for the 
majority of Miyahuna’s operating expenditures from lifting, treating, and distributing 
water across Jordan. Jordan’s lack of domestic energy resources means that it is held 
hostage by the region’s energy politics. The destruction of the Arab Gas Pipeline in the 
Sinai Peninsula exemplifies Jordan’s susceptibility to regional dynamics. Diversifying its 
access to energy would ensure more sustainable access and lower prices. This, however, 
is easier said than done. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council reluctantly agreed to 
provide critical foreign aid to Jordan after the destruction of the Arab Gas Pipeline 
pushed the Jordanian economy to the brink of crisis (The Peninsula 2012). Jordan has 
explored alternative energy options from Qatar (Jordan Times 2013) and Israel (Trilnick 
2013), but to date no deals have been reached. Jordanian lawmakers have protested 
potential plans for an Israeli gas deal in light of Israeli escalation of violence in the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank (Reed and Krauss 2014). Additionally, gas purchases from Qatar 
is not yet a viable option because the natural gas terminal at the Port of Aqaba is not yet 
complete (Jordan Times 2013). Some also argue that the Gulf States have used their 
financial clout to manipulate regional affairs. For example, some have linked Syria’s 
rejection in 2009 of a Qatari proposal to build natural gas pipeline that would pass 
through Jordan and Syria into Turkey with Qatar’s support for opposition movements 
fighting the Assad regime in 2011 and 2012 (Ahmed 2013). Jordan, in the end, became a 
key victim of the escalation of violence with over half a million Syrian refugees.  
Ultimately, mainstream analyses characterize the financial crisis in ways that link 
corporate restructuring to improvements in efficiency and financial stability. Mainstream 
claims about Jordan’s water crisis, however, tend to focus only the sector’s failure to 
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keep operating costs low and invest in infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion. The 
financial deficits and energy crisis are not direct symptoms of poor management in the 
water sector. Instead, they are outcome of institutional dynamics produced by 
government subsidies and donor support and domestic and regional political crises. As 
such, if subsidies are reduced, as recommended, the sector will no longer be able to cover 
operating costs let alone meet its necessary capital investments. The sector is thus 
institutionally and politically reliant on borrowed money to finance major projects and 
extensive government support for debt repayment and operational costs.  
 
Conclusion 
It is important to understand how Jordan’s water crises are framed in mainstream 
analyses because market based management has become hegemonic (Harris, Goldin, and 
Sneddon 2013). The mainstream characterizations can be divided into three themes: 1) 
water supply and demand, 2) institutional overlap and mismanagement, and 3) financial 
health. Analysts draw on these three themes in building the case for reform. These 
characterizations, however, are based on engineering and economic frameworks that do 
not reflect the institutional and political realities that underlie the challenges associated 
with supply and demand, institutional mismanagement and overlap, and financial 
realities.  
 Consequently, any assessment of the supply and demand mismatch must account 
for Jordan’s geopolitical constraints with respect to accessing shared surface water 
resources or challenges associating with collaborative production of new supplies. Jordan 
has been severely affected by regional instability over the past few years, which has 
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simultaneously reduced the likelihood of collaboration with its neighbors and between 
water sector institutions while also reinforcing domestic humanitarian, economic, and 
political crises. These domestic and regional dynamics strongly influence the 
government’s capacity to manage public deficits through finance reforms and public 
opinion. Economic and engineering frameworks attempting to frame these issues obscure 
the ways that critical political, social, and economic realities seriously shape operational 
systems and decision-making processes in Jordan.  
Mainstream water policy debates must address critical questions about 
jurisdiction, power, capacities, and abilities of water institutions. Framing of water sector 
crises is an inherently political process that requires acute understanding of local political 
realities and institutional dynamics (Mahayni 2013a). Scholarship explains how 
representation processes are inherently political – abstracting complex realities and 
translating them into easily interpretable facts (Stengers 2000) despite the limitations of 
framing water scientifically (Linton 2010; Mehta 2005). These facts take on meaning 
when policymakers and planners situate the facts within development paradigms and 
design programs to create order out of perceived chaos (Mitchell 1988). Further, it is 
through these processes that development institutions and projects are created and 
implemented (Scott 1998). This chapter builds on these perspectives by extending them 
to the debates about privatization in water management. Specifically, the chapter 
highlights how mainstream characterizations obscure the political and institutional 
realities of water sector crises in ways conducive for the advocacy of privatization and 
corporate restructuring.  
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Ultimately, it is important to keep in mind that critiques of representation should 
focus on the ways that policymakers utilize particular types of knowledge, and for what 
they exclude. All policy is political. The challenge, therefore, is to see and understand 
how water policy framing, development, and implementation are processes requiring 
careful consideration of environmental, social, economic, and political realities. The 
challenge ahead is to forge an analytical space for acknowledging complex human-
environment relationships and political realities in the policymaking process. The first 
step in doing so is to understand how the institutional and political constraints affecting 
contemporary water management crises were produced and evolved throughout the 
course of the water sector’s development. This is attempted in Chapter Three.  
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Chapter 3 Producing Constraints to Water Management  
Introduction 
Privatization of municipal water services represents a shift away from public 
sector management (Swyngedouw 2005) despite the fact that management failures are 
common to both regimes (Bakker 2010). Scholarship on the dynamics of municipal water 
services pre- and post-privatization, however, are rarely addressed together. While the 
public sector management crises were instrumental for justifying privatization programs, 
there has been little research into how the underlying reasons for these crises carried into, 
or shaped, reform projects. Making sense of this relationship requires understanding the 
history of urban water systems and institutions, and their development vis-à-vis state 
building processes.  
State formation and making processes facilitated the development of water sector 
development (Baker 2005) in ways that concentrated power (Swyngedouw 2014; Alatout 
2009; Swyngedouw 2007b; Alatout 2006; Swyngedouw 1999) and changed local 
governance dynamics over water resources (Haines 2010; Gelles 2000; Gilmartin 1996; 
Lansing 1991). Further, research shows that colonial and post-colonial policies played an 
instrumental role in shaping the dynamics of municipal water services (Gandy 2006; 
Swyngedouw 2004; Dill and Crow 2014). Together, these two arguments can help 
explain why privatization programs have largely failed throughout the global South. 
This chapter attempts to link the research on state building and water sector 
development with literatures on histories of urban water management using the case of 
Amman, Jordan. The case of Amman suggests that contemporary management crises 
cannot be understood without attending to donor financing projects and national water 
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sector development over the last fifty years. Donors and the Jordanian government have 
continuously partnered on institutional and policy development initiatives in order to 
improve and expand water management capacity at the municipal and national level. This 
chapter argues that the combination of donor-funded projects since the 1960s, state 
security, and crisis management led to the emergence, and continual evolution, of 
institutional and political constraints. These constraints have continually produced 
management failures in municipal and national water services, reflecting their endemic 
nature in the water sector, creating a seemingly perpetual crisis in the water sector. 
This argument is developed through an analysis of Jordan’s water sector history 
and donor-funded projects in Amman and Jordan’s national water sector since the early 
1960s. This chapter is divided into three sections. First, it begins with a historical 
overview of the water sector, urban planning, and development of the state. Second, the 
chapter analyzes three eras of Amman’s water sector development (1960s, 1970s to early 
1980s, and mid-1980s to 1990s), with specific focus on how infrastructural and 
institutional development reinforced the conditions of management failures over time. 
Third, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance of Jordan to academic 
scholarship about water management crises and governance failures. 
 
State Building, the Water Sector, and Amman 
Since independence, state building in Jordan has been mediated by several major 
humanitarian crises, regime security, and development goals (Ababsa 2013). These 
factors had an impact on planning and governance frameworks at the national and 
municipal levels. Initially, the state exercised strong influence over national development 
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and urban planning in an effort to consolidate its power over society and resources. In the 
1970s and early 1980s, Jordan’s experienced strong economic growth that facilitated the 
creation of a strong bureaucracy whereupon regime security and public acquiescence 
dominated water policies. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, a regional economic 
downturn forced Jordan into structural adjustment policies. With support from 
international financial institutions, Jordan adopted market-friendly policies in order to 
entice higher degrees of foreign investment. The state building processes and transition to 
market frameworks has left a lasting footprint on the water sector. As such, water 
management institutions have evolved in-line with dominant management trends 
overtime, with political and institutional constraints shaping water management goals, 
planning processes, and the institutional reforms. 
 
State Building in Jordan and Amman’s Urban Development 
Over the past 100 years, institution building and expressions of state power have 
been closely tied to the major development projects and its management of major events, 
including several refugee crises and foreign investment in capital-intensive projects. In 
the 1920s, two decades before independence, the Hashemite family selected Amman as 
the capital of the Trans-Jordan Mandate over the economically and politically strong city 
of al-Salt in order to consolidate their power (Tell 2013). Amman was considered to be a 
strategic military location because it was linked to the other major urban centers in the 
region by the Hijaz Railway (Hanania 2011; Rogan 1996). In turn, Mandate authorities 
built new state institutions and projected symbolic power throughout Amman in an effort 
to bolster the city’s local and regional status.  
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This model of top-down institution building carried into independence as 
Jordanian authorities sought to capitalize on regional finance and incoming migration. 
The state offered public sector job opportunities for Jordanians and regional migrants 
(Potter et al. 2009; Potter et al. 2007) while also coordinating with UN agencies to 
resettle incoming refugees in and around Amman. Authorities set up the Al-Hussein and 
Wehdat refugee camps for Palestinians expelled from their homes in 1948 and 1967, 
which later became permanent settlements that supported active businesses, schools, and 
social services (al-Hamarneh 2002). By the 1970s, state control had been largely 
consolidated. Authorities launched campaigns to attract regional investment in Amman 
and convinced major banks in the Gulf to open branches in Amman, shifting the 
commercial center from the historic downtown to newly developed western parts of the 
city (Biegel 1996). The state also encouraged capitalists fleeing the Lebanese and Iraqi 
wars to invest in Jordan (Biegel 1996).  
A regional economic crisis in the late 1980s and 1990s crippled Jordan’s economy 
as foreign investment and remittances from Jordanian workers abroad precipitously 
declined (Biegel 1996). By the late 1980s, Jordan transitioned towards a more market-
oriented economy. Throughout the 1990s, authorities passed laws to ease investments and 
rewarded major investors with permanent residency and citizenship (Olwan 2006). This 
was an attractive opportunity for wealthy Iraqis fleeing the second Gulf War (Parker 
2009). The state also created new institutions to facilitate major investment projects 
(Daher 2008) and adopted market-oriented planning and governance frameworks 
(Beauregard and Marpillero-Colomina 2011; Parker 2009). For example, the state created 
MAWARED, an autonomous state-owned enterprise, to oversee the redevelopment of the 
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Abdali district in Amman. Authorities destroyed the previous site of the General Jordan 
Armed Forces Headquarters and relocated a public transportation hub in the center of 
Amman for the Abdali Project and sold land at highly subsidized prices for the 
construction of a multi-million dollar exclusive commercial and residential center (Daher 
2008). The state effectively deregulated urban planning in order to make this project a 
reality.  
Ultimately, since Jordan’s independence in 1946, state security and economic 
interests had profound impacts on development planning at the national and municipal 
levels. This ultimately resulted in Amman becoming the country’s political and economic 
center. The water sector’s evolution mirrored this dynamic, as the state utilized water 
management to secure Amman as the capital city and establishing regime legitimacy and 
security in the Jordan Valley. These two political priorities also influenced the nature of 
the water sector’s institutional evolution. Over time, the water sector came to exemplify 
the nature of Jordan’s political and economic transformations and also highlight how 
particular political and institutional constraints became part and parcel of water 
management at the municipal and national levels. 
 
The Origins of Jordan’s Water Institutions 
The state’s management of local and regional events significantly influenced 
Jordan’s water sector since its independence. Two particular factors played a crucial role 
in shaping the sector’s development. On the one hand, Jordanian authorities sought 
greater control over the Jordan Valley after the Palestinian refugee crises created security 
and border concerns. On the other hand, the state sought to consolidate its power and 
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centralize its authority over the young state by prioritizing Amman’s water management 
needs. Over time, the state embarked on new management plans and initiatives in ways 
that reflected the rapidly changing contexts in the country.  
Jordan’s water sector has its origins in the early years of British Mandate Trans-
Jordan. Municipal councils held responsibility over local use and distribution while the 
central government facilitated project implementation, drafted legislation, and handled 
capital investment costs (Haddadin 2006). At the time, an Executive Council and later 
Legislative Council were responsible for drafting and implementing policies with 
technical, legal, and financial support from British civilian and military administrators, 
creating the foundations for a national infrastructure. Legislative development in Trans-
Jordan Mandate pieced together Ottoman laws on land and water rights with British 
Mandate Palestine regulations (Haddadin 2006). This institutionalized contradictions 
between Jordanian, Ottoman, and British mandate water laws and land rights, an issue 
that plagued the Levant area writ large (see Warriner 1981).17  
Brewing insecurity on the border with Palestine heightened the Mandate’s nascent 
control over land and water. The Jordan Valley became a strategic site for development 
as authorities sought to buffer the geopolitical crisis in Palestine. In 1939 Michael 
Ionides, the Mandate’s Projects Department manager, assessed the feasibility of sharing 
the Jordan River Basin as part of a political solution to Zionist settlement in the West 
Bank. Ionides concluded that the Jordan River could not meet Jordanian and Zionist 
                                                        
17
 In the 1920s and 1930s, tensions due to increasing Jewish migration into mandate-era Palestine resulted 
in government legislation over the use of water in what Haddadin (2006) considers to be the first foray into 
regional or international water issues. This dissertation does not delve into these issues, but it should be 
acknowledged that water legislation and institutions were and continue to be shaped by regional 
geopolitical concerns. 
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development plans without bi-party coordination (Haddadin 2000). Trans-Jordanian 
authorities perceived Zionist encroachment and confiscation of Palestinian lands as a 
threat to its security.  
Following Jordan’s independence, tensions increased after Zionist administrators 
began water transfers away from the Jordan Valley for agricultural production. Jordanian 
authorities feared this would stunt development and further deteriorate border security. In 
response, the Kingdom hired Sir Murdoch MacDonald and Partners, a British consulting 
firm, to study the development potential of the Yarmouk and Jordan River Basins in 1946 
(Baker and Harza Engineering 1955; Haddadin 2006). Their findings suggested that 
water transfers from the Jordan Valley would undermine local irrigation (Haddadin 
2000). These development challenges were compounded by Israel’s continued 
appropriation of water and the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians into the West Bank 
and Jordan in 1948. By this stage, Jordan and Israel were at war. 
In a peace-building effort, President Dwight Eisenhower sent Ambassador Eric 
Johnston to negotiate a unified development plan for the Jordan Valley between Israel 
and Jordan. Jordanian authorities were skeptical of Johnston because of American 
support for Israel, viewing his efforts as an attempt to convince Arab states to recognize 
Israel and undermine the Palestinians the right of return (Haddadin 2000). While 
Johnston’s shuttle diplomacy secured support from the Israelis, Jordanians, and other 
Arab leaders over the technical dimensions of the project (Beaumont 1997), no political 
agreement was reached (Haddadin 2000). This ultimately cemented Israeli and Jordanian 
non-cooperation in water management in the Jordan Valley until the signing of the peace 
treaty in 1994. 
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Jordan was thus pressed in two ways. Zionist administrators continued water 
transfers and thus reducing Jordanian access. Jordanian authorities, however, needed to 
balance their desire to transfer water away from the Jordan Valley with fostering local 
development in the Jordan Valley. Jordanian officials believed that security could be 
restored through permanent settlement and income-generating opportunities that would 
pacify widespread anger amongst Palestinian and Jordanian farmers (Haddadin 2006). 
Between 1946 and 1957, Jordan embarked on a systematic effort to delineate water and 
land rights in the Jordan River Basin according to land tenure laws denoted in the 
Ottoman Gazette (Haddadin 2006)18 by using triangulation land survey methods – a 
British technique for mapping land (Mitchell 2002). Land rights helped mitigate tension 
between nomadic Bedouin communities and Palestinian refugees (Tell 2013; Ababsa 
2013) and provided a framework for public assistance to large-scale development 
projects (Ababsa 2013; Haddadin, Sunna’, and Al Rashid 2006).19 For example, 
landownership permitted partial state financing of irrigation projects on the condition that 
landowners provide two-thirds of the capital cost (Haddadin 2006). Through such 
projects, Jordanian authorities gained political capital with beneficiaries of public 
assistance (Ababsa 2013), in turn, securing the Jordan Valley and consolidating state 
power.  
                                                        
18 While Islamic Shari’a law grants households the right to land and water, ultimate ownership remains 
with God with the state retaining the right to administer and distribute land. Yet, despite longstanding 
activity in the development of Islamic jurisprudence, the ideas developed in Islamic law intermix with local 
cultural customs and political power, as individuals and communities exercise undue influence in the 
distribution of land (Sait and Lim 2006).  
19
 In 1946, the Kingdom adopted Law Number 38 the Law of Settlement of Water Rights, which detailed 
the procedures by which water rights were specified. Six years later, Law Number 40 tied water rights to 
land definitions because irrigation farmers utilized the majority of water. 
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As tensions in the Jordan Valley eased, state officials were now faced with new 
tensions between rural and urban communities (see Tell 2013). As a growing city, and the 
center of political power, state officials prioritized the development of Amman’s 
municipal water services, which required significant attention due to major refugee 
camps and rapid urbanization. By the 1950s and 1960s, authorities consolidated 
municipal water management responsibilities, agricultural-related programs, and major 
infrastructural projects in one institution. In 1959, the Department of Irrigation, the 
drilling department at the Ministry of Public Works, and the Department of Water 
Resources Development at the Office of Consolidated Services were merged into the 
Central Water Authority (CWA). The CWA oversaw the development of water policies 
and projects throughout the country and provided bulk water supplies to municipalities. 
Water management responsibilities, however, remained with the municipalities 
(Haddadin 2006). In 1965, the Amman Municipality created a Water Department to 
oversee municipal water services and infrastructure management in Amman (Haddadin 
2006).  
This set a critical precedent for subsequent water sector development projects. In 
1966 the CWA was combined with the East Ghor Canal Authority and the Department of 
Mining to form the Natural Resources Authority (NRA). The East Ghor Canal Authority 
managed what is now called the King Abdullah Canal, provides irrigation water for 
agricultural production (Courcier, Venot, and Molle 2005).20 Unlike the CWA, the NRA 
assumed control over municipal water management, except in Amman. The exclusion of 
                                                        
20
 The canal stretches for 70 kilometers from the Yarmouk River along eastern bank of the Jordan River, 
and intercepting waters flowing into the Jordan Valley (Alkhaddar, Sheehy, and Al-Ansari 2005). 
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Amman from otherwise centralized water management reinforced the geographical split, 
and rift, between Amman, the Jordan Valley, and the rest of the country. 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war deepened the water management cleavage between 
Amman and the Jordan Valley. Israeli occupation of the West Bank sent a second wave 
of Palestinian refugees into Jordan. Political instability forced officials to question water 
allocation and distribution more seriously (Wolff et al. 2012). Jordan passed two laws to 
alleviate tensions and begin the reconstruction process in the Jordan Valley. Law Number 
2 in 1973 established the Jordan Valley Commission to manage social and economic 
development, including water development projects (Haddadin 2006) while Law Number 
56 in 1973 shifted municipal water management responsibilities from the NRA to the 
Domestic Water Supply Corporation (DWSC). The DWSC, however, did not hold any 
authority over municipal water services in Amman. In 1977, the Jordan Valley 
Commission became the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), consolidating the Jordan River 
Tributaries Regional Corporation, parts of the Natural Resources Authority, and the 
DWSC offices in the Jordan Valley under one institutional umbrella (Haddadin 2006). 
Again, Amman was excluded from these decisions. 
Ultimately, water institutions with some degree of centralization formed out of the 
geopolitical concerns over the Jordan Valley and Amman. Both Amman and the Jordan 
Valley emerged major development priorities for the state. They also were avenues 
through which state institutions were formed and reconfigured. Institutional 
transformations in the 1960s were taking place as major World Bank projects 
commenced. Donor-financed projects and conditions combined with the political factors 
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shaping institutional reforms to create dynamic institutional and political constraints on 
municipal and national water services.  
 
Donor Projects and Water Sector Crises 
Since the early 1960s, donors have provided critical loans for developing 
infrastructure, particularly for municipal water services, enhancing supply production 
capacity, and facilitating management and institutional reforms. Over the course of four 
decades, however, the combination of political factors and donor-conditions have 
produced and reinforced political and institutional constraints that undermined water 
management programs at the municipal and national level. Over time, management crises 
became a central characteristic of the water sector. Institutional reforms and water sector 
development projects simply reconfigured the conditions for management failures in the 
water sector.  
 
Amman’s Water Supply and Sewerage Projects 1960s to mid-1970s 
In the early 1960s until the mid-1970s, donors financed water infrastructure 
development on the condition that institutional and management reforms were adopted. 
These projects interacted with regime security priorities and humanitarian crises in ways 
that set up the projects for failure and reinforced the water sector crises. Though 
decisions taken in the mid-1950s to exclude Amman’s municipal water services from 
CWA and NRA oversight were intended to bolster its municipal water services, it was 
clear that Amman’s water sector could not satiate demand without network expansions, 
increased supplies, and better services. Jordan partnered with the World Bank to develop 
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Amman’s municipal water services, focusing especially on supply production and 
development of new infrastructure. The World Bank also financed reforms for Amman’s 
water institutions. By the mid-1970s, however, Amman’s water services remained in 
crisis – even with increased supply production and better infrastructure.  
The water supply and infrastructure crisis in Amman stemmed from its rapid 
growth from small town to major city. In the 1930s, only 20,000 people lived in Amman.  
By 1952 the population increased to 108,000, and by 1961 doubled to 203,000 people 
(IDA 1961a). Officials were unable to maintain and expand services to the rapidly 
expanding population. By 1961, only two-thirds of Amman’s residents had access to 
pumped water supplies, while the rest relied on charities and public donations. The 
existing infrastructure was also in poor condition, which produced extensive water loss 
and inconsistent service to households. The World Bank reported that “the combination 
of small distribution pipes, inadequate zoning and scarce water supply makes it 
impossible to maintain pressures, and interruptions of service lasting several days are not 
unusual in some areas of the city” (IDA 1961a, 2). Disruptions in the water deliveries 
produced fluctuations in water and air pressure, which accelerated infrastructure 
deterioration. As a result, an estimated 39 percent of the water circulating in the networks 
was lost due to leaks, resulting in lost revenue (IDA 1961a).  
Revenue losses from water leaks were compounded by low prices for municipal 
water services. The Water Department in the Amman Municipality incurred high deficits 
despite the increase in paying customers. This prevented reinvestment in infrastructure 
and expansion to new settlements. The combination of a poor water network, cost 
recovery, and non-revenue water loss were identified as key priorities for the World 
 90 
Bank’s first project in Amman. Between 1961 and 1973, the International Development 
Association (IDA) extended a $2.0 million credit to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for 
the Amman Water Supply Project.21 The IDA loan financed two-thirds of the project 
while government subsidized the remainder. The credit however was extended to 
Jordan’s central government and not directly to the Amman Municipality. The central 
government, in turn, extended a loan with 4 percent annual interest to the Amman 
Municipality with the expectation that the debt would be repaid over a 23 year period 
(IDA 1961a). The goals of the project were to increase revenues, facilitate investment in 
infrastructure development and rehabilitation, and restructure institutions.  
Officials proposed raising the price of water by 30 percent through a graduated 
tariff (IDA 1961a).22 Project officials reasoned that the graduated tariff revision price 
would increase revenues without burdening poor consumers. The IDA reported,  
Since the relatively well-to-do residents and establishments located on the hills of the 
city, where water service is now intermittent, would be among the most immediate 
beneficiaries of the project, it might not be inequitable to increase average rates by 
introducing a more steeply graduated rate schedule than is in use at present. Such a rate 
schedule would also have the effect of avoiding wasteful use of water (IDA 1961a, 10). 
 
As the main beneficiaries of network expansions, wealthier households could subsidize 
the costs of rehabilitation in older neighborhoods and keep prices low for poor families. 
Network rehabilitation and extension were complemented by the construction of new 
wells and pumping stations in order to increase Amman’s water supply. This reduced 
reliance on low-quality water and the prevalence of water borne diseases in poor 
neighborhoods (IDA 1961a), especially in the Palestinian refugee camps (IDA 1973).  
                                                        
21
 IDA credits differ from traditional World Bank loans in that they carry lower interest rates. 
22 It was estimated that water rates would need to increase at least by 15 to 25 percent in order to reduce 
impacts on consumers and make the project financially viable (IDA 1961b).  
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Project officials wanted to ensure that improved management complemented the 
infrastructural investments. The IDA advised the Amman Municipality to create an 
autonomous water department with accounts separated from other departments (IDA 
1961a) in order to mitigate the Water Department’s budget deficits. Prior to the project, 
the budget of the Water Department was shared with the other municipal services, 
allowing for cross-subsidization in the water sector. By separating the water department 
and its budget, the IDA believed that the Water Department could respond more 
effectively to rising costs and investment needs without being subject to competing 
demands for capital in other municipal departments.  
World Bank officials credited the Water Department for expanding water supply 
distribution throughout Amman. Officials, however, were unhappy with the financial 
performance of the Water Department (IDA 1973). Revenues remained low and water 
losses increased from 40 percent in 1961 to 64 percent by 1972. This meant that nearly 
two-thirds of the distributed water did not produce a financial return (IDA 1973). In 
1971, the IDA recommended a feasibility study for the creation of a new municipal water 
department. In 1973, Jordan signed an official agreement with the World Bank to create 
the Amman Area Water and Sewerage Authority (AWSA) (Haddadin 2006; IDA 1973), 
which was separated from the Amman Municipality and acquired the assets and debt 
liabilities of the Water Department. Additionally, AWSA would serve as the World 
Bank’s direct partner in future water sector projects.  
By assuming the Water Department’s debt, AWSA was not in a position to make 
capital investments in Amman’s water networks, which would reduce non-revenue water 
loss. Water losses increased when several thousand new Palestinian refugees arrived in 
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Amman after the 1967 war with Israel. Between 1973 and 1978, the IDA extended a 
second credit of $8.33 million to the Jordanian government in order to reduce water loss 
and improve AWSA’s financial performance (IDA 1973).23 As part of the agreement, the 
central government received the credit and extended a second loan to AWSA with an 
annual interest rate of 6 percent to be repaid over 29 years (IDA 1973). In an effort to 
build on the successful expansion of water production and water networks (IDA 1961a; 
IDA 1961b), this program prioritized network leakages, inaccurate meters, and inefficient 
billing and collection practices (IDA 1973). The IDA provided consultants to support 
AWSA officials in the establishment of a leak detection and repair office, the 
implementation of a household survey to detect illegal connections, and to reorganize the 
billing and collection systems (IDA 1973). Additionally water prices increased to 0.75 
Jordan Dinars per cubic meter, and for the first time customers were required to pay 
connection fees and user charges for the sewerage system (IDA 1973).24  
The IDA commended AWSA’s improved operational and managerial 
performance and expansion of water networks. AWSA’s billing reforms and meter 
replacement programs helped reduce non-revenue water loss by 1976, though it still 
remained high at 41 percent (IDA 1978). Nevertheless, AWSA continued to struggle 
financially as operational costs increased due to rising electricity prices (IDA 1978). 
Additionally, the loss of cross-subsidies from the Amman Municipality and rapidly 
                                                        
23
 The project’s goals included: a) extend piped water supply and sewerage services to all parts of the 
project area; b) reduce the percentage of water loss; and c) develop AWSA as a viable entity responsible 
for Amman’s water supply and sewerage system (IDA 1973). 
24 There were fears that the costs could have detrimental impacts on per capita consumption, which was 
already low at about 35 liters per capita in the urban areas and 12 liters per capita in the refugee camps 
(IDA 1973), well below the recommended volume of water for basic health and sanitation of 50 liters per 
capita per day (Gleick 1996).  
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accruing debts from the IDA loans compounded AWSA’s financial crisis. Ultimately, the 
IDA recommendations and loan conditions set into motion a cycle of debt-finance 
agreements that weighed heavily on AWSA’s capacity for revenue generation despite 
improvements in the rates of water loss and higher prices. Low revenues and debt-
financing agreements weakened AWSA’s financial stability and impeded its capacity to 
maintain water networks. This set the stage for further water management reform projects 
in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
 
AWSA, Water Supplies and Continued Reforms in the Late 1970s – 1980s 
By the late 1970s, political and institutional constraints stemming from regime 
security, development policies, and donor conditions began to express themselves in 
various dimensions of municipal and national water management. In particular, the 
government used civil service employment to quiet public discontent but failed to attract 
the best individuals as regional economic growth attracted educated engineers to better-
paying jobs in the Gulf. AWSA, on the other hand, was subject to stringent civil service 
codes that forced it to retain low-quality staff at high salaries (IDA 1978). Water scarcity 
also emerged as a critical barrier to competing state development policies in the Jordan 
Valley and water sector development in Amman. Authorities struggled to meet increased 
demand for water due to rapid population growth as Amman’s water supplies were 
already fully developed (IDA 1978).  
Population growth overextended AWSA. Between 1966 and 1976, Amman 
experienced an annual growth rate of 11 percent, as compared to 3.5 percent annual 
growth rate in the rest of Jordan (IDA 1978). The challenge presented by population 
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growth, however, was not the increased demand. Amman’s population growth meant that 
AWSA had to finance the expansion and rehabilitation of Amman’s municipal water 
networks. Despite significant extensions to the water supply and sewerage networks in 
1960s and the first half of the 1970s, 20 percent of households remained without access 
to formal connections (IDA 1978).25 Consequently, Jordan and the IDA reached an 
agreement in 1978 for another loan to rehabilitate and expand AWSA’s water networks.  
Between 1978 and 1981, Jordan received $14 million credit from the IDA, which 
was passed on to AWSA at an interest rate of 6 percent annually with a 25-year 
repayment period (IDA 1978).26 This was the last proposed IDA project for Jordan 
because it had reached a level of economic development that made it creditworthy for 
Bank lending. The project allocated investments for increasing water supply production 
capacity and expanding water networks, and, for the first time, launching water transfers 
to Amman.27 Officials proposed water transfers because supplies from the Qastal and 
Swaqa aquifers no longer fulfilled Amman’s needs and the Amman-Zarqa groundwater 
basin showed early signs of over-exploitation and salinity (IDA 1978), which increased 
more than seven-fold between 1970 and 1998 (USAID 2007).  
                                                        
25
 More than 70 percent of households were not connected the sewage collection systems (IDA 1978). 
26
 The five objectives of the project were: a) construction of 207 kilometers of water mains, laterals and 
house connections, a 4,000 cubic meter reservoir, and one booster pumping station; b) construction for 
approximately 225 kilometers of sewerage mains, laterals, and house connections and two sewage lift 
stations; c) supply of 15,000 water meters, pipes, fittings, and relevant electrical and mechanical and 
maintenance equipment; d) consulting services for construction supervision; and e) staff training (IDA 
1978, i). 
27
 Water transfers in Jordan first began in the 1960s to its second largest city Irbid, which received water 
from the Dhuleil-Azraq aquifer (IDA 1978) through an abandoned oil pipeline from the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (Haddadin, Sunna’, and Al Rashid 2006). More supplies to Irbid became necessary in the 1970s, 
resulting in additional transfers from the Aqib Aquifer in northern Jordan and in the late 1980s from the 
Jordan Valley (Haddadin 2006). 
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The IDA (1978) recommended water transfers from the Azraq Basin and the King 
Talal Dam reservoir. In the end, officials approved the Azraq project but abandoned plans 
to transfer water from King Talal Dam due to water quality problems (World Bank 
1985). Water transfers from the Azraq Basin, which is about 100 kilometers east of 
Amman, began in 1980. It added an additional 15 million cubic meters to Amman’s water 
supply, shifting municipal distribution from intermittent to continuous. However, the 
water transfers also produced one of Jordan’s greatest environmental tragedies (Molle, 
Wester, and Hirsch 2010). It devastated the ecosystem of Azraq Oasis and wetlands, 
which hosted rare flocks of migratory birds and other wildlife, as water tables dropped by 
several meters in thirty years, increased water salinity by 77 percent in deep wells and 90 
percent in shallow wells, and increased concentration of metals and solids (Daoud et al. 
2006). Over time, water transfer schemes throughout Jordan grew increasing complex. 
Figure 3.1 depicts Jordan’s bulk current bulk water production and transfer arrangements. 
The middle sections in this figure represent the bulk water supply reservoirs, which 
collect water from various sources throughout the country and supply the middle and 
northern governorates.28 
                                                        
28
 The bulk water schematic is divided by governorates and proposed water utility companies. The yellow 
circles represent well fields whereas the blue polygons indicate the presence of bulk water reservoirs. The 
small green and red circles represent the import and export points of the bulk water supplies. The case of 
Amman indicates that the majority of its drinking water supplies are derived from bulk water resources 
outside of the governorate. 
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Figure 3.1 Jordan’s National Bulk Water Supply Schematic  
 
Source: (USAID 2015) 
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The Azraq water transfer project was successful in ensuring more stable water 
supply in Amman and paved the way for subsequent transfers. Authorities devised plans 
to transfer an additional 45 million cubic meters of water from the King Abdallah Canal 
in the Jordan Valley to Deir Alla reservoir linking the Jordan Valley with Amman. The 
project, completed in 1987, was the first occurrence of surface water being used for 
municipal purposes. Prior to this project, surface waters were designated for irrigation 
(Haddadin 2006). In order to appease farmers, officials also transferred Amman’s treated 
wastewaters back to the King Talal Dam for irrigation in the Jordan Valley (Haddadin 
2006).  
The water transfers from the Azraq Basin and the King Abdullah Canal 
represented a new phase in the national water sector’s strategies and the relationship 
between Amman and the rest of Jordan. AWSA’s revenue generating capacity, however, 
continued to suffer from high rates of non-revenue water loss, averaging 44 percent over 
the lifespan of the project (World Bank 1985). Though the proportion of the population 
receiving piped water increased from about 80 percent in 1977 to 98 percent in 1982 
(World Bank 1985), continuous distribution of water accelerated network deterioration 
and increased water losses. As more consumers connected to the network, more water 
was pumped into the system, and more water was lost. AWSA also incurred higher 
energy bills because as more energy was required to circulate the water on a continuous 
basis.  
The financial costs associated with these operational challenges reinforced the 
constraints impeding on AWSA’s financial performance. Interest on previous IDA loans 
also consumed 28 percent of AWSA’s budgets as compared to a projected plan of 
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spending 8 percent on debt servicing. Revenues were ten percent lower than projected, 
while governmental and other loans comprised of 77 percent of its total budget (World 
Bank 1985). This forced the central government to service part of AWSA’s debt (World 
Bank 1985), raising questions about AWSA’s financial and operational viability.  
AWSA’s poor performance compelled authorities to transfer responsibilities for 
Amman’s municipal water services to the Jordan Valley Authority in 1982. One year 
later the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) was created to oversee planning, production, 
and management of water supplies and wastewater services for all of Jordan except the 
Jordan Valley (Haddadin 2006). WAJ replaced AWSA and the Domestic Water Supply 
Corporation (previously responsible for bulk water supply and sewerage systems outside 
of Amman) (Haddadin 2006) in a move to centrally coordinate the planning and 
execution of water sector projects nationally (World Bank 1984). WAJ assumed control 
over all municipal water services and the assets of the municipalities. This also meant 
that WAJ assumed all of AWSA’s debts.29  
Thus, WAJ was forced to cope with institutionalized new tensions with the JVA 
and also address its dire financial conditions from its inception. Water transfers from the 
Jordan Valley remained a key source of debate between WAJ and the JVA. WAJ argued 
that sourcing Amman’s water supplies from the Jordan Valley was necessary because of 
Amman’s unprecedented population growth rates. The JVA, however, argued that poor 
                                                        
29 Though WAJ was set up as an autonomous corporate body with financial and administrative 
independence, it was also subject to civil service and government procurement laws. Additionally, at the 
time, the President and Secretary General of WAJ, both politically appointed by the Council of Ministers, 
reported to the Prime Minister’s office (Abu-Shams and Rabadi 2003a). This arrangement structurally 




economic development in the Jordan Valley spurred high rates of urban migration to 
Amman and water transfers would increase domestic migration as agricultural 
development programs became deprioritized (Haddadin, Sunna’, and Al Rashid 2006).  
The political tensions with the JVA combined with the continued impacts of IDA 
donor conditions in ways that severely constrained WAJ’s capacity to ensure continued 
production and distribution of water in Amman, make capital investments, and repay 
debts from the three IDA-financed credits. Simply increasing supplies, improving water 
networks, and reforming institutions did not reform or produce a healthy water sector. 
IDA debt financing agreements and decisions to reform municipal water institutions and 
their budgetary arrangements played an instrumental role in shaping the financial health 
of the Water Department, AWSA, and WAJ. Further, the political motives behind the 
development of the Jordan Valley and the decision to isolate Amman from the rest of the 
country ended up being institutionalized in a contentious arrangement between WAJ and 
the JVA. As such, the achievements of the IDA-financed projects must be juxtaposed 
against the challenging political and institutional constraints produced by state 
development priorities and donor conditions. These constraints did not disappear as 
responsibilities were transferred from the Water Department to AWSA, and then to WAJ. 
Rather, they evolved and became institutionalized in ways that undermined efforts to 
improve municipal water services.  
 
Centralizing Water Management and the Eight Cities Project 
It is no surprise that WAJ’s operational and financial performance did not differ 
from the experiences of the Water Department and AWSA. Non-revenue water loss 
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remained high and supplies were noticeably declining. WAJ, however, also faced the 
challenge of ensuring water supplies for Amman as conditions throughout the country 
rapidly deteriorated. The World Bank again partnered with the Jordanian government in 
in order to increase water supply production and improving WAJ’s administrative 
capacity and streamlining operations throughout Jordan. Like the previous projects, this 
initiative produced less than desirable results. 
The water sector’s poor performance contrasted with Jordan’s strong economic 
growth throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. Jordan experienced high rates of 
foreign investment and an average annual economic growth rate of 10 percent over six 
years. Agricultural production, especially in the Jordan Valley, played an important role 
in Jordan’s economy as regional demand for Jordanian produce also increased. Jordan’s 
economy also benefited from remittances from the Gulf, which comprised nearly two-
thirds of Jordan’s GDP between 1976 and 1982. However, things worsened in the mid-
1980s because of the Iran and Iraq war and recession in the Gulf. Foreign aid to Jordan 
declined by 25 percent, remittances stagnated, and export of agricultural products and 
manufactured goods to neighboring countries fell (Clausen 1986).  
The rapidly changing economic conditions had strong implications for the water 
sector. The World Bank (World Bank 1986) noted, 
The rapid growth of the economy in recent years and the associated increase in 
municipal, industrial, and agricultural water demands, coupled with Jordan’s high rate of 
population increase, have put serious pressure on the country’s limited water resource; 
and water scarcity may become a principal constraint to economic growth. In these 
circumstances, it is crucial for Jordan to realize the maximum benefits from its limited 
resources through continued development and implementation of a sound sector strategy 
and through prudent water resource management (1-2).  
 
Jordan’s ability to reinvigorate its economy required a strong water sector capable of 
managing scarce water supplies at high rates of efficiency. WAJ, however, faced 
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administrative challenges in its first years of operation. It had to standardize billing and 
operational procedures for all of the municipalities while also addressing high rates of 
water losses plaguing Jordan’s major and secondary cities, averaging at 40-45 percent 
(World Bank 1984; World Bank 1985). Additionally, Jordan was experiencing a rapid 
decline of available water supplies, which led officials to caution that municipal and 
industrial demand for water may not be met without reductions in irrigation (Huang and 
Banerjee 1984). This was particularly alarming because of the strong role agriculture was 
playing in Jordan’s economic development. In the 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan (1981-
1985), the Jordanian government allocated 16 percent of public sector investments for the 
production of new water supplies, seven times higher than the previous plan (1976-1980) 
(World Bank 1986).  
In light of these challenges, the World Bank agreed to finance a fourth project for 
$30 million in 1984 (World Bank 1984)30 for the rehabilitation of water supply networks 
and wastewater treatment services for eight cities in Jordan, including Amman.31 The 
project’s goals included improving WAJ’s: 1) data collection, monitoring, and evaluation 
practices, 2) debt-equity ratio, cost recovery, asset expansion and rehabilitation, and 3) 
managerial practices (World Bank 1984). The project stressed the importance of building 
capacity in WAJ in a context of water scarcity and limited economic development. This 
project helped WAJ make significant improvements in supply production, billing 
procedures, and infrastructural development. WAJ, however, was unable to cover its 
                                                        
30
 This loan carried an interest rate of 10 percent annually, to be repaid over 15 years. This loan was 
different than past loans in that it was variable, with a 0.75 percent charge on money that is not dispersed. 
Loans extended by German KfW and USAID were to be paid over 20 years after an initial 10-year grace 
period and carried an interest rate of 6 percent annually. All interest payments during the construction 
period were paid by the government and added to the debt of the Water Authority of Jordan (World Bank 
1984). 
31
 The other cities included Mafraq, Ajloun, Anjara, Ein Janneh, Kufrinja, Madaba, and Ma’an. 
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operating costs due high rates of water loss, resistance to tariff reforms by authorities, and 
the government’s failure to follow through on a promise to subsidize water tankers to 
small villages and rural communities (World Bank 1989).  
The fact that WAJ could barely cover operating costs meant that it could not 
invest in the maintenance of water networks. Consequently, average rates of non-revenue 
water loss throughout the country increased from 38 percent in 1984 to 58 percent in 
1987. The cause was partly administrative and operational. A study conducted in 1987 
found that of the 59 percent of the non-revenue water loss in Amman, 21 percent was 
from water leaks and 38 percent from poor monitoring of water meters and billing 
practices (World Bank 1989). The setbacks in monitoring and registration of water 
meters was cause for concern as supplies increased by an average of 9.7 percent per year. 
Collectively, these factors undermined WAJ’s debt servicing capacity, resulting in an 
overdue debt of 16.8 million Jordanian Dinars on principal and interest by 1989 (World 
Bank 1989).  
WAJ’s failure to improve conditions in Amman led to a fifth World Bank project 
in 1986. The project budgeted $50 million for programs and capital investments in 
Amman, with 52 percent financed by the World Bank and the remainder covered by the 
government and consumer revenues. The loan was made to the government for 15 years 
at a variable interest rate. WAJ was subject to an interest rate of 5 percent annually to be 
repaid to the government. The project sought to create a long-term investment program 
for Amman’s municipal water services that covered improvements for water resource 
management and reduction of water loss. It also financed the rehabilitation and extension 
of water distribution and sewage collection and water treatment (Clausen 1986).  
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The project’s success, however, was again offset by WAJ’s poor financial 
performance. Expenses outpaced revenues, and as a result the operating gap increased 
from 18 percent of operating revenues in 1986 to 100 percent by 1994 (World Bank 
1995). Several factors drove the deficit increase. Firstly, there was a significant gap 
between water production costs and water prices, which were produced at an average cost 
of 0.6 Jordanian Dinars per cubic meter but sold at 0.3 Jordanian Dinars per cubic meter 
(World Bank 1995). Secondly, non-revenue water loss increased from 45 percent to 60 
percent (World Bank 1995). The World Bank placed blame on higher rates of water 
losses on WAJ for its “…failure to incorporate water loss reduction as an internal and 
on-going program…” (World Bank 1995, iv) because WAJ failed to adequately train 
staff and monitor water distribution networks and water meters throughout Amman.  
By 1988, it was clear that WAJ was incapable of overseeing strategic planning 
and operational responsibilities. In response, the Jordanian government created the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation to coordinate water-planning strategies between WAJ 
and the Jordan Valley Authority. Removing planning responsibilities from WAJ, 
however, did not free it from its problems. Rather, it faced new challenges as ministry 
and WAJ officials worked to determine the separation of responsibilities, an issue that 
affects both institutions today. Additionally, debts incurred over the forty years and 
limited capacity to increase revenues and cover operational costs – let alone capital 
investment – threatened WAJ’s long-term viability. In fact, authorities recommended 
financial restructuring and debt forgiveness in 1995 (World Bank 1995). Such 
recommendations, however, would be insufficient unless policymakers and donors 
reconsidered their approach. The evidence shows that institutional reforms, government 
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policies, and donor conditions since the 1960s were instrumental in producing the 
conditions underlying the management crises.  
 
Conclusion 
Jordan’s water sector has been characterized by persistent crises because 
politically motivated government policies and donor conditions seriously shaped and 
constrained the national water sector and Amman’s municipal water services. Early in the 
state building process, state officials fostered water sector development policies that were 
acutely attuned to legitimacy, regime security, and power, particularly in the Jordan 
Valley and Amman. Donor projects were subsequently implemented within this political 
context, ultimately producing, reinforcing, and transforming institutional and political 
constraints in water management. Together, government priorities and donor 
requirements shaped the trajectory of the water sector at the national and municipal level 
and the production of various economic, hydrological, and engineering crises. Over time, 
the constraints underlying the production of these water crises were merely reconfigured 
rather than transformed.  
 The development and evolution of state institutions and water management 
practices is context-dependent. Outcomes of institutional development and water 
management are contingent upon the local interactions of state priorities and donor 
conditions vis-à-vis strategic planning, management frameworks, infrastructure, and 
finance. In the case of Jordan, authorities faced difficult questions about how to balance 
agricultural and urban needs in times of political and humanitarian crisis. These shaped 
the state’s priorities and provided a crucial, and highly influential, context for World 
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Bank projects. In tracking the history of institutional development and the World Bank’s 
projects, it becomes clear that the issues of cost recovery, non-revenue water loss, 
infrastructure, and debt have been mainstay issues plaguing the water sector for over fifty 
years – indicating a systemic crisis internalized within the water sector.  
Urban water scholarship argues that water management failures can take place 
even when engineering succeeds in increasing water supply and improving distribution 
(Bakker 2010). Indeed, this chapter affirms this argument. Scholarship about urban water 
management particularly in cities of the global South have provided important insight on 
how past policies underlie inequalities in access to water and poor infrastructure (Gandy 
2006; Swyngedouw 2004). This literature, however, has not accounted for how 
contemporary municipal water crises are inherently linked to the historical evolution of 
urban water management and its relationship to state building processes. In closing this 
gap, the chapter provides a conceptual link for understanding why privatization programs 
have failed.  
This chapter has demonstrated how the water sector’s regulatory plane reflects the 
continual evolution of past constraints interacting with new conditions. Structural 
adjustment, deregulation, privatization, and commercialization have been implemented 
within these evolving contexts. It is thus important to examine, and understand, the 
origins and transformation of the politics and institutions underlying management 
failures. This historical context elucidates why the problems afflicting the water sector in 
the early 1960s carried into the 1990s, despite a markedly different political and 
economic context and water sector. It also provides crucial insight into the conditions and 
constraints shaping privatization programs since their onset in 1999. The next chapter 
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more thoroughly examines the contemporary contexts of these institutional and political 
constraints and how they have shaped the corporatization process in Jordan’s municipal 



























Chapter 4 Privatization in the Water Sector 
Introduction 
Analysts argue that corporatization of Jordan’s water sector is necessary because 
management and governance conditions have failed to improve despite nearly four 
decades of capital investments and policy reforms (USAID 2011; World Bank 1999). 
Over the last fifteen years, three major initiatives have been introduced in order to inject 
private-sector participation and corporate frameworks into water management. In 1999, 
the Ministry of Water and Irrigation and the Water Authority of Jordan signed a 
management contract with Lyonnaise des Eaux – Montgomery Watson – Arabtech 
Jardaneh (LEMA) to introduce corporate governance in Amman’s municipal water 
services. This was part of a more general trend of privatizing Jordanian public services, 
including the telecommunications and energy sectors (Tomaira 2008). In 2004 and 2007, 
limited liability companies assumed control of municipal water services in Aqaba and 
Amman and in 2011, Jordan and USAID launched the Institutional Support and 
Strengthening Project (ISSP) in an effort to expand the corporatization process to the 
national water sector. To date, the corporatization process has failed to accomplish its 
intended goals. 
Academics and civil society groups argue that privatization programs, broadly 
speaking, fail to improve water management and services because of the poor regulatory 
environment within which they are implemented (Smith and Hanson 2003) and because 
companies prioritize profit over services and equity (von Schnitzler 2008; Loftus 2007; 
Loftus 2006b). Bakker (2010), however, argues that both public and private sector 
management failures express similar features and experiences. Despite her claim, 
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scholars have devoted little attention to the common experiences of public and private 
sector management failures. In other words, how are reforms influenced by the dynamics 
of underlying public sector failures? 
This chapter builds on the arguments offered in Chapter Three and suggests that 
that Jordan’s experiences with corporatization have been strongly shaped by the 
continued influence of institutional and political constraints endemic to the water sector. 
Further, the corporatization programs have introduced new governance conditions that 
have interacted with these constraints, producing differential experiences at the municipal 
and national levels and new tensions and challenges. The evidence for this argument is 
presented in three main sections. First, the chapter reviews the privatization programs and 
the links between them. Specifically, it discusses the LEMA management contract, the 
creation of limited liability companies in municipal water services, and the design and 
implementation of the ISSP. The second section discusses how the political and structural 
constraints have been produced and reinforced, and ultimately shaped, the outcomes of 
the corporatization process. Evidence for these sections come from key-informant 
interviews conducted in Amman, Jordan, in 2012 and analysis of published policy 
reports. The final section provides a brief summary of the chapter’s findings and 
discussion of implications for scholarship about water governance in the context of 
privatization and related institutional reforms. 
 
Privatization in the Water Sector 
By the late 1990s, the Water Authority of Jordan did not reflect the desired 
outcomes from nearly forty years of World Bank financed reform projects. As a result, 
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the World Bank recommended that Jordan consider private sector participation. In 1997, 
Jordan unveiled a new water strategy that permitted the transfer of management of water 
services to the private sector, albeit with significant regulatory control by the government 
(World Bank 1999). This strategy paved the way for the LEMA management contract, 
the creation of limited liability companies, and later the ISSP. Until the ISSP, 
privatization in the water sector was restricted to municipal water services. The ISSP 
introduced an overall framework for corporate restructuring and institutional reforms at 
the municipal and national scale. The three initiatives – LEMA, limited liability 
companies, and ISSP – reflect the sector’s new trajectory towards corporatizing the water 
sector. 
 
LEMA Management Contract and the Capital Investment Project 
The LEMA management contract initiated the corporatization process in the water 
sector by introducing private sector management practices into Amman’s municipal 
water services. The Capital Investment Project (CIP), a major infrastructure rehabilitation 
and reform program for Amman’s water network intended to facilitate the continuous 
delivery of water, accompanied the management contract.1 The CIP and the LEMA 
management contract represented a remarkable shift in the history of Amman’s municipal 
water services, albeit to a limited extent. Though LEMA was responsible for managing 
Amman’s municipal water services, WAJ oversaw the contractor’s performance and 
managed its budgets, investments, and water supplies. This set a critical precedent of 
continued government control over the corporatization of municipal water services. 
                                                        
1
 LEMA was not responsible for overseeing the CIP but it directly benefited from its implementation. 
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The LEMA management contract was financed by a $55 million loan agreement 
with the World Bank under the Amman Water and Sanitation Project. The World Bank 
required Jordan to sign a contract with a private company for four-years for three reasons. 
First, Jordan struggled to provide financially efficient and effective management and 
services despite nine World Bank-financed projects. Second, it was believed that a 
private operator with extensive experience would rapidly improve performance and 
efficiency. Third, the private sector could provide performance incentives for employees 
and improve hiring practices outside of Jordan’s civil service laws, and facilitate quicker 
procurement of needed capital investments (World Bank 1999).  
World Bank financing of the management contract was contingent upon a series 
of concessions and performance requirements by LEMA and the central government with 
respect to services, budget management, and employment. Jordan was required to create 
and support a Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) to provide institutional oversight 
over the management contract. The government was also expected to revise tariffs in 
order to improve cost recovery, as detailed in its 1997 Water Utility Policy (World Bank 
1999). WAJ was also expected to improve operational capacity and financial viability by 
improving monitoring of water and wastewater networks and to develop a robust 
information system to better track leaks, repairs, and accounts receivables. Last, Jordan 
was required to commit to private-sector participation or corporatization by submitting a 
proposal to the World Bank for the post-LEMA phase at least twelve months before the 
expiration of the contract (World Bank 1999). The World Bank also accepted several 
governmental stipulations to the contract. WAJ retained control over LEMA’s accounts, 
tariffs, and ownership over Amman’s water infrastructure, which appeased Jordanian 
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desires for oversight over LEMA’s performance and contract renewal decisions (World 
Bank 1999). 
LEMA’s financing, on the other hand, was contingent upon its progress in 
updating the billing system, training staff, improving efficiency, and reducing non-
revenue water loss. Together, the PMU and the World Bank monitored LEMA’s progress 
based on several performance indicators. First, it was expected to develop a framework 
for identifying investment needs and making investment decisions and implementation 
more efficient. Second, LEMA was expected to reduce non-revenue water loss and 
increase the number of hours of water delivery. Third, it was expected to lead a major 
initiative to replace and repair water meters throughout Amman. Last, LEMA was 
expected to improve efficiency standards in municipal water services through reductions 
in the number of staff, reducing energy requirements, improving customer services 
(World Bank 1999). 
The CIP accompanied the reorientation of municipal water management towards 
private-sector practices in order to systematize water distribution and reduce non-revenue 
water loss, which remained high – 52 percent in 1999 (World Bank 1999). Amman’s 
water networks were revised such that the city was divided into fifteen distribution zones 
that further divide into 314 distribution sub-districts. Map 4.1 map shows the fifteen 
districts and the sub-districts. Each distribution zone contains sub-districts that hold an 
equal number of customers (Policymaker Three 2012). Sixty underground tanks with a 
storage capacity of 626,200 cubic meters were installed throughout the city and twelve 
water towers with a storage capacity of 6,611 cubic meters were built in higher 
elevations. Additionally, 26 booster stations were installed to circulate water from 
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primary to secondary and tertiary lines, for a total operational capacity of 6,611 cubic 
meters per hour (Jordan Water Company 2007b). Seventeen main pumping stations with 
84 serviceable pumps and twelve water supply stations service the network (Jordan Water 
Company 2007a). Amman’s eastern and southern districts receive water from the Zai 
Reservoir while the western districts of the Capital are supplied from the Dabouq 
reservoir through gravity-based pumping supplies (Jordan Water Company 2007b).2 
Under the intermittent distribution system, each sub-district receives unlimited volumes 
of water for 24 to 48 hours on a fixed weekly rotation. Households, therefore, are 
required to install and maintain storage tanks for weekly water use and can use unlimited 
amounts of water on days of water delivery.3 The rationale for this infrastructural 
revision was improving distribution of water resources, billing, and non-revenue water 
loss. 
 
                                                        
2 A wastewater system was also rehabilitated to collect from the residential areas to the treatment stations 
in Abu Nseir and Wadi Essir, or sent to Baqaa or Fuheis stations to be sent to Al-Khirbit Al-Samra’ 
treatment station privately operated under a BOT contract (Jordan Water Company 2007b). The As-Samra 
treatment plant services approximately 45 percent of Jordan’s population. In order to update the facility and 
build a pre-treatment plant, another BOT was negotiated in 2003 (Haddadin 2006).  
3




Map 4.1 Jordan Water Company Distribution Zones and Sub-Districts 
 




The combination of management reforms and infrastructural rehabilitation 
significantly improved Amman’s municipal water services. LEMA successfully upgraded 
customer services, increased efficiency in operations, replaced several hundred thousand 
water meters, improved billing operations, and expanded hours of water delivery (Gomez 
2009). LEMA’s progress was based on two particular factors: 1) Jordan granted LEMA 
full possession – not ownership – of infrastructure during the scope of the project and 2) 
the CIP critically subsidized needed repairs in the municipal water network. LEMA’s 
possession of the network allowed it to autonomously address problems related to water 
distribution, network monitoring, meter repairs, and billing. The CIP facilitated this by 
allowing LEMA to concentrate its budgets on these initiatives without needing to worry 
about financing major capital investments in network repairs. Though Jordan retained 
control over tariffs throughout the duration of the contract, LEMA’s profit margins 
increased from 3.7 percent to 16.4 percent between 2001 and 2004, in large part because 
the CIP helped reduced non-revenue water loss (SEGURA/IP3 2006).  
In 2004, Jordanian authorities agreed to extend LEMA’s contract another three 
years in preparation for the next phase of municipal water management. With support 
from USAID, Jordan hired SEGURA/IP3 Consulting to explore management options for 
the post-LEMA period. The agency considered a wide variety of public sector control, 
private sector management, leasing, contracting, and participation, and the creation of 
publicly and privately held water utility companies (SEGURA/IP3 2006). SEGURA/IP3 
ultimately recommended that a private shareholding company be in charge of all aspects 




The company was designed on the organizational structure created under the 
LEMA contract. The proposed company, however, differed from LEMA’s contract in 
two critical ways. First, the proposal allocated control over revenues to the company to 
ensure financial sustainability. This would allow the company to dedicate revenues from 
operations according to operational, maintenance, and investment requirements. Second, 
SEGURA/IP3 recommended that the company be legally independent with full 
ownership over its assets (SEGURA/IP3 2006). In January 2006, authorities considered 
their options and ultimately decided on creating a limited liability company to replace 
LEMA and oversee Amman’s municipal water services.  
 
Limited Liability Companies: Jordan Water Company - Miyahuna  
In January 2007, Jordan Water Company - Miyahuna assumed control over 
Amman’s municipal water services. As a limited liability company, the creation of 
Miyahuna was another step towards comprehensive corporatization in municipal water 
management within state control. Against the recommendation of SEGURA/IP3, 
Miyahuna is wholly owned and regulated by WAJ. Jordanian authorities rejected outright 
privatization and management contracts because the limited liability company option 
allowed the government to retain control over municipal water services (Gomez 2009).  
Alternatives to the limited liability model were considered to be unfeasible by 
Jordanian authorities. Renewing LEMA’s contract was not an attractive option because 
both LEMA and WAJ had already performed to capacity with respect to water losses and 
water supply provisions. A contract extension would require LEMA to significantly 




contract. This, however, would require WAJ to guarantee increases in bulk water supplies 
(World Bank 2007), which was difficult considering that bulk water supplies were 
already at peak volumes (Gomez 2009; World Bank 2007). Consultants also cautioned 
against concession and leasing models in lieu of a private management contract. 
Consultants believed that Jordanian regulations would deter private sector participation 
and/or undermine the negotiated agreement (SEGURA/IP3 2006). Additionally, there 
were fears that contractors would provide excessively high prices because of an 
inadequate tariff model (Gomez 2009). Naturally, restoration of WAJ control over 
Amman’s municipal water services was out of the question due to the World Bank’s 
requirement that Jordan commit to corporatization in the water sector (World Bank 
2007). Consequently, the limited liability model reflected compromise as it advanced 
corporatization under the purview of state control.  
The limited liability option, however, seemed pre-determined among influential 
policymakers (Gomez 2009). Authorities based their decision to pursue a limited liability 
model in Amman on the success of the Aqaba Water Company, which was launched in 
2004. The Aqaba Water Company was formed as part of the development of the Aqaba 
Special Economic Zone, which was created in 2000. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority (ASEZA) argued that improved water and wastewater services were necessary 
for development. ASEZA, which is legally responsible for developing utilities inside the 
zone, leveraged their political weight and convinced government authorities that a 
corporate model was preferable to WAJ (Gomez 2009).1 By this stage, government 
authorities had already expressed support for corporatization of public utilities in their 
                                                        
1
 Despite the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority’s legal responsibility for developing utilities, all 




commitments to the World Bank, and as such, the Council of Ministers approved the 
creation of the Aqaba Water Company. 
The Aqaba Water Company is jointly owned by WAJ (85 percent) and the Aqaba 
Special Economic Zone Authority (15 percent) (Gomez 2009). As the majority 
shareholder, WAJ controls the general assembly, which is the company’s highest 
authority. WAJ also controls the board of directors, which is appointed by the general 
assembly. Of the seven members on the board, five are appointed by WAJ whereas the 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority appoints two. Financially, the water company 
holds financial autonomy for day-to-day decisions but WAJ holds control over strategic 
financial decisions. Operationally, Aqaba Water Company signed an agreement for fixed 
volumes of bulk water supplies with WAJ, though it is free to use its water resources 
according to company and municipal needs (Gomez 2009). 
Many of the Aqaba Water Company’s institutional arrangements were passed 
onto Miyahuna, some of which failed to heed the SEGURA/IP3 recommendations 
(SEGURA/IP3 2006). Rather than being a private-share holding company with full 
financial autonomy, Miyahuna is 100 percent owned by WAJ and regulated by WAJ. 
This means that WAJ controls Miyahuna’s general assembly and also has control over 
nomination and selection of the Board of Directors, which select – and can dismiss – 
general managers and executives (Gomez 2009). Similarly, WAJ and Miyahuna signed 
an assignment agreement that delineated responsibilities. WAJ retained control over 




to full ownership over assets of Amman’s municipal water infrastructure.2 Miyahuna, 
however, was granted responsibility for all operations and minor investments in water 
and wastewater services for the entire Amman Governorate on the condition that it 
coordinate investment plans and projects with relevant institutions (Jordan Water 
Company 2007a).  
Under this model, authorities developed multi-year business strategy for the new 
company. As a corporate entity, Miyahuna’s business plan includes six strategic 
initiatives: 1) providing leadership in the management of water scarcity, 2) establishing 
customer confidence, 3) meeting the demands of growth, 4) building planning and 
technical capability and capacity, 5) enhancing management capabilities, and 6) building 
business partnerships (Jordan Water Company 2007a). Miyahuna was charged with 
improving communications with customers by sharing company plans and programs, 
addressing issues of concerns, and educating the public on water conservation schemes. 
Miyahuna also launched an extensive branding campaign to its customers and embarked 
on several marketing campaigns to raise awareness about their private status in order to 
build consumer confidence. They held events in public schools, involved community 
organizations, and delivered Miyahuna brochures with household bills (Policymaker 
Seven 2013).  
Since it commenced is operations in 2007, Miyahuna has demonstrated 
improvements by reducing rates of non-revenue water loss to 34.3 percent and increasing 
the average weekly hours of distribution to households to 38 hours. Customer service also 
                                                        
2
 A General Assembly and a Board of Directors, appointed by the General Assembly, lead the management 
structure of Miyahuna. The Board of Directors consists of representatives from the water sector, other 




improved, with 99.5 percent of all registered customers receiving a bill in 2010 (Jordan 
Water Company 2010). Service disconnections also decreased in large part because 
customers more consistently paid their bills. This success was attributed to public service 
campaigns in local newspapers and direct phone calls to households late on their 
payments (Policymaker Seven 2013). Miyahuna also coordinated with the Jordan Post 
Company to allow customers to settle their accounts at any postal station (Jordan Water 
Company 2010). Miyahuna’s efforts have paid dividends for improving the perception of 
Amman’s municipal water services. Customer satisfaction surveys conducted in 2011 and 
2012 revealed high levels of satisfaction with Miyahuna’s services (Policymaker Seven 
2013).  
Until 2011, however, the corporatization process was restricted to municipal 
water services in Amman and Aqaba. It was becoming clear, however, that without 
sector-wide reforms, the successes experienced in municipal water services would remain 
limited. As such, in 2011, USAID and Jordan launched the Institutional Support and 
Strengthening Project to deepen and expand the corporatization process from the 
municipal scale to the national water sector through a reconfiguration of institutional 
responsibilities and policies. 
 
The Institutional Support and Strengthening Project 
By the late 2000s, Jordan was suffering from the effects of a regional economic 
decline, an escalating refugee crisis, and intensifying water scarcity. These conditions 
reinforced the stark contrast between the performance of LEMA and the limited liability 




recommended that Jordan expand the corporatization process or face higher costs and 
risks in the water sector (USAID 2011). One year later, Jordan and USAID signed an 
agreement to implement the Institutional Support and Strengthening Project (ISSP) for 
the corporate restructuring of Jordan’s water sector.  
The project was designed as a five-year project, though USAID only committed 
to financing three years. The project was renewed for two more years in 2013 and 2014. 
The ISSP relies on a combination of international and local expertise in the pursuit of 
reforms at the municipal and national level. Two consulting companies were hired to 
work with the Jordanian government: International Resources Group (IRG), a subsidiary 
of Engility Corporation, and EcoConsult. IRG is an international consulting firm that 
specializes in policy reform and capacity building in water resources management. 
EcoConsult, which has played a prominent role in major sustainable development 
projects in Jordan, is IRG’s local partner (Ryan et al. 2013). Together, IRG and 
EcoConsult partnered with the MWI, WAJ, and Miyahuna in pursuit of two goals 
pertaining to municipal water services: 1) sector restructuring and 2) water utility 
reform.3 Sector restructuring is based on three sub-goals of consolidating planning and 
management within the MWI, create a top-level National Water Council, and convert 
WAJ into a bulk water supplier and distributer. The water utility reform goals are to 
complete the process of corporatization, improve governance and management, and 
create an independent regulatory institution to oversee the corporatized utilities (USAID 
2012).  
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Several reasons were provided for sector restructuring and water utility reform. 
First, ISSP officials noted that the overlapping mandates between the MWI and WAJ had 
stifled strategic and sector-wide planning and management. Second, there was an 
inherent conflict of interest in WAJ’s bulk water supply responsibilities and ownership of 
the limited liability companies. Third, hidden and direct subsidies distorted the financial 
state of the water sector as cost recovery challenges affected operations at multiple levels. 
Fourth, the limited liability companies faced several institutional barriers that undermined 
their authority and management autonomy. Fifth, tariffs for bulk water supplies and 
consumers did not reflect the cost of production and sector-wide expenses. Last, the 
water sector suffered from strong political influence as government officials regularly 
intervened in water sector planning.  
The ISSP addresses these problems through a combination of strategic 
reorganization, institutional reform, and capacity building at the national and municipal 
scale. With respect to the water utilities, authorities sought to deepen and expand the 
corporatization process in municipal water services by working limited liability company 
executives and employees to improve business-related practices and increase efficiency 
(Ryan et al. 2013). The long-term goal is to create a sound institutional basis for 
converting all remaining WAJ offices providing municipal water services into limited 
liability companies.4  
The ISSP also seeks to re-regulate oversight of the limited liability companies by 
bolstering the Performance Management Unit’s (PMU) regulatory capacity. The PMU, 
which was initially created to oversee the day-to-day operations of the LEMA 
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management contract, evolved into a monitoring institution providing performance 
valuations of the limited liability companies. The PMU, however, has no regulatory 
enforcement power. Additionally, because the PMU is a sub-institution within WAJ it is 
unable to address WAJ’s conflict of interest as the owner and regulatory of the limited 
liability companies. Consequently, under the ISSP, the PMU is being shifted into the 
MWI and converted into the Water Utility Regulatory Unit. In doing so, the PMU will be 
the sole regulatory authority for the entire water sector, which will provide technical 
recommendations for water policies without political influence.  
The national level reforms revised WAJ and MWI responsibilities in order to 
address WAJ’s excessive operational and financial burden and the failure to clearly 
delineate and establish cooperation between the MWI and WAJ. Authorities are working 
to shift WAJ’s responsibilities away from municipal water services in order to 
concentrate solely on bulk water supply production and distribution to the corporatized 
water utilities. Related, responsibility for national water strategy and planning is being 
concentrated within the MWI. Last, a National Water Council will synthesize stakeholder 
interests through a democratic forum in order to make recommendations to the Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation on management strategies and planning.  
Ultimately, the ISSP attempts to place responsibility for municipal water services 
with the limited liability companies and reconfigure institutional mandates at the national 
scale in order to streamline and improve water governance through a corporate 
framework. The collective experience of the ISSP, however, has been less than 
satisfactory as reform has not progressed as planned (Ryan et al. 2013). Institutional and 




water sector have differentially shaped perceived decision-making capacity, processes, 
and experiences for authorities involved in managing municipal and national water 
services. 
Constraints to the Corporatization Process 
 Political and institutional constraints endemic to the water sector have 
differentially shaped the corporatization processes for municipal and national water 
sector authorities. In particular, Jordan’s political dynamics, donor conditions, and 
rapidly changing domestic and regional contexts have affected reform conditions and 
possibilities. The corporatization processes taking place since 1999 introduced new 
governance conditions that interacted with already existing constraints affecting water 
management to the detriment of the ISSP programs. These constraints have differentially 
affected officials at the MWI, WAJ, and Miyahuna with respect to decision-making and 
capacity to adopt reform measures. Understanding the ISSP’s stalled progress, therefore, 
requires clarifying how the context of pre-existing and evolving constraints has affected 




 The way Jordan’s political system copes with and responds to domestic discontent 
and regional crises has significantly shaped the corporatization of the municipal and 
national water sector. Four particular constraints have affected the corporatization 
process. First, the Council of Ministers holds significant influence holds over Jordan’s 
policymaking processes. Second, the minister of the MWI has played a critical role in 




discontent have influenced the nature and direction of government policies, especially 
since the emergence of widespread protests throughout the region in 2011. Fourth, Jordan 
has been directly burdened by the region’s political crises, particularly through refugee 
resettlement and reduced access to cheap energy. These constraints are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing. Collectively, they increase the perceived risks in decision-making 
processes associated with the corporatization process specifically and the water sector 
more generally. Fears of controversy, according to the chairman of one of Jordan’s most 
prominent engineering consulting firms, has undermined long-term development 
planning (Policymaker Sixteen 2013).  
Indeed, the ISSP has been implemented at a time of greater expressions of public 
discontent with rising costs of living and limited employment opportunities driven by 
regional political crises. Since 2005, nearly 500,000 Iraqi refugees and 600,000 Syrians 
have registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Jordan 
(UNHCR 2013). It is estimated that there are several thousand more Syrians who are not 
registered. Approximately 80 percent of these refugees live in urban areas, which creates 
downward pressures on water services5 and employment opportunities while housing and 
food prices increase (MOPIC 2013). In response, Jordanians have taken to the streets 
with greater frequency, especially since 2011. For example, major protests erupted 
throughout the country in September 2012, with taxi drivers delivering an especially 
public strike in Amman, after the Council of Ministers approved the IMF’s recommended 
price increases for 90-octane gasoline and diesel by 10 percent in order to reduce federal 
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deficits (Kadri and Kershner 2012). In reaction to the public outcry, King Abdullah 
halted the price hikes and ordered additional research.6 One month later, ongoing public 
discontent about the state of political affairs led to the king’s dissolution of parliament 
and his appointment of a fourth prime minister in one year. In fact, between 2011 and 
2013, King Abdullah dissolved his government five times (Zawahri 2012).  
The principal source that binds these political constraints together is the 
institutionalization of regime protection through a federal law that requires the Council of 
Ministers to approve all major public policy reforms. The heads of Jordan’s ministries 
comprise the Council of Ministers. All ministers are appointed by the king and are 
dismissed when the government is dissolved. The Council of Ministers’ power over 
public policy reforms, and the king’s political control over ministerial appointments 
produced a dynamic sensitive to widespread protests. This king’s frequent dissolution of 
the government over the last several years has reinforced the Council’s reluctance to 
adopt controversial policy decisions out of fear of creating a political crisis.  
This political dynamic has directly impacted the water sector and the corporate 
restructuring process. In particular, the political sensitivity involved with the Council of 
Minister’s has led to strong ministerial influence over the direction of the sector’s 
priorities and policies. Consequently, frequent changes to ministerial appointments have 
created inconsistent visions and directions for water sector planning. Between 2009 and 
2012, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation had five different ministers, each serving a few 
months to a year (Policymaker Twelve 2013; Zawahri 2012). This has delayed decision-
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making processes and scuttled reform proposals (Zawahri 2012) because new ministers 
brought new priorities (Policymaker Twelve 2013) such as wastewater treatment, water 
supply production, or infrastructure rehabilitation (Policymaker Nine 2013). 
The nature of ministerial involvement in the water sector is often dependent on 
individual personalities. For example, former minister of Water and Irrigation 
Muhammad Najjar thought it was necessary to be involved in WAJ and Miyahuna’s day-
to-day operations. After becoming Minister in 2009, he immediately revisited several 
policy decisions taken by his predecessor. He was particularly concerned about long-term 
plans for the Disi Water Conveyance Project and Miyahuna’s preparedness to receive 
increased volumes of water. He commissioned a study about this issue shortly before he 
was dismissed. Six months later, Najjar was reappointed and discovered that his 
predecessor had not followed through on the study. He explained that this lack of 
continuity in ministerial decisions is why he felt it was necessary to intervene in the 
affairs of WAJ and Miyahuna (Policymaker Fourteen 2013).  
This stands in direct contrast to the opinion of another former minister. Rather 
than being involved in day-to-day operations, this former minister focused on planning 
and strategies for the national water sector (Policymaker Ten 2013). Specifically, he 
argued that the minister should advocate for increased government funding for the water 
sector and securing Jordan’s right to trans-boundary waters (Policymaker Ten 2013) 
rather than overseeing WAJ’s operational responsibilities. One former Secretary General 
of WAJ shares the belief that the minister should avoid intervening in direct operations 
and management. This Secretary General was frustrated by the minister’s direct 




decisions because she was “not a water person” and bypassed her in sector consultations 
despite the fact that she held the highest position within WAJ (Policymaker Six 2013).7 
Direct ministerial involvement in the water sector and the Council of Ministers’ 
reluctance to take on controversy at a time of radically changing domestic economic and 
humanitarian conditions has stalled several aspects of the ISSP. In particular, the 
negotiations on a new water law that would institutionalize revised institutional 
responsibilities and tariff negotiations have been delayed indefinitely (Ryan et al. 2013). 
The failure to pass a new water law has negatively affected the ISSP’s efforts to address 
as the institutional overlap and mismanagement in the water sector. Under the existing 
water law, both the MWI and WAJ monitor surface and groundwater resources and grant 
licenses for well drilling with little coordination. The MWI is unable to coerce WAJ into 
cooperation because it was legally founded on a by-law rather than a dedicated law, 
meaning it as it has less legal control over the water sector than WAJ.  
Similarly, the Council has refused to consider additional tariff reforms after it was 
revised in 2011. Under this revision, the number of tariff blocks was increased from four 
to seven. Yet, the tariffs remain highly subsidized, and the Council’s refusal to consider 
new reforms has affected the water sector’s ability to deal with rising operating costs 
driven by higher fuel prices after the Arab Gas Pipeline was destroyed during Egypt’s 
political crisis in 2011. Jordan, which imports approximately 90 percent of its energy 
needs, lost access to a critical source of cheap and clean natural gas. In response, the 
National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) resorted to producing electricity by burning 
crude oil, which is less efficient and more expensive (Policymaker One 2012). Both the 
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water law and the tariff revisions are central elements of the corporate restructuring 
process. As such, ISSP progress has been stunted by the institutionalization of regime 
security into Jordan’s political system. 
Regime security, therefore, plays a de facto role in policymaking through frequent 
changes to ministerial appointments and the Council of Ministers’ refusal to negotiate 
controversial topics, such as a new water law or tariff reforms. This political influence 
over the water sector generally has been historically produced and reiterated over fifty 
years of state building initiatives and reforms, rendering the issue of regime security as an 
endemic and instrumental component of the water sector’s managerial dynamics. This 
has had the effect of reinforcing the institutional constraints affecting the MWI, WAJ, 
and the limited liability companies, and in turn, shaped the outcomes of institutional 
restructuring and governance reforms. Reform programs were implemented in a context 
of non-cooperation and institutional tensions between the municipal and national water 
sectors. As such, this does not reflect a failure of the public sector management regimes 
or the limitations of the ISSP. Rather, it suggests the importance of attending to the ways 
that Jordan’s institutions are designed and how they operate. Understanding how the 
institutional constraints shape management dynamics provides a deeper understanding for 
how and why corporatization process has proceeded and why it has failed to realize its 
intended goals. The next section provides a more detailed analysis of how the 
institutional constraints have interacted with the ISSP and the challenges that have arisen 







The nature of Jordan’s political system and the ways it responds to humanitarian 
crises and public pressure have mediated and reinforced institutional constraints affecting 
the water sector. Specifically, the water sector suffers from three interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing constraints. First, the limited liability companies are inherently 
designed and operate as partially corporatized entities, limiting their ability to respond to 
investment and operational challenges. Second, the partial corporatization of the limited 
liability companies is reinforced by the lack of an independent regulator, which is due to 
the fact that WAJ maintains sole ownership and regulatory control over of the utilities. 
Third, there is limited coordination between the MWI and WAJ due to an inadequate and 
outdated water law governing institutional responsibilities. The corporatization process 
has attempted to redress these institutional challenges through legal reform, sector 
restructuring, and water utility reform. Progress on these fronts, however, has been stifled 
by political influences, which have created institutional resistance to reform programs 
that reinforced challenges to water sector cooperation and coordination. 
The partial corporatization of the limited liability companies has severely 
constrained their capacity to respond to rapidly changing operational contexts 
(Sommaripa 2011). Miyahuna currently generates enough revenue to cover operating 
costs, heightening worries about the lack of capital investments in the repair of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary water networks, which would help maintain low rates of water 
loss (Policymaker One 2012). Capital investments, however, have been deprioritized 
because operational expenditures have risen dramatically in recent years due to increased 




instrumental role in increasing operational expenditures. LEMA, for example, was 
initially expected to increase the hours of water distribution and reduce non-revenue 
water loss to 25 percent by the conclusion of the contract. After nearly 500,000 Iraqi 
refugees arrived in Jordan in the mid-2000s, however, LEMA’s performance benchmarks 
for water distribution and non-revenue water loss were lowered (World Bank 2007). 
Miyahuna has faced similar challenges with the Syrian refugee crisis.8  
Further, since 2011, Miyahuna has been forced to allocate a majority of its 
operational budget towards rapidly increasing energy costs (Humpal et al. 2012). 
Significant levels of electricity are required in order to distribute water throughout 
Amman, in which the highest and lowest elevations differ by 400 meters (Policymaker 
One 2012). This compounds an already expensive water supply production process. 
Before Amman’s water reservoirs are filled, WAJ lifts bulk water supplies located in the 
Jordan Valley and near the Dead Sea, which are 470 meters below sea level, to 900 
meters above sea level. WAJ also receives subsidized electricity prices to finance the 
energy requirements for producing and lifting water to higher elevations. Yet, the sector’s 
deficits are so high that it has failed to pay its arrears to the National Electric Power 
Company (NEPCO). In July 2012, NEPCO shut off electricity to the MWI headquarters 
for several days due to an outstanding debt of 7 million Jordanian Dinars, forcing 
Minister Muhammad Najjar to appeal for a 50 million Jordanian Dinar loan (Namrouqa 
2012a).  
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To date, the cost of producing bulk water supplies have not been transferred to 
Miyahuna as the Treasury covers the difference between WAJ’s water production costs 
and the bulk water prices charged to the companies (USAID 2011). This direct 
subsidization of bulk water prices has ensured Miyahuna’s financial solvency in the 
short-term despite the rapid increase in demand and energy costs (Humpal et al. 2012). 
There are fears, however, that Miyahuna will have to declare bankruptcy if its capacity to 
autonomously deal with budget deficits is not revised (Policymaker Twelve 2013). Doing 
so will require a revision to the regulatory frameworks that guide the corporatization of 
the limited liability companies. 
Doing so requires changing WAJ’s sole ownership, political control, and 
regulation of the companies. The root institutional cause of this partial corporatization 
stems from the regulatory frameworks that guide their creation, ownership, and oversight. 
The existing framework guiding the creation, ownership, and oversight of the companies, 
which prevents the full corporatization of the companies, can be traced to the Council of 
Ministers’ insistence that WAJ retain asset ownership and control over finances in the 
LEMA management contract (World Bank 1999). Under this arrangement, all of 
LEMA’s revenues were transferred into WAJ accounts. WAJ, on the other hand, 
dispersed money into LEMA accounts based upon pre-arranged financing agreements. 
All profits in excess of these financing agreements were transferred back to the central 
government (World Bank 2007). One consequence of this arrangement is that LEMA 
failed to improve its cash flow (Ryan et al. 2013) despite increased hours of delivery and 




This contracting arrangement with WAJ carried into the creation of the limited 
liability models (Ryan et al. 2013). In particular, Miyahuna’s corporate framework is tied 
to, and restricted by, the assignment agreement with WAJ. Under this agreement, 
Miyahuna is responsible for minor investments, such as rehabilitation of water treatment 
plants, whereas major investments, such as network expansion, are the responsibility of 
WAJ. Miyahuna does not own its assets and all revenues in excess of operational costs 
are returned to the government under the National Surplus Law (Policymaker Twelve 
2013). These two factors place Miyahuna in a precarious bind with respect to operational 
expenditures and capital investments.  
As noted earlier, Miyahuna requires significant capital investments in order to 
ensure that water losses remain low. The company’s ability to pursue capital investments 
are hampered by the assignment agreement’s unclear definition on what constitutes major 
or minor investments (Policymaker Five 2013). Miyahuna’s Planning and Investment 
Department manager noted that on several occasions WAJ rejected project proposals 
because of disagreements over whether the projects were minor or major investments 
(Policymaker Five 2013). Additionally, Miyahuna has been subjected to WAJ’s unilateral 
revision of investment procedures. In its first few years of operations, Miyahuna was 
permitted to seek donor financing for minor investments but WAJ later reversed this 
decision and required Miyahuna to collaborate with the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation (MOPIC), which is responsible for overseeing foreign 
assistance (Policymaker Five 2013). This further reduced Miyahuna’s autonomy over its 




Miyahuna is also subject to ministerial influence over its operations. For example, 
between 2007 and 2011, Miyahuna collected household bills on a quarterly basis. In 2011 
Minister Muhammad Najjar authorized a decision that required Miyahuna to collect 
monthly bills from its customers. Miyahuna, however, was not consulted on this decision 
or given advance notice. Miyahuna’s operating costs increased substantially as they 
needed to recruit new tellers and meter readers and purchase additional cars. Several 
months after his decision, the minister reversed course after Miyahuna had already 
recruited and trained staff (Policymaker Five 2013).  
The partial corporatization of the limited liability companies and WAJ’s sustained 
control over municipal water services cannot be effectively resolved without addressing 
the issue of independent regulation and the sector’s general disorganization. At the heart 
of this issue is the water law, which grants WAJ legal authority over the MWI 
(Policymaker Fifteen 2013).9 This means that WAJ technically delegates strategic 
management responsibilities to the MWI even though WAJ is supposed to report to the 
ministry (Policymaker Four 2012). The legal dynamic has produced overlapping 
responsibilities between WAJ and the MWI (Policymaker Six 2013).  
One example of this overlap has been in the monitoring and regulation of surface 
and groundwater resources. Because of the nature of the water law, WAJ continues to 
build new wells without the knowledge of the MWI, while the MWI authorizes the 
production of new water supplies without consulting WAJ (Policymaker Twelve 2013). 
ISSP officials are trying to address this by consolidating surface and groundwater 
monitoring responsibilities in the MWI and converting WAJ into a bulk water supplier 
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through a new water law. This institutional revision, it is argued, will ensure the 
sustainability of Jordan water resources over the long-term (USAID 2011). Though WAJ 
has created a bulk water department, steps towards legally revising institutional 
responsibilities have been tabled by the governmental refusal to consider a new water law 
(Ryan et al. 2013).10  
The lack of clearly defined responsibilities also affects tariff decisions. The water 
sector’s long-term financial conditions would greatly benefit from revising bulk and 
municipal water budget models (Sommaripa 2011). WAJ and the MWI both have the 
authority to request tariff revisions from the Council of Ministers. Yet several ministers 
have cancelled tariff studies because they were considered misplaced or ill timed because 
of Jordan’s delicate political climate (Ryan et al. 2013).11 WAJ, on the other hand, has 
become reluctant to make recommendations about tariffs because they no longer see it as 
their priority or domain of work (Policymaker Twelve 2013). The failure of the MWI and 
WAJ to make a convincing case for tariff reforms, however, is not their fault. Rather, it 
stems from the nature of the water sector’s evolution in which lack of institutional 
cooperation and continued political influence of Jordanian ministers over water sector 
planning and policies became endemic to the water sectors operational processes.  
The constraints affecting the water utilities and institutional tensions highlight the 
need for independent regulators in the water sector. Independent regulators, it is argued, 
help ensure that authorities do not subject political influence over water policies and 
regulations. The senior regulatory advisor to the ISSP, stated,  
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…the regulator's job is to try to keep it all as balanced as possible and to take it out of the 
hands of people that have the most gain from any decisions. So, the utility doesn't like the 
regulator because the regulator limits the return on investment that the utility can get. The 
costumer doesn't like the regulator because tariffs go up. And the government doesn't like 
it because the government is not in-control of setting those prices, which pisses off the 
voters. But the government can't say, we didn't do that. That's, the regulator, who did 
that. And the regulator is independent form us, so if you don't like it go throw tomatoes at 
him don’t throw it at us. So, that's where the regulator supposed to sit, and we always say, 
that if people like the regulator he's not doing his job properly. The idea is, the regulator 
should be powerful enough to be able to enforce its decisions. That means it has the 
power of the courts. I can take your license away, or I can remove your management, if 
you, the company, the utility, don't do what I tell you to do. And when I say, jump, the 
utility says, how high. And, do you want me to jump yesterday, or do you want me to 
jump today. 'cause I'll jump right this second (Policymaker Four 2012)   
 
He noted, for example, that tariff decisions should be regulated by economic and not 
political considerations and that the independent regulator should have the authority to 
determine and impose tariffs. Decisions about how to subsidize poor households are 
political decisions that can involve cross-subsidization or direct cash transfers to families 
in need of assistance. These concerns, however, should not be the priority of the regulator 
(Policymaker Four 2012). The senior regulatory advisor also noted that regulators should 
be the sole institution responsible for granting operating licenses to water utilities and 
bulk water suppliers (Policymaker Four 2012). This also means that the regulator can 
cancel operating licenses for non-performance. For example, the regulator can levy 
penalty fees or cancel an operating license if it is unhappy with a water utility’s 
performance. If the license is canceled, the regulator could decide on any number of 
arrangements, including wholesale transfer of all assets to a private company 
(Policymaker Four 2012). 
The Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU), which is hosted within WAJ, is 
supposed to be the water sector’s regulatory institution. The PMU was created as part of 
the LEMA management contract to oversee LEMA’s day-to-day operations and the CIP. 




monitoring of WAJ and the limited liability companies on several Key Performance 
Indicators. In its current capacity, however, it can merely provide performance reports 
and recommendations. It does not have the authority to compel WAJ or the companies 
into compliance.  
This severely undermines the PMU’s intended regulatory responsibilities as 
recommendations or performance evaluations often go ignored. The director of the PMU 
noted,  
…in terms of enforcement and ensuring an implementation of the recommendations, this 
is something which the PMU has been suffering from since the inception of the whole 
monitoring regime. So, for the last six years, nothing in that regard took place making 
sure that the utility basically complies with what they are required to comply with, even if 
they have breaches when it comes to certain parameters, certain issues. The only thing we 
are doing is recommending and then WAJ takes it on from there and we don't know what 
happens. There is no transparency basically after issuance of our monitoring report. 
Nothing is clear. No roles and responsibilities between the owner and the regulated entity 
and PMU is currently sitting in WAJ - it's not being or not able to push basically on these 
issues (Policymaker Eight 2013). 
 
The source of the PMU’s weakness is that it is hosted in WAJ. Consequently, the PMU 
has no regulatory authority over the PMU and also reinforces WAJ’s conflict of interest 
as owner and regulator of the limited liability companies. The PMU, therefore, merely 
provides a cosmetic front with respect to monitoring and regulation within the water 
sector.  
The strong role played by the Council of Ministers in managing Jordan’s delicate 
political climate reinforces the PMU’s limited capacity and stifled progress on converting 
the PMU into a legally independent and autonomous Water Utility Regulatory Unit 
(WURU). The PMU received very little support from the ministers because of confusion 
about the PMU’s role and because of the frequent changes to the ministerial seat. The 




The PMU has suffered in my opinion. I only assumed the PMU last January, but from my 
understanding, they suffered from different ministerial changes. The PMU had the 
support of the minister, then comes a new minister and says “what is the PMU? What do 
they do? Why are they being paid higher salaries? Why? Why? Why? So everyone has 
their own mood and strategies. Nothing is institutionalized 100 percent (Policymaker 
Eight 2013) 
 
The lack of institutionalization, and failure to convert the PMU into the WURU, stems 
from the fact that a new water law has not been agreed upon by the Council of Ministers 
(Policymaker Three 2012). Consequently, WAJ and MWI authorities agreed that the 
PMU would remain in WAJ but would report directly to the MWI until a law is passed 
(USAID 2014a).  
Overall, the constraints affecting the water sector, and the corporatization process, 
have been institutionalized by a politically driven history of sector development and state 
building processes. The role played by the Council of Ministers in the water sector, 
however, is off limits to donors and the ISSP program. Consequently, consultants with 
the ISSP solicited an agreement from the government that ministers could not reverse 
decisions that are part of the corporate restructuring process. This, however, created an 
inconsistent reform process as several initiatives, such as WAJ’s conversion into a bulk 
water supplier and negotiations over a new water law, have been partially realized or 
suspended altogether. The inability to deal with politically sensitive issues affecting 
municipal and national water sector institutions reinforced the constraints plaguing the 
water sector and undermined the corporatization process.  
Ultimately, the corporatization process has been significantly shaped by 
constraints endemic to the water sector. Most of these constraints, such as institutional 
overlap, predate the corporatization process whereas others were institutionalized 




have stalled reforms in ways that do not necessarily reflect limitations with public sector 
or corporate management regimes. The ISSP could not address the deeply embedded 
structural and political constraints shaping the dynamics of the water sector at the 
national and municipal scales. However it has introduced new governance conditions that 
will, in the long-term, interact with continually evolving political and structural 




 Jordan’s privatization-related reforms over the past fifteen years have produced 
mixed results. These results, however, have little to do with the nature or adequacy of the 
reforms. Rather, the LEMA management contract, limited liability companies, and the 
ISSP represent a new phase in continuous reform and development in Jordan’s national 
and municipal water services. The outcomes of fifty years of development projects in the 
water sector have interacted with the corporatization process to reinforce the effects of 
existing political and institutional constraints while also creating new challenges. 
Consequently, the debates over the merits of public and private management regimes in 
municipal and national water services should be reconsidered. 
It is no coincidence that the World Bank required some form of privatization in its 
loan to Jordan in 1999. The World Bank had been requiring greater private sector 
participation for several years in funded projects throughout the global South because 
public sector management failures and extensive financial deficits. Even with extensive 




results continued to be mixed. Academics have strongly critiqued privatization programs 
arguing that they were undemocratically designed by financially-interested elites 
(Goldman 2007) in an effort to create new business opportunities for multinational 
companies (Swyngedouw 2005). Additionally, scholars note that the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund played an instrumental role by coercing governmental 
deregulation of water sectors through donor conditions in exchange for key critical loans 
(Bakker 2010).  
These arguments reiterate the notion that privatization represented a radical 
departure from public sector management. Indeed, the essence of privatization does differ 
from public sector management. What is missed in making this claim, however, is the 
fact that the political and institutional environments within which privatization programs 
are implemented are context dependent and, in turn, generate different outcomes. In some 
cases, privatization programs have succeeded where there are strong regulatory 
institutions (Smith 2004). The majority, however, have failed. Understanding these 
failures, however, requires assessing the nature of donor conditions and requirements and 
their interactions with institutional and political dynamics that shape a water sector’s 
operational and managerial systems.  
This chapter’s argument elaborates Bakker’s (2010) argument on why governance 
conditions matter for the outcomes of privatization and corporatization processes in 
municipal and national water services. She argues that analysts must attend to the effects 
of interactions of social, economic, and political institutions on management services in 
the formal and informal sectors. The limitation of this argument, however, is that it does 




historically. The case of Jordan suggests that the corporatization process has introduced 
new governance conditions that have interacted with the ongoing transformation of the 
water sector. Some of these constraints, like the institutional overlap between the MWI 
and WAJ, and the strong political influence of the ministers and Council of Ministers, 
significantly predate the corporatization process. Other constraints, like institutional 
models of the limited liability companies, are rooted in the introduction of privatization 
processes that began in 1999. Together, these have interacted to create an inflexible and 
politically sensitive water sector. It is thus important to pay attention to the way state 
institutions are created and transformed through water management and remade through 
reform projects. As argued in previous chapters, reform projects cannot presume clean 
slates in which new policies can be implemented.  
These experiences with and outcomes of the reform programs also play a critical 
role in shaping household access to water and experiences with the water sector. Indeed, 
fears of public discontent have directly and indirectly shaped decision-making processes 
at the municipal and national level. The next chapter discusses how Jordanian and non-
Jordanian households have perceived and experience the water reform process and 
service changes over the last fifteen years in Amman. Understanding these perspectives 
and experiences is critical as the corporatization process is unlikely to cease in the near 
future. In fact, the ISSP is set to end the fall of 2015 and indications are that USAID 








Chapter 5 Privatization and Household Experiences 
Introduction 
 The effects of privatization of water services on households have been framed in 
two contradictory ways.1 Advocates of privatization, particularly the World Bank (1993), 
argue that such initiatives are pro-poor as reforms generate more efficient and effective 
distribution services. Social scientists, on the other hand, strongly critique privatization 
programs because poor consumers often face higher costs (Birdsall and Nellis 2003) and 
experience invasive measures that reduce their autonomy over water access and use (von 
Schnitzler 2008; Loftus 2006b). Both advocates and opponents of privatization share a 
common concern about the failure to provide efficient, effective, and equitable municipal 
water services. While some of the underlying causes of management failures in both 
public and private management regimes stem from political and institutional constraints 
affecting water services (see Chapters 3 and 4), additional research is needed into how 
households are affected by the interactions of privatization programs and the design of 
municipal water systems and services. 
This chapter argues that in the case of Amman, the corporatized water utilities 
have improved municipal water services for households in terms of billing and consistent 
distribution. Despite such improvements, access inequalities persist because of the city’s 
intermittent delivery system. The design of Amman’s municipal water system requires 
households to store and ration water use each week because of a systematic intermittent 
delivery schedule. The design of this system, however, produces constraints to access, 
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 Privatization in this instance implies wholesale transfer of water services and infrastructure to private 




primarily affecting low-income households. The tariff revisions adopted in 2011 
enhanced these inequalities as many low-income households were charged higher prices 
and consequently spend a greater share of their monthly income for municipal water bills. 
Households, however, are willing to pay higher prices so long as their barriers to access 
are addressed. It is thus important to consider how the infrastructural design of the water 
network, delivery schedules, billing, and modes of access to and storage of water 
collectively interact with household economic conditions. Without attending to the reality 
of household experiences with the municipal water services, a third pending tariff 
revision risks enhancing inequalities in water access and use.  
This analysis uses two techniques to examine inequalities in access and 
distribution over the last decade. First, using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
software, Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) is conducted to understand temporal 
and spatial trends in water deliveries and consumption.2 ESDA helps deduce the 
differences in water consumption in poorer east Amman and wealthier neighborhoods in 
west Amman. Second, extended interviews were conducted with families living in 
different parts of Amman. These households were selected through sno-ball sampling 
methods and reflect the different socio-economic strata of society, family size, and 
location. The interviews dealt with household perceptions and experiences with 
municipal water services and the corporate restructuring process.  
This chapter is divided into several parts. First, it presents an explanation of 
ESDA methods and discusses the results of the Global Moran’s I. The second part of the 
chapter examines the results of the ESDA through an analysis of household perceptions 
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and experiences in the contexts of the services and reforms. Third, the chapter concludes 
with a synthesis of the research findings and contribution to academic scholarship. 
Water Policies, Services, and Socio-Economic Inequalities 
Amman is a city starkly divided along socio-economic lines. Unlike many water 
services in many cities of the global South (Gandy 2006; Swyngedouw 2004), however, 
98 percent of all households have access to municipal water services (Potter and 
Darmame 2010). This achievement complements the Capital Investment Project’s (CIP) 
rehabilitation of Amman’s water network and its engineering into a gravity-based 
distribution system in the early 2000s.3 Initially, the CIP was designed for the continuous 
distribution of water throughout Amman4 as it was set to coincide with the completion of 
the Disi Water Conveyance Project. However, project delays in the Disi project forced 
officials to shift the design of the municipal water system for intermittent distribution 
(Policymaker Three 2012). As part of this process, the water networks were divided into 
fifteen districts and 344 sub-districts, which receive unlimited water one to two days per 
week. On these days, households are allowed to use and store as much water as possible 
(Abu-Shams and Rabadi 2003b).  
Accompanying the CIP were initiatives designed to improve improving billing 
and customer services, particularly monitoring of household water meters and 
connections. One of LEMA’s primary goals was to improve monitoring of household 
consumption for the purpose of improving billing procedures and reducing non-revenue 
                                                        
3
 Prior to the project, households did not receive water on a continuous basis, but the water network was not 
engineered for intermittent distribution. 
4
 Benefits of continuous distribution include: 1) a reduction of operational costs by simplifying operations 
routines and an extension of the lives of pipes, valves, and water meters; 2) an improvement of the 
perception of municipal water services among its subscribers and a reduction of the likelihood of illicit 
connections or nonpayment of bills; and 3) an improvement of public health by eliminating negative 




water loss. Over the course of the management contract, LEMA replaced 250,000 water 
meters in nearly half of the 314 sub-districts. As a result, LEMA was able to reduce non-
revenue water loss from 54 percent to 46 percent by 2006, with 150 out of the 314 sub-
districts experiencing only 35 percent of non-revenue water loss due to upgrades to the 
network and water meters (World Bank 2007). Miyahuna has built on this progress by 
reducing non-revenue water loss to 35 percent for its entire network (USAID 2014b).5 
Throughout the course of the CIP, the number of customers registered with 
LEMA and Miyahuna and total billed residential consumption increased significantly. 
The number of subscribers registered with Miyahuna steadily increased over the last 
decade from 357,185 in 2004 to 512,268 by 2012. Figure 5.1 highlights this increase 
between 2004 and 2007. 
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 USAID/Jordan, however, is concerned about the possibility of significant increases in Amman’s rates of 
non-revenue water loss due to the completion of the Disi Water Conveyance Project. Authorities estimate 




Figure 5.1 Number of Registered Subscribers 
 
Source: Jordan Water Company - Miyahuna 2012 
 
The growth in the number of customers stems from Amman’s rapid population growth in 
the mid to late 2000s. Starting in 2005, Amman started receiving several hundred 
thousand refugees from Iraq. Many of these refugees were middle income families 
opening new houses, and in some cases, leading to new urban developments in west 
Amman, particularly in the Deir Ghbar neighborhood. Improved monitoring of residential 
water meters ensured that LEMA and Miyahuna were able to more accurately bill 
customers for consumed water. This led to an increased in the billed residential water 
consumption, which increased from 46 million cubic meters in 2002 to 75 million cubic 


















































































































































































































Figure 5.2 Total Residential Water Consumption 
 
Source: Jordan Water Company - Miyahuna 2012 
The increase in water consumption has remained heavily subsidized by direct and 
indirect subsidies for municipal water supply provisions sold to Miyahuna by WAJ. The 
water tariff was revised twice in 1997 and 2011. The 1997 tariff revision was 
implemented two years before LEMA’s launch in order to disassociate increasing water 
prices with privatization (World Bank 2007). This tariff created four tiers for household 
bills, as represented in Table 5.1, and was calculated according to the following formula: 














2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
















1 0 - 20 2.000 0.672 0.300 2.150 
2 21- 40 (0.14×volume) - 0.8 (0.0448×volume) - 0.224 0.300 4.150 




-(0.084627×volume) 0.300 5.150 
4 > 130  (0.85×volume) (0.392×volume) 0.300 5.150 
Source: Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 
 
The bulk of the water bill in this tariff is derived from the volume of water consumed. 
Households that consume more water were expected to pay higher prices for each cubic 
meter. In 2011, the tariff revision added three more tiers, as represented in Table 5.2: 






Unit price of 
water (JD) 
Unit price of 
sewerage (JD) 
Factor 
1 0 – 18 2.430 2.130*  0.600*  1 
2 19 – 36 4.080 0.145 0.040 1 
3 37 – 54 5.730 0.500 0.250 1 
4 55 – 72 5.730 0.850 0.450 1.1 
5 73 – 90 5.730 1.000 0.600 1.15 
6 90 – 126 5.730 1.400 0.700 1.15 
7 > 126 5.730 1.600 0.800 2 
*Fixed amount not related to volume  
Source: Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 
 
This revision introduced greater price sensitivity for all consumers. Households in the 
first tier only pay a fixed fee. All water bills that fall in tiers 2-7 are based on the 
following formula: 






In theory, the new tariff encourages conservation among high-end users while 
maintaining subsidization of poor households that consume limited amounts of water.  
In light of the increasing water consumption and Miyahuna’s rising operating 
expenses, ISSP, authorities hope to again revise the tariff in order to reduce the subsidies 
for municipal water supplies and increase Miyahuna’s revenues (USAID 2011).6 Public 
policy experts also advocate for tariff reform because the current tariff subsidizes 
wealthier households, exposes low-income households to higher costs, and fails to 
encourage more sustainable water use (Najjar and Telfah 2012; Ray 2010). The tariff 
reforms, it is argued, will improve services, and in turn, encourage household willingness 
to pay higher prices (Policymaker One 2012).  
Collectively, the CIP, billing revisions, and the tariff modifications facilitated 
improvements from operational standpoints and the overall perception of Amman’s 
municipal water services (USAID 2011). However, despite the equal availability of water 
to the 314 sub-districts, lower income households, which tend to be larger than wealthier 
households, still consume less water on average (Ray 2010).7 Wealthier residents 
typically reside in low-density neighborhoods in western parts of the city whereas lower-
income households are located in high-density areas in the east. East and west Amman, 
                                                        
6 Economic reforms designed to enhance government capacity and reduce fiscal deficits have exacerbated 
household concerns. The International Monetary Fund recommended that the Jordanian government 
reconfigure public subsidies for energy and food (IMF 2012a). The reductions in energy subsidies have 
created significant problems for households in the last three years. Households rely on gas heaters and gas 
stoves for cooking. Between fall 2012 and fall 2014, one tank of natural gas increased from 6 Jordanian 
Dinars to 10 Jordanian Dinars. In the winter months, large families using two heaters could spend at least 
80 Jordanian Dinars on heating. In 2013, the Jordanian government canceled the blanket subsidy on gas 
tanks and provided direct cash transfers to qualifying families, but the cash transfers did not cover the 
difference in the price increase of gas. Consequently, with the rising cost of living, few households are 
capable or willing to assume higher costs for water services.  
 
7
 The total volume of piped water generally declines in the summer months and increases in the winter, 




therefore, represent de facto geographical divisions in poverty and wealth. The reality of 
the geographical split is northwest to southeast, running through the center of the city, as 
depicted in Map 5.1. Subsequent references to east and west Amman in this chapter refer 
to these specific areas.  
Map 5.1 East and West Amman 
 
Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 
 
Existing research makes it clear that socio-economic inequalities appear in water 
access and consumption (Potter and Darmame 2010; Ray 2010). What remains unclear is 
how the intermittent delivery system and corporate restructuring process affect the 
production of these inequalities. Considering the stark socio-economic inequalities, how 




shape inequalities and household experiences? Why is this so? These questions are 
examined using exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) and household interviews with 
residents of Amman.  
 
Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
The results of the ESDA reveals that there are tendencies of spatial clustering in 
the overall amount of water consumed and revenue generated in the 314 sub-districts but 
that there are few differences between average customer water consumption and average 
revenue generated per customer. It is important to note that customers billed are not the 
same as households. Customers have registered water meters with Miyahuna and receive 
quarterly bills. The difference between households and customers will be further 
discussed below. The discrepancy between the overall spatial clustering but little spatial 
clustering for average consumption and revenue generated can be addressed through 
ESDA (Anselin, Sridharan, and Gholston 2007), which provides insights about overall 
and local spatial clustering using the Global Moran’s I and Local Indicators of Spatial 
Clustering (LISA) analyses. The Global Moran’s I generates an overall measure of 
clustering whereas LISA highlights local areas of clustering in water consumption and 
revenue generated and for average customer consumption and revenue in each of the 314 
sub-districts. Global Moran’s I values range from -1 to 1, in which -1 indicates perfect 
dispersion and 1 indicates perfect clustering. A value of 0 indicates random distribution. 
It is important to note that Global Moran’s I and LISA analyses are not predictive or 




they merely provide a statistical snapshot of the degree of spatial clustering throughout 
Amman. 
 
Global Moran’s I  
The Global Moran’s I results reveal that there is spatial clustering in the overall 
levels of water consumption and revenue generated but little spatial clustering at the level 
of customers billed. The Global Moran’s I is based on data provided by Miyahuna for 
each of the sub-districts, while customer averages were calculated by dividing the amount 
of water distributed and revenue generated by the number of customers billed. The results 
of the ESDA inform reflections on how the spatial clustering relates to, or reflect, socio-
economic differences in the city. Using ESDA, the impacts of the LEMA management 
contract, CIP, and performance of Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna are tested through 
ESDA analyses of water distribution, customers billed, and revenue-generated data for 
each sub-district.  
The statistical significance of the spatial clustering is based on a pseudo p-value 
generated by several hundred permutations of the Global Moran’s I analysis. Statistical 
significance is indicated by p-values of .1, .05, .01, and .001. Lower p-values indicate a 
higher degree of statistical significance. Spatial weight matrices determine how space is 
factored into correlation calculations. Three types of spatial weight matrices can be used 
in tests of the Global Moran’s I. First, the simple contiguity calculates spatial relations 
through vertices held in common between two areas. Second, rook spatial weights 




common vertices and pure borders. This analysis uses the queen spatial weight matrix 
because the sub-districts are not uniform in size or shape. 
Miyahuna provided data for the ESDA analyses. The data set included the number 
of customers billed, revenue generated, and volume distributed for January and July in 
the years 2003, 2007, and 2011.8 These three years were selected because they provide 
insight into the impacts of the CIP, LEMA management contract, and Miyahuna on water 
distribution. The months of January and July were also selected to provide insights into 
seasonal differences in water consumption and delivery. Additionally, average customer 
consumption, revenue generated per customer, and average revenue per cubic meter were 
computed. These reflect average levels of consumption and average price per cubic meter 
of water paid by customers in each sub-district. This. Table 5.3 highlights the variables 
analyzed and how they were calculated:  
 
 
Table 5.3 Variables used in GIS Analysis  
Variable Calculation 
Customers Billed Total Number of Customers Billed in each Sub-district 
Cubic Meters Delivered Total Volume of Water Delivered and Consumed in each Sub-
district 
Revenue Total Revenue Generated in each Sub-district 
Average Cubic Meter per Customer 
Billed 
Cubic Meters Delivered / Customers Billed in each sub-district 
Average Revenue per Customer Billed Revenue / Customers Billed in each Sub-district 
Average Revenue per Cubic Meter Revenue / Cubic Meters Delivered in each Sub-district 
 
The two sets of data can indicate if there are geographic differences in 
consumption, storage capacity, and monthly bills from an aggregated perspective and 
average customer for each sub-district. It is important to note that the water network sub-
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districts do not necessarily correlate to neighborhood sub-divisions, which are more 
neatly divided along socio-economic lines. The results of the Global Moran’s I tests 
suggest that Amman’s municipal water services demonstrate significant levels of spatial 
clustering in water consumption and revenue generated. The Global Moran’s I results for 
the numbers of customers billed, cubic meters delivered, and revenue generated were 
statistically significant at p-values of .001. This means that there is spatial clustering in 
water consumption in the sub-districts. The results for the average customer, however, 
demonstrated weaker incidents of statistically significant spatial clustering. In other 
words, the data results suggest that average customers consumption is similar throughout 
Amman. Table 5.4 shows the results of the Global Moran’s I tests for the six variables, 
by month, for 2003, 2007, and 2011.  
The number of customers billed, revenue generated, and volume delivered in each 
of the 344 sub-districts all demonstrate highly significant levels (p=.001) of spatial 
clustering in January and July in 2003, 2007, and 2011. The average customer 
consumption and average revenue per customer, however, were not as statistically 
significant. The average customer consumption was significant in July 2003 (p=.007) and 
January 2007 (p=.033). The average revenue per customer billed was significant in 
January 2003 (p=.081), July 2003 (p=.038), January 2007 (p=.003), and July 2007 
(p=.004). Average revenue per cubic meter showed statistically significant clustering for 

















































































































Collectively, the spatial clustering in the total amount of water consumed and 
revenue generated in each sub-district raises questions about where these clusters are 
located. Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) identify areas of spatial clustering 
(Anselin 1995). When high values are surrounded by similar values, the polygons are 
colored red. When low values are surrounded by other low values, the polygons are 
colored blue. Outliers are represented in pink and light blue, in which a high value is 
surrounded by low values, and vice-versa. The LISA maps are based on a queen spatial 
weight matrix and 999 permutations. The LISA maps visualize, at a statistical 





Maps 5.2-5.7 highlight the locations of spatial clusters for water consumption in 
each sub-district in January and July 2003, 2007, and 2011. Local clusters of high 
consumption are shown in red whereas clusters of low consumption are shown in blue. 
Maps 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrate strong incidents of spatial clustering of high consumption 
in west Amman. Maps 5.4 and 5.5 similarly show strong incidents of spatial clustering of 
high consumption in west Amman, albeit with a bit more dispersion. Maps 5.6 and 5.7 
also show spatial clustering of high consumption in west Amman. The maps for water 
consumption in 2003, 2007, and 2011 do not indicate that there are concentrations of low 
volumes of water consumption in east Amman. Rather, the low volumes of water 
consumption are found in the outer suburbs of the city, which also happen to be more 
industrial rather than residential zones. 
The LISA maps for the overall amount of revenue generated reveal similar trends 
with local clusters of high revenues in west Amman. Maps 5.8 and 5.9 demonstrate that 
are strong incidents of high revenues generated in the core of west Amman. Maps 5.10, 
5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 indicate that the areas generating high revenues gradually expanded 
into newer residential developments in the northwestern part of the city. The maps also 
show clusters of low revenues in the suburbs and parts of east Amman, shown in blue. 
The clusters of low revenues tend to be found in low density suburban developments 
located around industrial zones. Collectively, the high degrees of clustering in the amount 
of water delivered and revenue generated in west Amman suggests that there are 
differences with respect to water consumption in ways that correspond to socio-economic 




statistically significant clusters of low water consumption and revenue generated suggests 
that other factors may be shaping meter readings and water bills.  
It is clear that seasonality is not a strong influence nor is the transfer of 
responsibilities from LEMA to Miyahuna. While data would be required to test how these 
results compare to consumption patterns under WAJ control, they do suggest that the 
intensification of the corporatization process since 1999 has had a limited effect on 
consumption and water distribution.9 Nevertheless, there are three possible reasons that 
explain the differences between trends in overall levels of consumption and revenue 
generated and the results for the average household.  
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Map 5.2 Cubic Meters Delivered January 2003 






























Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




Map 5.3 Cubic Meters Delivered July 2003 






























Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




Map 5.4 Cubic Meters Delivered January 2007 































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 



































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 



































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




Map 5.8 Revenues Generated January 2003 































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




Map 5.9 Revenues Generated July 2003 































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




































Map Produced by Basil Mahayni, Data Source Jordan Water Company – Miyahuna 2012 




One possible explanation is that overall consumption trends in low-income and 
high-income parts of the city average out at the level of customers billed because the sub-
districts combine poor and wealthy neighborhoods. This, however, is unlikely except for 
a small number of sub-districts in central Amman as a majority of low-income families 
are concentrated in eastern parts of the city. A second explanation is that customers billed 
throughout Amman have more or less equal consumption patterns despite significantly 
different storage capacities. Though household chores and water use for hygiene may not 
vary by socio-economic conditions, households in west Amman often maintain large 
gardens and swimming pools. The third explanation is that a few differences appear 
between the number of customers billed geographically, excluding west Amman, is 
because other factors cloud the results of the Moran’s I and LISA analyses, such as 
shared water meters. This analysis would benefit from a comparison between water bills 
and number of households in each district, especially since the eastern parts of the city 
are more densely populated. Evidence shows that many households, particularly in poorer 
parts of the city, share water meters. This highlights the importance of attending to how 
individual households interact with the municipal water system, and its intermittent 
distribution. Indeed, household interviews reveal that there are several factors that shape 
water access outside of direct water connections to the municipal water network.  
 
Understanding Household Perspectives 
Household interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013 suggest that inequalities in 
access to and consumption of water are shaped by several factors independent of the 




results. Household interviews reveal that the intermittent distribution system has 
differentially affected households as they face billing, water pressure, and storage 
concerns. This section investigates these three factors in addition to examining how the 
corporatization process has affected households, and their public perceptions. Interviews 
were conducted with heads of households living in Amman. The households varied by 
size, geographical location (neighborhood), socio-economic status, and citizenship.1 
Respondents revealed that socio-economic status plays an important role in shaping water 
access independent of the corporatization process. In fact, most households welcomed the 
reforms as they observed significant improvements in municipal water services.  
 
Storage Capacity and Water Use Practices 
 Household access to water and water use practices is an outcome of the 
interaction between socio-economic conditions and Amman’s intermittent delivery 
system. It is important to note that intermittent deliveries are not the same as water 
rationing. Intermittent deliveries are based on the continuous distribution of water into a 
sub-district for a restricted period of time whereas water rationing restricts the amount of 
water households can use over a period of time. Under the intermittent delivery system, 
                                                        
1 It is important to consider geographical location because Amman’s topography affects water pumping in 
significant ways – households at higher elevations sometimes experience reduced water pressure, which 
may prevent the filling of tanks to capacity. Geographical location can also be an indicator of socio-
economic class, and it is important to understand from the perspectives of the households how their income 
and social standing affect their ability to store water and shape their water-use behaviors. Considerations of 
socio-economic status also clarify how the block-tariffs and general water prices factor into household 
expenditures. The last factor, citizenship status, is critical because of the significant numbers of refugees 
living in Amman and the claims they can make to public officials. Palestinians have been living in Jordan 
for nearly 60 years, yet not all have the same legal status. When Jordan occupied the West Bank, it granted 
Palestinian refugees citizenship, but did not extend the same privileges to Palestinians from Gaza. Today, 
Palestinians from Gaza only hold legal residency but not citizenship. Second, the thousands of Iraqi 
refugees tend to be better off financially than the Syrians, yet share similar constraints in their ability to file 





households can use as much water as they desire on days water is delivered and store as 
much water as possible. Nevertheless, low-income and wealthy households have different 
storage capacity, largely conditioned by where they live and how much they can afford.  
The intermittent delivery schedule ensures that all areas of Amman receive 
unlimited volumes of water over the course of 24 to 48 hours. On days water is delivered, 
installed ground level or rooftop tanks or underground cisterns automatically fill when 
water is delivered while automated measurement levers in the storage tanks cease the 
water intake once the tank is full. Households without storage tanks only have access to 
water on the day of delivery. Storage tanks are made of metal or plastic, and range from 
two to four cubic meters in size. Households are responsible for purchasing, installing, 
and maintaining storage units.  
In east Amman, which is characterized by a high density of older buildings, 
households are limited to rooftop or ground-level storage tanks. Interview respondents 
living in east Amman indicated storage capacities ranging from 2 to 6 cubic meters. 
Some households also fill jerry cans on “water days” in order to supplement their water 
supplies (Respondent Nine 2013; Respondent Twentyone 2013). In fact, one Syrian 
family living in Jabal Amman did not have access to any storage units forcing them to 
collect as much water in jerry cans and water bottles for their weekly use of water. They 
pleaded with their landlord to make the necessary investments, but the landlord refused to 
do so without partial investment from the tenants. As Syrian refugees, however, the 
family could not afford the financial commitment as they were already living beyond 
their means (Respondent Twentyone 2013). West Amman, on the other hand, is largely 




of land. Respondents in west Amman noted that they own underground cisterns, which 
significantly increase storage capacity to 30 cubic meters or higher (Ray 2010) in 
addition to storage tanks (Respondent Twelve 2013; Respondent Seventeen 2013; 
Respondent Nineteen 2013; Respondent Twenty 2013).  
Storage capacity plays an important role in shaping lifestyles and quality of living 
in east and west Amman. One study reported that over 20 percent of the water distributed 
in Amman is consumed by fewer than 5 percent of households residing in western parts 
of the city (Namrouqa 2009). The concentration of high volumes of consumption within 
such a small percentage of families reflects the key role that storage capacity plays as the 
intermittent systems means they do not have 24 hour access to municipal water 
deliveries. Four respondents living in west Amman noted that their underground cisterns 
allowed them to maintain lush gardens without having to implement schedules for water 
intensive activities (Respondent Twelve 2013; Respondent Seventeen 2013; Respondent 
Nineteen 2013; Respondent Twenty 2013), with two of the families also owning 
swimming pools (Respondent Nineteen 2013; Respondent Twenty 2013). Middle and 
low-income households living in east Amman, however, are forced into planning their 
water use over the course of the week. With the burden mostly falling on women 
(Masharqa 2012), households often restrict the number of showers per week or 
scheduling household chores on “water days” (Respondent Nine 2013; Respondent Ten 
2013). The nature of these restrictions, however, can depend on the size of the family 
(Respondent Two 2012) with small families having more flexibility than larger families 
(Ray 2010). Seasonality can also affect water use practices among low-volume 




reduced volume of water resources in municipal reservoirs while water use increases for 
laundry, showers, and house cleaning because of higher temperatures and dust in the 
streets (Respondent Three 2013; Respondent Ten 2013; Respondent Thirteen 2013).  
Limited storage capacity can also mean that households need to spend extra 
money for additional water supplies. On occasion, sub-districts do not receive scheduled 
deliveries because of complications in the municipal water network. Miyahuna regularly 
suspends water pumping after rains because treatment plants cannot process turbid waters 
(Namrouqa 2012b). When this happens, households can file a claim with Miyahuna for a 
free delivery via water truck but this often requires a personal connection for an 
immediate response (Policymaker Twelve 2013). All interview respondents had no idea 
that such a service was available. The alternative is that households restrict or postpone 
water-based activities, such as showers or laundry, until the next scheduled delivery or 
consider purchases water from private water vendors (Respondent Sixteen 2013).  
Private water vendors are ubiquitous in Amman and notorious for charging high 
prices. The number of households who purchase water from such vendors is small, at an 
estimated 2.5 percent in the winter and 5 percent in the summer (Salman, Al-Karablieh, 
and Haddadin 2008, 300). There are several reasons why households are reluctant to 
purchase from vendors. First, water quality is questionable and households cannot 
guarantee that the vendor sourced the water from a regulated water pump.2 Second, 
private vendors sell water at significantly higher prices than Miyahuna. Third, most 
vendors require that households purchase the entire tank, which range between 4 and 10 
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cubic meters. For example, a household with 4 cubic meters of storage purchasing from a 
vendor supplying 6 cubic meters will be forced to buy the extra 2 cubic meters. In some 
cases, households recruit their neighbors into a group purchase to divide the delivery and 
cost (Respondent Thirteen 2013). Fourth, it is not always easy for households to hire or 
ensure timely delivery of water. One respondent noted that it is difficult for her to hire 
private water trucks because she lives in a dense neighborhood with narrow streets, 
creating accessibility issues for the truck (Respondent Four 2013). Image 5.1 provides a 
picture of a four cubic meter private water truck in downtown Amman. Another 
respondent noted that vendor schedules are not fixed, and thus waiting times can last 
several hours until the delivery is made (Respondent One 2013).  
Ultimately, the design of the municipal water system heightens the impacts of 
socio-economic constraints on household water consumption and water use practices. 
Socio-economic conditions determine how much water a household can store each week 
and how they prioritize their water use, explaining why east and west Amman are 
characterized by significant differences in water consumption and revenue generated. 
This dynamic is further mediated by infrastructural, technological, and financial 
constraints, which dictate the amount of water that actually flows into a storage unit and 
how much a household spends on its water bills. The location of storage units and water 
pressure interact with capacity to invest in water pumps and individual connection fees to 
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Infrastructure and Water Pressure 
The systematization of intermittent deliveries and improvements in the 
monitoring of water meters has created three related ways in which wealthy and poor 
households are differentially affected. First, low water pressure plagues Amman’s water 




intake into rooftop storage tanks, and result in units being less than full after water 
deliveries are complete. Second, Miyahuna has encouraged households to relocate water 
tanks to the ground level in order to ensure that tanks are filled to capacity each week. 
This, however, fails to address the effects of low water pressure as households suffer 
from low water pressure in faucets and showers when tanks are located at the ground 
level. Consequently, many households are forced to install water pumps to bolster water 
pressure for intake into the storage unit or into the home, but this requires additional 
investments in pumps, infrastructure, and electricity. Third, costs associated with merely 
accessing water have deterred many households from registering individual meters. In 
many cases, households share a water meter in order to divide registration costs, but this 
ends up increasing household water bills. 
Though the CIP allowed Miyahuna to guarantee water deliveries to building 
access points, the gravity-based design creates water pressure problems that limit the 
replenishment of storage tanks for many households. As part of the CIP, ground 
reservoirs and water towers were installed to supply distribution networks through 
gravity-based pumping into sub-district water transmission lines. Each day of the week, 
different reservoirs and towers receive water from the primary transmission lines and 
transfer water to secondary and tertiary distribution networks to households. Despite the 
success of the CIP in revising and stabilizing municipal water deliveries, Amman’s 
topography and the intermittent delivery system create fluctuations in water pressure that 
ultimately affect replenishment of household storage units.  
The geographic location of households is an important factor in the availability of 




pumping water from reservoirs or towers to lower-elevations whereas households 
residing at elevations higher than the reservoirs or towers face problems replenishing 
their tanks due to low water pressure. Additionally, households located near major 
institutional centers, such as hospitals or Royal Palaces, benefit from strong water 
pressure. The water pressure concerns in the networks can equally impact low and 
wealthy households. Two respondents living in west Amman noted that their tanks 
regularly do not fill to capacity because of low-water pressure (Respondent Eighteen 
2012; Respondent Twenty 2013) whereas one interview respondent in east Amman noted 
that they regularly experience strong water pressure because of their close proximity to a 
major hospital (Respondent Thirteen 2013). It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
the geographical impact on water pressure stems from a households elevation and 
proximity to water towers and reservoirs and not from their location in east and west 
Amman. 
A household’s location does, however, play a critical role in determining how 
well it can improve low water pressure. Miyahuna guarantees water deliveries to building 
access points, but households are required to take the necessary steps to ensure the 
storage of water (Policymaker Seven 2013). In some cases, however, rooftop storage 
tanks may not fill to capacity each week because the water pressure may not be strong 
enough to push water several stories high. In response, Miyahuna has encouraged 
households to install ground level storage tanks in order to alleviate service gaps 
(Policymaker Seven 2013). Households with ground level storage units, however, can 
suffer from low water pressure in kitchen and bathroom faucets and showers (Respondent 




water tanks. Many new apartment units throughout Amman incorporate space for ground 
level water tanks whereas older neighborhoods, especially in east Amman, were not built 
with such considerations. As such, there are serious space limitations that prevent this 
possibility of relocating roof top storage units. Image 5.2 depicts this density in the 
Ashrafiyeh neighborhood in east Amman.  
Image 5.2 Ashrafiyeh Neighborhood, East Amman 
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In response, authorities have encouraged households to install water pumps to 
increase water pressure for filling rooftop tanks or improving water pressure in building 
pipes (Policymaker Seven 2013). A household survey noted that 40 percent of wealthy 




and Darmame 2010). One reason for this difference is the added cost of installing a local 
water pump. A two cubic meter tank can cost in the range of 50 to 100 Jordanian Dinars, 
while an electrical pump can cost 15 to 35 Jordanian Dinars. Households also need to 
factor labor and installation of any other fixtures required to complete the installation of 
the pump and storage tank (Gerlach and Franceys 2009). Investment in household water 
infrastructure, however, is not a one-time deal. Households must maintain treatment of 
storage units for quality purposes and monitor and address any malfunctions in the 
storage tank or pump, or leaks in the pipes. Consequently, some households are reluctant 
to install electric pumps (Respondent Seventeen 2013) because electricity prices have 
radically increased in recent years (Kadri and Kershner 2012). 
Ultimately, the design of Amman’s municipal water services has required 
households to take on significant expenses beyond mere connection fees. The system is 
compounded by the fact that there are high fixed fees as compared to low variable costs 
associated with water bills. It is estimated that the average household in Amman invests 
nearly 700 Jordanian Dinars just in household water systems, including pipes, tanks, and 
pumps (Ray 2010), not including water connection fees and installation of water meters. 
Fees associated with the installation of water meters and connection to the municipal 
water network depends on a number of conditions, including homeownership and age of 
the building (Jordan Water Company 2014) with prices ranging from 250 Jordanian 
Dinars (Respondent Sixteen 2013) to 450 Jordanian Dinars (Respondent Eleven 2013). 
Together, the installation of necessary equipment and connection fees can total nearly 
1000 Jordanian Dinars, or one-third of the annual minimum wage. The high fixed cost of 




flexibility. Because of these expenses, many low-income households opt share water 
meters.  
Households sharing a water meter receive one water bill from Miyahuna. In some 
cases, households divide water bills with other family members residing in the building, 
and in others landlords share water meters with tenants (Respondent Nine 2013; 
Respondent Fifteen 2013; Respondent Seventeen 2013). The prevalence of sharing water 
meters is quite high. Potter and Darmame (2010) reported that 56 percent of low-income 
households they surveyed share a water meter as compared to 12 percent of wealthier 
households. Gerlach and Franceys (2009), on the other hand, reported that 38 percent of 
their low-income survey respondents share a water meter.3 Though sharing water meters 
is a way to by-pass the connection fees, households do not necessarily save in the long 
run as the collective volume of water consumed may push the water bill into higher price 
blocks.  
One respondent noted that his extended family, which occupies the entire 
building, shares one water meter. His father pays the monthly bills and each family 
reimburses him for all utility expenses (Respondent Seventeen 2013). Another 
respondent, a young man from Iraq, shares 6 cubic meters of water with his landlord, 
landlord’s wife, and two sons. Each month, he pays 5 Jordanian Dinars to his landlord for 
water, or about half of the quarterly bill, which is about 30 Jordanian Dinars (Respondent 
Fifteen 2013). In both cases, each household pays higher prices per cubic meter than they 
would if they owned a single water meter. For example, the tenant and landlord pay Tier 
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3 prices based on their collective consumption. The tenant, however, would likely only 
pay Tier 1 prices if he had his own water meter.  
The social and economic inequalities generated by low water pressure, access to 
infrastructure, and water meters stem from the design of the intermittent distribution 
system. Authorities calling on households to take steps to improve access to water 
services by relocating water tanks or installing electric pumps do not take into 
consideration that households often face severe space and financial constraints. This 
produces substantially different experiences for low-income and wealthy households 
beyond municipal water bills. The corporatization process, particularly the tariff revision, 
risks accentuating these inequalities if the reality of household experiences with the fixed 
costs associated connecting to the water system specifically, and the general costs of 
accessing water are not seriously considered. 
 
Implications of Corporate Restructuring 
Household experiences with the municipal water system provoke varying 
opinions about the corporatization process. Jordanians are willing to accept higher prices 
for water and private sector participation so long high quality public services are 
provided and authorities are held accountable. The fact that perceptions of public opinion 
have played a key role in stalling the corporatization process of municipal and national 
water services merits closer investigation. Indeed, one of the key claims in academic 
literature is that corporatization has systematically affected low-income households. In 
the case of Jordan, however, frustration with water services do not necessarily stem from 




to interact with the design of municipal water system. Corporatization processes risk 
reinforcing these inequalities, as evidenced by the impacts of the tariff revision in 2011, 
which pushed many households in lower price brackets into higher tiers. Failure to 
understand household experiences and opinions may reinforce the political constraints 
shaping water sector reforms while also deepening the inequalities in access to water.  
Indeed, water authorities are cognizant of growing discontent among Jordanians 
in response to subsidy reductions and lack of accountability in public policy (ICG 2012; 
Vogt 2011). Jordanian authorities, however, have failed to acknowledge the 
heterogeneity of these opinions. This is exemplified by the fact that Jordanians have not 
directed their protests at water management issues or the privatization processes despite 
having to pay higher prices. The 1997 and 2011 tariffs increased water prices, 
particularly for low-income households. Prior to the 2011 tariff, Gerlach and Franceys 
(2009) reported that only 3 percent of households surveyed paid Tier 1 prices compared 
to 46 percent paying three times the minimum charge and 14 percent paying more than 
ten times. The 2011 tariff revision, which added three more price blocks, increased water 
prices between .60 Jordanian Dinars and 11 Jordanian Dinars depending on consumption 
(Namrouqa 2010). Yet, after its implementation, less than one percent of all households 
billed in June 2012 were charged Tier 1 prices whereas almost 70 percent of all 
household bills were in Tier 2, 3, and 4 (Jordan Water Company 2012).4  
Despite more households paying higher prices, few indicated being frustrated 
with water prices. In fact, respondents have praised the reform processes for significantly 
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improving municipal water services since the LEMA contract began in 1999. In 
particular, households feel that customer services are more responsive, water delivery 
schedules are more consistent, and that household bills are more standardized and easier 
to pay (Respondent Three 2013; Respondent Five 2013; Respondent Eleven 2013; 
Respondent Thirteen 2013). Affirming the belief held by water authorities that people 
will accept higher prices with better services (Policymaker One 2012; Policymaker Four 
2012), some households expressed a willingness to pay more for water services. Though 
they could not or would not pay more than 2 to 5 Jordanian Dinars (Respondent Four 
2013; Respondent Five 2013; Respondent Ten 2013). Price increases however must be 
accompanied by improvements to water pressure, the frequency of delivery, and 
reductions in water leaks (Respondent Three 2013; Respondent Four 2013; Respondent 
Six 2013; Respondent Nine 2013) in addition to reducing the fixed cost of connecting to 
the municipal water system. Failing to do so may force low-income households sharing 
water meters to pay higher prices and may lead to questions of accountability, which has 
become a hot topic in Jordan after several corruption incidents were revealed during the 
privatization of the telecommunications and energy sectors (Respondent Nine 2013; 
Respondent Thirteen 2013).  
The perceived absence of accountability has been reinforced by the fact that 
Jordan’s water sector institutions fail to communicate effectively with their customers 
(Marketing Research Organization 2012; Shridhar 2012a; Shridhar 2012b). Few 
respondents noted receiving any direct communication in the form of brochures, phone 
calls, or letters on water sector initiatives (Respondent Three 2013; Respondent Four 




service disruptions or the extent of Miyahuna’s services or the fact that billing schedules 
are subject to change (Marketing Research Organization 2012) while households are 
generally unaware of the services provided by the water utilities, such as Miyahuna’s 
willingness to provide contractors free of charge for households desiring to install new 
water tanks or update local infrastructure (Policymaker Seven 2013). This failure to 
communicate with customers is exemplified by how well households understand their 
water bills or the extent of the water subsidies. A majority of respondents recognized that 
their water bills are subsidized (Respondent One 2013; Respondent Two 2012; 
Respondent Four 2013; Respondent Five 2013; Respondent Six 2013; Respondent Nine 
2013; Respondent Ten 2013; Respondent Eleven 2013; Respondent Twelve 2013; 
Respondent Thirteen 2013; Respondent Sixteen 2013; Respondent Seventeen 2013), 
however, few could identify the extent of the subsidy or understand how the subsidy was 
calculated. In fact, one believed that existing government subsidization of household 
water bills was an institutional cover for theft by public officials (Respondent Ten 2013).  
Indeed, it is perceptions like these that the government fears. Chapters Three and 
Four demonstrate how governmental authorities use political institutions and decision-
making processes to avoid controversial issues, no matter the long-term effects for the 
water sector. Authorities, however, have failed to adequately understand household 
experiences and opinions and communicate their strategies to their constituents. In fact, 
most household respondents did not know much about the water sector’s corporatization 
process, with one respondent believing that LEMA was still responsible for managing 
Amman’s municipal water services despite the fact that their operations ceased in 2007 




government is doing and why, which, when combined with direct experiences with 
Amman’s municipal water services, generated strong and varying opinions about the 
corporatization process. Collectively, household opinions reflect a heightened awareness 
of and concern for accountability in municipal water services and in the corporatization 
process. 
On the one hand, corporatization was a meaningful and welcome intervention as 
an alternative to the public sector. Households note that municipal water services have 
significantly improved since 1999 because private water companies prioritize customer 
services and efficiency (Respondent Six 2013). One Jordanian-Palestinian man living in 
east Amman said, “the private company will give you your needs and will take from you 
its needs. But the government is different. Privatization is business and I do believe in 
business” (Respondent Eleven 2013). The public sector, on the other hand, is belied by 
the lack of incentives and measures that hold authorities accountable. The solution for 
this, they argue, is to allow private companies to oversee municipal water services with 
governmental oversight (Respondent Fifteen 2013). Indeed, many mentioned that public-
private partnerships and state owned enterprises provide the safest model (Respondent 
One 2013; Respondent Ten 2013).  
Others argued that general privatization and public private partnerships are not 
feasible in Jordan because the government is too weak to hold the private companies 
accountable (Respondent Seventeen 2013), which would negatively impact low-income 
households. One Jordanian-Palestinian woman from east Amman feared that corporate 
control over municipal water services would negatively impact families like hers, stating, 




They don’t care about the services” (Respondent Thirteen 2013). Indeed, the capitalist 
incentives involved in the privatization process compelled one to label the privatization 
process as “administrative corruption.” This Jordanian-Palestinian man noted,  
Privatization is administrative corruption. And it’s very easy to know that. If you lived 50 
years in Jordan, and every day they privatize a company, you won’t see any privatization 
for a failed company. They take the most profitable companies and they privatize it… 
 
Indeed, the government does not have an exemplary record of privatizing or 
corporatizing its public sectors, with several highly public incidents of corruption taking 
place during the privatization of the electricity and telecommunication sectors (Tomaira 
2008). This compelled a Jordanian-Palestinian woman to describe the process as an 
indication governmental corruption in transferring service responsibilities to particular 
private companies (Respondent Nine 2013). 
Collectively, the mixed-opinions regarding privatization, public sector 
management, and public-private partnerships reflect a strong concern over accountability. 
These opinions are partially informed by household experiences with municipal water 
services over the last fifteen years and public perceptions of governmental transparency 
over policy decisions. Indeed, the government’s fear of public backlash has played a 
strong role in shaping progress in water sector reforms. Yet, households are willing to 
accept higher prices and expressed a willingness to pay more while also offering varying 
opinions about reform programs. This means that the government could do a better job of 
understanding public sentiment and taking their experiences seriously in the policy 







Privatization programs in municipal water services have received extensive 
scrutiny, especially by critical scholars. In particular, scholars have highlighted how 
privatization introduces profit-incentives into water management (Swyngedouw 2005), 
which result in higher prices for urban consumers (Shiva 2002) and expose poorer 
communities to new mechanisms that regulate their use of water (von Schnitzler 2008; 
Loftus 2006b). These mechanisms dispossess poorer communities of access to water and 
over its regulation (Bakker 2010). The case of Amman, however, suggests that the focus 
on privatization processes and their outcomes interact with the design of the municipal 
water system to produce different experiences throughout the city. 
The design of the municipal water system plays a critical role in shaping 
household experiences and access inequalities, while corporatization processes can 
improve household experiences with water utilities through improved customer and 
delivery services. This is not an endorsement of corporate restructuring. Rather, the 
intention is to highlight the fact that, in some cases, corporatization can improve services 
for customers despite the fact that significant institutional and political constraints affect 
the water sector. Consequently, authorities must carefully understand how high fixed 
connection fees and Amman’s intermittent water distribution systems produce access 
inequalities. If the factors underlying these inequalities are not carefully considered, the 
proposed tariff revisions, a key element of the corporate restructuring process, will likely 
intensify the inequalities – as evidenced by the 2011 tariff revision.  
Indeed, the combination of limited water resources and institutional and political 




water system. Water engineers do not favor intermittent supply systems because it 
accelerates deterioration of water infrastructure. Yet, with few options for increasing 
water supplies to Amman, authorities were forced to standardize and systematize 
intermittent water distribution throughout the city. The CIP ensured that nearly all 
households are connected to the formal water networks and have weekly access to 
municipal water supplies. The ESDA, however, revealed a contradiction in that there is 
clear spatial clustering in where water is consumed and where revenue is generated in 
Amman while there are few differences in the average revenue per cubic meter and 
average customer consumption throughout the 314 sub-districts. This contradiction can 
be explained by the fact that customers billed often aggregates average households, 
despite their starkly different capacities to store and consume water. Household 
inequalities are compounded by pressure issues and other associated expenses. It is no 
surprise that households unable to afford their own water meter, expand storage capacity, 
or improve water pressure tend to be poorer.  
In light of these realities, households demand accountability from the water 
authorities. Households are already doing the best that they can to conserve water 
consumption and taking the necessary measures to ensure access to water. Jordanian 
authorities, on the other hand, have not been transparent in communicating about the state 
of the water sector and the reform programs. This has generated mixed opinions about the 
privatization of municipal water services. Democratizing the reform process and doing a 
better job of assessing public opinions and perceptions would alleviate the challenges to 
the water sector produced by governmental responses to public opinion. It could also 




the next phase of the ISSP risks more failure and the possibility of real discontent as the 
IMF pushes Jordan into revising its water tariffs. This underscores why it is important to 
carefully understand how the realities of and barriers to household access and 
consumption may interact with privatization programs. The failure to consider household 
















Chapter 6 Conclusion 
The question addressed in this dissertation is how have fifty years of municipal 
and national water sector development affected municipal and national water 
management and reform processes? Mainstream analysts argue that Jordan’s water sector 
suffers from a supply and demand mismatch, institutional overlap and mismanagement, 
energy scarcity, and poor financial management. These are compounded by regional 
conflicts and domestic challenges stemming from recurring refugee crises over the last 
fifty years. The push to corporatize Jordan’s municipal and national water services, which 
has been underway since 1999, draws heavily on these issues. The link drawn out 
between these problems and corporate restructuring as a proposed solution is generally 
framed through economic and engineering frameworks, with intent of depoliticizing 
water management. This approach, however, draws on economic and engineering 
frameworks that mischaracterize the institutional and political dynamics of the water 
sector’s operational systems and services.  
The case for corporate restructuring in Jordan thus merits reconsideration. Four 
bodies of literature on scientific representation and modernization, state building and 
water sector development, the political and economic histories of municipal water 
services, and corporatization and privatization of municipal water services provide 
insight into how and why Jordan’s water sector always seems to be in crisis. First, 
scholarship addressing the relationship between forms of scientific representation in 
development argues that hydrological, engineering, and economic frameworks facilitated 
politically charged modernization of state institutions and economic development 




Alatout 2008; Molle, Mollinga, and Wester 2009; Scott 1998). Scholars, however, have 
yet to draw on this research for explaining why privatization and corporatization continue 
to dominate global debates around water management (see Harris, Goldin, and Sneddon 
2013). This scholarship provides valuable insights on the ways that scientific, 
engineering, and economic frameworks depoliticize debates about municipal and national 
water management crises and privatization as a solution (see Mahayni 2013a).  
Second, related research suggests that while modernization programs were 
successful in building state institutions and increasing economic development, these 
initiatives produced social and environmental crises and changed local community 
dynamics and state and society relationships (Haines 2010; Baker 2005; Mosse 2003; 
Gelles 2000; Lansing 1991; Wittfogel 1981). This research, however, has primarily 
focused on economic development at the national level but does not address the 
relationship between state building processes and the development of municipal water 
services. Third, scholarship on the histories and dynamics of municipal water services in 
colonial and post-colonial eras suggests that elite and capitalist interests and western 
models of urbanization strongly shaped the evolution and dynamics of municipal water 
services (Kaika 2005; Joyce 2003) in ways that resulted in unequal access to water 
among urban residents (Dill and Crow 2014; Kooy and Bakker 2008b; Kooy and Bakker 
2008a; Gandy 2006; Swyngedouw 2004; Swyngedouw 1997). This research, however, 
does not attend to the political dynamics of state building. It is important to consider 
municipal water services evolved alongside national water sector development because of 





Fourth, researchers have also documented the creation, implementation, and 
immediate impacts of privatization and corporatization of municipal water services 
(Bakker 2010; Larner and Laurie 2010; Goldman 2007; Swyngedouw 2005). This 
scholarship shows that poor management practices, financial deficits, and deteriorating 
ecosystems (Swyngedouw 2005; Bakker 2003b) helped justify privatization programs 
throughout many cities in the global South to the detriment of municipal water services 
(Harris, Goldin, and Sneddon 2013; Bakker 2010; McDonald and Ruiters 2005; 
Swyngedouw 2005; Bakker 2003a; Shiva 2002). The extensive research on privatization 
of municipal water services, however, has largely failed to situate the dynamics of water 
management historically and deduce links between failures in the public and private 
sector management regimes. The historical relationship between state building and 
dynamics of municipal water services also provide a crucial context for understanding the 
dynamics and outcomes of privatization programs. Additionally, though researchers have 
extensively documented the ways that household access and autonomy over water 
governance are diminished through privatization programs (von Schnitzler 2008; Loftus 
2006b; Smith 2004; Smith and Hanson 2003), researchers have not sufficiently 
considered how the design of municipal water systems shape household experiences with 
water access and use (Anand 2011), nor have researchers examined how public opinions 
about water sector reforms and perception of government and private sector institutions 
interact with regime security concerns.  
Collectively, these bodies of literature help clarify the entangled challenges 
underlying Amman’s municipal water services and Jordan’s national water sector, and 




affirms claims made by Swyngedouw (2004), Bakker (2010), and Linton (2010) that 
water management should be seen as a process that unites social, economic, political, and 
ecological factors in ways that influence decision-making institutions and processes and 
dynamics of access to water. This dissertation advances the debates around municipal and 
national water management, state building, and reform with four theoretical 
contributions.  
First, economic, scientific, and engineering frameworks have been redeployed in 
the push to privatize and corporatize water sectors throughout the global South. While 
critical academics highlight the contexts within which reforms have been implemented 
and economic reasons for privatization, they do not carefully examine how these 
frameworks link water management crises and justify reform. Economic, scientific, and 
engineering frameworks were instrumental in building politically charged modernization 
programs, which often led to the degradation of environmental systems. Today, these 
frameworks depoliticize debates around privatization and corporatized water 
management through quantification of water supplies and demand forecasts. In the 
process, political and institutional constraints in resource management are treated as 
issues to be reformed through economic principles and more efficient engineering rather 
than as endemic characteristics of the water sector. Sound critiques of proposed water 
management reforms, therefore, must start with the framing of water management crises, 
particularly for how they simplify constraints and what these representations exclude.  
Second, state building and the development of municipal water services have 
been, and continue to be, interrelated and interacting processes. State building processes 




water sectors throughout the global South, and generated constraints to municipal and 
national water sector management. The financial, institutional, political, and 
supply/demand constraints are commonly experienced throughout the global South, 
hence the commonalities of privatization reforms implemented worldwide. The creation 
and evolution of these constraints, however, is path dependent. National and municipal 
water sector crises in Africa, Latin America, and Asia reflect the unique experiences with 
colonialism, modernization, donor involvement, and state/society relationships. Water 
sector institutions, therefore, must be situated within the histories of state building 
processes and development of municipal water services. This will shed light on the 
dynamic influence of institutional and political constraints on water management, and in 
turn, provide a basis for context-dependent water policy reforms. 
Third, governance dynamics, and failures, express the ongoing transformations of 
various formal and non-formal institutions involved resource allocation and decision-
making processes. Mainstream critics argue that privatization reforms fail because 
governments do not facilitate the success of governance as a decision-making process. 
Critical scholars, however, argue that governance debates tend to prioritize economic 
principles and priorities on services over equitable participation in water policy decisions. 
Both groups, however, do not acknowledge how governance dynamics reflect historical 
imprint of historical political, social, cultural, and economic factors on formal and non-
formal institutions. This imprint has changed over time through development programs 
and reform initiatives, and in the process been shaped by institutional and political 
constraints. Indeed, even if water policies are designed with attention to context, failing 




continued inequalities in water access and consumption, in addition to unequal 
participation in decision-making processes. 
Fourth, household experiences with municipal water systems are shaped by a 
combination of engineering, socio-economic conditions, and “soft-path” water policies. 
The engineering of municipal water systems interact with household socio-economic 
conditions to produce differential access and water use experiences. In particular, factors 
such as geography, modes of water access and storage, fixed infrastructure and 
connection costs, and variable water prices can lead to unequal water access even in the 
fairest water systems. Failing to understand these dynamics in the development of reform 
programs and water policies can force households to opt out of municipal water services 
in favor of non-formal, and often unhealthy, supply services. Further, household 
experiences have played a strong role in shaping perceptions of reform processes that 
have led to greater repression in some cases and postponement of critical reforms in 
others. As such, management regimes must attend to the household realities and the 
socio-economic constraints they face with respect to accessing water services.  
In the case of Jordan, reform dynamics and outcomes of privatization have been 
shaped by the longstanding effects state building processes on the national and municipal 
water sectors. Since the early 1960s, Jordanian authorities, with donor support, sought to 
build water sector institutions with an eye towards regime security. This led to the 
creation and evolution of constraints that have shaped, and continue to shape, the water 
management processes and water sector institutions. The corporatization reforms today 
are interacting with these processes, thereby blurring the differences between the 




corporatized, partially state-centered water management plagued by conflicting priorities 
and tensions within the water sector.  
Ultimately, authorities wish to create sustainable, adaptive, and resilient 
municipal and national water systems capable of addressing the persistent challenges 
plaguing the water sector since independence. By the end of 2014, however, a series of 
challenges related to access to cheap energy and the Syrian refugee crisis have set back 
reform programs generally, and specifically the ISSP. Granted, Jordan’s context has 
radically changed since corporatization reforms began in 1999 and the ISSP’s inception 
in 2011. These challenges, however, are not new. Rather, they have heightened the 
impacts of institutional and political constraints in municipal and national water 
management. Jordanian authorities are not interested in raising prices, reconfiguring 
institutional responsibilities, or reducing the central government’s political influence over 
the water sector because of fears of public unrest. This reluctance towards reform is 
longstanding, rooted in the history of state building and the desire for regime security, 
and in the process institutionalized constraints in the water sector. Authorities could more 
appropriately deal with these constraints by democratizing the reform process and 
exercising transparency about the water sector’s struggles.  
Nevertheless, the corporatization process appears to be charging ahead. In spring 
2015, USAID is expected to tender a second round of corporatization programs for 
Jordan’s water sector. One expert in the water sector industry believes USAID is unhappy 
with the ISSP’s progress on institutional restructuring (Policymaker Seventeen 2014). 
The tender was supposed to be released in fall 2014, but IRG’s contract was extended 




thus stand at odds. The expert suspects that USAID postponed the tender because the 
current minister wishes to restrict the second round of reforms to building capacity in the 
water utility companies and improving the state of water sector infrastructure while 
excluding a more politically contentious overhaul of the water sector’s governance 
systems, such as the water law and tariff reform.  
 This claim reinforces the importance of asking why Amman has been a continued 
target of reform and development projects. One perspective is that the previous projects 
failed because of poor implementation. This perspective reiterates mainstream economic 
and engineering frameworks that depoliticize the water sector. The second perspective is 
that institutional and political constraints inherent to its designs and operations means that 
reforms will always have to be on the table. The nature of water management and future 
prospects are always and necessarily politically-shaped by social, cultural, economic, 
engineering, and ecological factors, and, consequently, always under consideration of 
reform. The main issue is that problems such as non-revenue water rates, financial 
deficits, rising demand, low supplies, and other policy, economic, and engineering issues 
are not expressions of inadequately designed projects or poor implementation. Rather, 
they are symptoms of a more general crisis associated with the political and institutional 
design of the water sectors operations.  
Over the past fifty years, projects have addressed these issues without attending to 
the conditions that produced the crises in the first place. As such, the debates over public, 
private, or public-private management paradigms require reconsideration as past and 
current management regimes are inherently linked by the constraints endemic to the 




strong influence of the Council of Ministers, cannot be dismissed nor can they be re-
engineered by the creation of institutions, like the National Water Council, that 
streamline politically charged debates. Similarly, the imbricated development of 
municipal water services in Amman and state building priorities cannot be separated from 
regime security, rent-seeking through foreign financing, or prioritizing public 
appeasement. The same holds true for debates about the production of water supplies, 
development of municipal and national water infrastructure and transfer schemes, and the 
allocation of water to different sectors of the economy. These are not factors that get in 
the way of good management or governance. They are part and parcel of the managerial 
and governance contexts.  
This does not mean there is no hope for moving forward or that efforts should not 
be made for changing the status quo. Rather, this is a call for considering the fact that 
politics has been part and parcel of the development process at every point in the sector’s 
history at both the municipal and national levels. The social sciences, and geographers in 
particular, can play a crucial role in detailing the historical evolution and outcomes of 
water management and sector development in urban areas and at the national level. 
Additional research is needed to better understand the relationship between the political 
economy of urbanization and the development of municipal water services under 
privatization. It is somewhat surprising that scholarship on state building and the 
emergence and creation of municipal water services has not been more closely examined 
by scholars of the political economy of privatization in urban water services.5 Engaging 
the two bodies of scholarship provides an avenue for taking the contribution of social 
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scientists towards a more detailed understanding of how water sector crises are contextual 
and contingent. It also provides a unique avenue for participating in the mainstream 
debates in water management, which are primarily dominated by economists and 
engineers, in that comparative studies provide better understanding of how different 
contexts and constraints can interact to shape governance conditions.  
 Effective participation in mainstream debates, however, requires taking seriously 
mainstream analyses rather than merely deconstructing and dismissing them altogether. 
While it is important to bring a critical eye to the mainstream debates, it is also useful to 
use these debates as a starting point for discussion. The fact is that effective water 
management, engineering, and the application of economic frameworks require strategic 
simplification. Unfortunately, social scientists are often on the “outside looking in” rather 
than participating in the debates directly. Part of the problem rests with the fact that 
mainstream analysts often dismiss social science critiques. The other part, however, is 
that social scientists generate inaccessible critiques, which ultimately shapes their 
capacity to engage with water policy makers. It can be stated with a high degree of 
certainty that many policymakers in Jordan and internationally will not understand the 
“hydro-social cycle” because it does not resonate with their worldview. In the writing of 
this dissertation, there has been a concerted effort to avoid such terminology out of fear 
that it may be construed as jargon by those unfamiliar with the critical debates in the 
social sciences. The worldview of economists and engineers is indeed hegemonic and 






Limitations of the Study and Directions for Future Research 
 There are, of course, several limitations to this study. First, for reasons related to 
capacity, time, and finance, the study does not address the Jordan Valley Authority’s 
(JVA) role in the water sector. The JVA has been a critical part of the state building 
process since independence, as discussed earlier in the dissertation. Today, it is the key 
institution overseeing water production, management, and allocation in the Jordan 
Valley. Examining the role that the JVA plays in shaping water management dynamics at 
the municipal and national level would have greatly expanded the scope of this research. 
Doing so, however, would have required greater consideration of rural/urban tensions 
over water use. It also would have necessitated a more detailed and thorough assessment 
of the dynamic relationship between Jordan, Israel, and Palestine. Future research should 
address how institutions like the JVA have shaped and continually reshape the context 
within which water management is implemented. It is clear that water services at both the 
national and municipal scales link together many variables, many of which bring their 
own unique political and institutional challenges. 
 Second, the study would benefit from a multi-city comparison. Amman’s 
municipal water services are closely linked to WAJ operations elsewhere in the country 
through extensive water transfer programs. Additionally, the model of the private 
management contract and limited liability companies provide institutional precedence for 
future corporatization processes in Jordan’s municipal water services. Future research, 
therefore, should examine how Miyahuna compares to the corporatized utility in Aqaba 
and to WAJ-operated municipal water services in other cities such as Ma’an, Tafileh, or 




utilities to succeed under various institutional and political contexts in addition to 
providing needed evidence on whether or not corporatization is indeed the best path for 
Jordan’s municipal water services. 
Third, the study would benefit from a comparison with other mid-sized cities 
experiencing similar challenges to municipal water services. Regionally, such cities could 
include Damascus, Beirut, or Tunis. Other cities from the global South should also be 
considered. Indeed, there is a tendency in academic literature to offer blanket critiques of 
privatization and corporatization processes when the empirical evidence suggests that the 
implementation of such programs and their outcomes are much more diverse. Such a 
comparison, furthermore, would also generate critical evidence that could be used to 
challenge many of the “laboratory experiments” in privatization advanced by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For obvious reasons, a multi-city 
comparison would have been impossible to complete over the last two years, but it does 
provides a basis on which future studies can be modeled.  
Fourth, more household interviews and more diverse interview participants could 
bolster the arguments offered in the dissertation. Of the households agreeing to 
participate in interviews, only five of the twenty-three were conducted with females or 
included female participation. For many families, it is considered taboo for a mother or 
daughter to sit with a young man like myself without a male figure present. Most 
households did not restrict female participation explicitly, but I also framed the request 
for interviews to provide households with the autonomy to decide on who will 




households in order to clarify answers and ask new ones, though time constraints 
prevented this.  
Related, the GIS analyses in this study would also benefit from population data 
rather than customers billed. Households sharing a water meter are treated as one 
customer. More accurate data about average household bills and water consumption 
could be generated with specific population data for each sub-district. Further, household 
proximity to the location of water towers and underground reservoirs in the sub-districts, 
and more specific information of about the location of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
networks would shed further light on how these factors shape water consumption 
throughout Amman. A longer time-series predating the privatization process would also 
allow for a better comparison between WAJ, LEMA, and Miyahuna. Unfortunately, 
Miyahuna and WAJ did not make these datasets available for security reasons and 
population data was not readily available. Nevertheless, Chapter Five demonstrates the 
benefits of combining GIS analyses with household interviews. Future research on urban 
water governance dynamics should seriously consider how GIS and statistical analyses 
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Appendix I: Household Interviews 
Interview Location Identity Date 
Interview 1 Airport Road Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
May 19, 2013 
Interview 2 Um Uthaina Iraqi Refugee November 15, 
2012 
Interview 3 Bayadir Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
June 22, 2013 
Interview 4 Jabal Nadhif Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
February 2, 2013 




February 6, 2013 
Interview 6 Hay Nazzal Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
February 10, 2013 
Interview 7 Sahab Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
February 13, 2013 
Interview 8 Jabal Nadhif Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
February 15, 2013 
Interview 9 Hashemi Shamali Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
May 25, 2013 
Interview 10 Ashrafiyeh Iraqi Refugee May 18, 2013 
Interview 11 Weibdeh Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
May 20, 2013 
Interview 12 Jabal Amman Jordanian May 11, 2013 
Interview 13 Wehdat Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
June 4, 2013 
Interview 14 Abu-Nusseir Iraqi Refugee June 26, 2013 
Interview 15 Marka Iraqi Refugee May 29, 2013 
Interview 16 Marka Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
June 3, 2013 
Interview 17 Jabal Amman Jordanian May 30, 2013 
Interview 18 Um Uthaina Jordanian December 6, 2012 
Interview 19 Dabouk Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
June 13, 2013 
Interview 20 Abdoun Jordanian 
Palestinian Origin 
April 3, 2013 








Appendix II: Key Informant Interviews 
Interview Institution Title Date 
Policymaker 1 Jordan Water 
Company 
Miyahuna 
Technical Director December 12, 2012 




Project Directors October 23, 2012 






Advisor and Team 
Leader 
June 18, 2012 




December 7, 2012 







February 6, 2013 




April 7, 2013 







January 22, 2013 





June 13, 2013 
Policymaker 9 EcoConsult Managing Director May 12, 2013 
Policymaker 10 Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation 
Former Minister May 12, 2013 
Policymaker 11 Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation 
Director of Water 
Demand 
Management Unit 
April 18, 2013 
Policymaker 12 EcoConsult Technical Manager 
Water Supplies and 
Utilities 
June 12, 2013 





January 27, 2013 
Policymaker 14 Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation 









May 5, 2013 
Policymaker 16 Engicon Chairman May 30, 2013 




Policymaker 18 Mercy Corps Jordanian December 6, 2012 










Appendix III: Interview Protocol  
Policymaker Interviews 
1. Can you describe your work or responsibilities in the water sector? 
2. What do you believe to be the most pressing issues in the water sector in general? 
What do you believe to be the most pressing issues in Amman’s municipal water 
services? 
3. Can you describe your perspective on the working relationship between the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Authority of Jordan, and 
LEMA/Miyahuna? How has this relationship evolved over time? How do you 
think this relationship between the institutions an governance in general can 
improve? 
4. Can you evaluate Jordan’s transition to a more corporate-oriented water sector? 
What is the history of this transition? How did it start and why? 
5. How do you assess the water sector’s governance performance? 
6. How has the water sector been affected by regional and domestic changes? How 
have theses issues impacted reform? 
7. What is your long-term diagnosis for the water sector? Why? 
8. What is your opinion of the role of the minister? Does the frequent changes to the 
minister shape or affect the water sector? If so, how? 
9. What role does public pressure play in water management? 
10. How does politics shape water management? 
11. What would you reform or change in the water sector, and why? 
 
Household Interviews 
1. Do you rent or own your home? Where do you live? 
2. Can you please describe your water capacity at home? How much do you pay for 
water? Are you willing to pay more? 
3. What is your experience with Miyahuna’s services? 
4. What is your perception of the water sector and services? Are you satisfied or is 
there room for improvement? How can they improve?  
5. In the last 10 to 15 years, do you feel that municipal water services have 
improved? If so, why? If not,  
6. What communication do you have with the water sector? Do you receive public 
service announcements? 
7. Have you ever relied on a private water truck? If so, why? What was your 
experience? 
8. Do you feel there is a crisis in the water sector? What drives the crisis? 
9. How does the intermittent distribution system affect you? How often do you 
receive water? How do you store water? Do you face problems with water access 
and storage? If so, what are these problems and what are their causes? 
10. What is your opinion about privatization in the water sector? Are you familiar 
with reform initiatives? If so, how do you feel about these reforms? 
 
